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Part I
Introduction

Introduction and Summary of Research Results
1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis that started 2007, the earthquake in Japan with the subsequent and
ongoing nuclear catastrophe from Fukushima in March 2011 or the current European sovereign
debt crisis shed light on the complexity, interconnectivity and vulnerability of financial markets.
The financial crisis had its seeds in the decline of the U.S. subprime market, a relatively small
market segment. Due to securitization, the impact was widespread and shortly after also con-
tagious to other asset classes. Governments worldwide had to undertake costly interventions.
First, they had to bail out large financial institutions to avoid a complete collapse of the finan-
cial system. Second, they passed stimulus packages to mitigate the decline in the real economic
activity. The disastrous events in Japan were at the heart of a chain of disturbances in the
world’s supply networks. For instance, in the car industry, shortages of parts delivered from
Japan forced General Motors to halt production at some plants in the U.S. and Spain. Most
recently, the debt crisis in Europe illustrates the dangers which emanate from a small country
like Greece for the financial system or the global economy. In designing the rescue package for
Greece, politicians were very intent that private creditors voluntarily accept a loss of half the
value of the bonds not proclaiming a credit event. Such a credit event would trigger the pay-
ments of credit default swaps on Greece government bonds and therefore affect issuers of default
insurance. Since neither the amount nor the number of participating parties is ultimately clear,
authorities feared an unpredictable dispersion of losses and shocks also seen at the collapse of
Lehman Brothers.
All these described events have in common that singular or peripheral incidents induce widespread
disruptions to the provision of the entire respective system as the financial industry or manu-
facturing network or even have negative consequences for the whole economy. Researchers and
politicians have put the objective to identify and limit these systemic risks on their agendas.
This dissertation contributes to this discussion. More precisely, the four research papers that
constitute this doctoral thesis (i) study the underlying risks and consequences of systemically
important financial institutions in Switzerland and the United States, (ii) discuss regulatory
measures which limit these risks, (iii) propose a model for calculating losses due to production
disruptions in manufacturing networks, and (iv) compare different measures for the identification
of systemic relevant agents in a supply chain network.
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2 Summary of Research Results and Contributions
This dissertation consists of four research papers:
 The value of the liability insurance for Credit Suisse and UBS (with Mario Haefeli).
 To be ‘too big to fail’ - distorted liability insurance premiums across U.S. banks.
 Losses from time-structured supply chain disruptions (with Kamil Mizgier and Stephan Wag-
ner).
 Bottleneck identification in supply chain networks (with Kamil Mizgier and Stephan Wagner).
Their content and contribution are summarized in the following subsections.
2.1 The value of the liability insurance for Credit Suisse and UBS
The financial industry as a whole and the two big banks Credit Suisse (CS) and UBS in par-
ticular play an important role for the Swiss economy. More than 10% of the gross domestic
product is created by this sector. Moreover, total assets of the entire sector (the two big banks)
correspond to a sextuple (quadruple) GDP which is internationally one of the highest ratios (see
Swiss National Bank (2011)) and also reflect the concentration risk which emanates from this
industry. During the subprime crisis huge losses of UBS made it necessary for the government
to intervene. This intervention was not justified by a contract but by the pivotal role of the
bank for the financial industry and ultimately the economy as a whole (Expertenkommission
zur Limitierung von volkswirtschaftlichen Risiken durch Grossunternehmen (2010)) and is often
called ‘implicit guarantee’.2 Consequently, the survival of a systemic relevant bank is secured by
a state guarantee which is not reimbursed by the institution itself. There is a natural interest
of a society to determine the value of such a guarantee and discuss ways to limit the inherent risk.
In this paper, we estimate the implicit guarantee value for CS and UBS by calculating lia-
bility insurance premiums quarterly in a dynamic setup using data from 2004 through 2009. In
our liability insurance approach, debtholders, not the shareholders, are protected in the case of
a default and the bank is eliminated, i.e., its license is withdrawn. In other words, we compute
the guarantee value as if the guarantee for debtholders had been explicit. The calculation of the
guarantee value is based on the theory of valuing debt and deposit insurance by Merton (1974,
1977, 1978). We closely follow Lucas and McDonald (2006, 2009), who adapt this theory for
detecting the risk inherent in government-sponsored enterprises. The model detects the current
crisis by indicating high guarantee values for both banks, CS and UBS, in the years of 2008
and 2009, compared to the lower premiums in earlier years. For instance, for CS (UBS) we
obtain a maximum value of 21.3 (12.7) bn CHF in 2008. This is the premium the bank has to
pay for debt insurance for one year. Although these numbers seem to be large, compared to
profits, one has to take into account the reduced interest payments to depositors which would
2To be accurate: we call the guarantee implicit if there does not exist a contract between bank and guarantor
although there are reasons to assume that a guarantee exists.
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disburden the banks on the other side. The sensitivity of the results with respect to different
model specifications and parameters, e.g., jumps in the asset path or various volatility levels,
is analyzed. We conduct a policy analysis with respect to political and regulatory relevant and
frequently discussed measures, such as increased capital requirements or an augmented num-
ber of audits. Strengthened capital requirements and the increased number of audits reduce
the guarantee value substantially. A 2% lower liability to asset ratio induces reductions in the
highest guarantee values of roughly 13% (26%) for CS (UBS). With a higher number of audits
during the crisis the values for the put price are even diminished by a factor of roughly nine.
2.2 To be ‘too big to fail’ - distorted liability insurance premiums across U.S. banks
The second article of this thesis also considers aspects regarding the implicit guarantee from the
government for systemic relevant or ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF) institutions.3 Additional to the
contingent-claim approach which we already used for the Swiss case (see Subsection 2.1), there
exist a second approach for the valuation of the implicit guarantee. The cash-flow or spread
based approach estimates the refinancing advantage of a systemic relevant bank in comparison
to others. For instance, Baker and McArthur (2009) find in the U.S. a positive spread between
the average costs of funds of the two groups indicating that counterparties (debtholders) seem
to be able to distinguish TBTF and Non-TBTF institutions or are aware of the existence of
implicit guarantees and therefore require a lower risk premium. They state, but do not verify,
that if this gap is attributable to the government guarantee it implies a taxpayer subsidy for the
TBTF banks.
This paper studies cash-flow as well as contingent-claim approach for financial institutions in
the U.S. from 2004 to 2009. First, I investigate differences in refinancing costs of TBTF and
Non-TBTF banks using annualized quarterly interest expenses on debt as dependent variable.
After controlling for a range of variables which influence the refinancing costs of a firm, I find
evidence that TBTF firms could fund their operations under better conditions than their com-
petitors during the last two years, the time the U.S. government implemented an official TBTF
policy. In the second part of the paper, I revisit the contingent-claim approach. The estimation
is based on balance sheet data as total assets or liabilities and market data as market capital-
ization and equity volatility. Latter quantities are determined by the market perception about
risk and future returns, therefore are also influenced by the implicit state guarantee (see also
O’Hara and Shaw (1990), Cordella and Yeyati (2003), Lucas and McDonald (2009) or Peris-
tiani, Morgan, and Savino (2010)). I examine more closely differences in asset volatility between
Non-TBTF and TBTF banks and study the impact of the described endogeneity effect on the
level of liability insurance premiums across banks. I can show that premiums relative to total
assets differ substantially between systemic relevant and other banks during the crisis. In the
period from the first quarter 2004 through the fourth quarter of 2007, the difference in relative
3I use these expressions interchangeably, but are aware of the fact that systemic relevance can not only be caused
by size but also by interconnectivity.
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premiums between Non-TBTF and TBTF institutions is 0.23% on average, then it increases to
3.39%. If the gap is attributable to the TBTF policy of the U.S. government, one can argue that
the policy was successful in the sense that the guarantee value was relatively lower for TBTF
institutions than for the rest of the studied financial sector. The spread corresponds to an ab-
solute value of about $19.25 bn per year taking into account the amount of total assets from
TBTF financial firms during this time. Third, the average absolute liability insurance premiums
accumulated for TBTF institutions equals approx. $128 bn per year. The analysis of higher
capital requirements (target liability-to-asset ratio of 70% as in Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and
Pfleiderer (2011)) shows that the average amount can be reduced by around 40%, i.e., potential
bailouts should be much cheaper for tax payers.
2.3 Losses from time-structured supply chain disruptions
The last two papers of the dissertation deal with production disruptions in manufacturing net-
works. In contrast to the work on financial markets where banks are assumed to be already
identified as systemic relevant, in this part we are concerned with the loss dispersion in a sup-
ply chain network (third paper) and the identification of systemic relevance in the production
context (fourth paper).
As a result of fiercer competition, growing customer needs, accelerated globalization of mar-
kets and rapidly developing technology, almost all industries have experienced massive pressure
to make intrafirm and interfirm business processes more efficient and/or more responsive. Firms
outsource manufacturing, research and development activities, source in low-cost countries, re-
duce inventories and slack, streamline the supply base and collaborate more intensively with
other members of the supply chain. Naturally, the potential cost reductions and improved oper-
ational efficiencies achieved through these management decisions come at a cost: supply chain
networks (SCNs) are becoming large and densely interconnected, which increases the production-
inherent complexity and uncertainty. Therefore, predictions regarding output losses from pro-
duction breakdowns in the supply chain are difficult to make due to the insufficient knowledge of
potential hazard events, the interaction of firms and the dispersion of losses through the network.
A model for calculating the loss distribution of an appointed firm (in the following ‘focal’)
due to time-structured disruptions in a given production network is proposed. For each firm
in the network, we allow a variety of hazard events which can be idiosyncratic (e.g., machine
malfunction) or systematic and affecting more than one firm (e.g., natural catastrophes). We
describe the interaction of different hazard events on the firm level and account for the required
time for resolving the disruption using renewal-reward processes. The interaction and dispersion
of disruption losses across firms are obtained by incorporating the network topology explicitly.
The latter modeling aspect allows us to reproduce contagious effects; i.e., idiosyncratic disrup-
tions may affect other firms in the SCN by propagating through existing linkages among firms.
By incorporating systematic hazard events and the network topology (contagion), we cover two
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fundamental aspects of interdependency among firms in SCNs that are essential for estimating
the loss distribution from disruptions in each node in the network. We discuss the impact of
some basic diversification strategies on one stage (vertical) and across two stages (horizontal).
Vertical diversification can be very successful to reduce uncertainty. However, if we anticipate
also the effects of other stages the situation changes. Simultaneous production breakdowns on
different stages potentially prevent loss propagation and therefore horizontal diversification can
be disadvantageous. Clear statements in favor of diversification are more difficult than one could
expect. With the help of an implemented stylized example, we quantify the effects of different
model specifications or varying risk factors on expected losses and other risk measures. The
reconfiguration of the supplier base on the first stage can lead to substantial improvement of
the focal firm’s risk profile. In collaboration with a big insurance company, we specify the data
requirements which are necessary to calculate the losses with the proposed model.
2.4 Bottleneck identification in supply chain networks
As pointed out, the complexity of these networks makes predictions regarding output losses from
production breakdowns in the supply chain difficult. In particular, for focal firms it is essential
to identify their high risk suppliers. Supply chain risk managers are then enabled to reconfigure
the network structure or improve the resilience by introducing additional inventories to mitigate
or prevent contagious effects. In network theory, researchers have been working on ways to
condense the informational content of a network for a long time. They examined possibilities to
describe networks and identify important nodes in a network (see for instance Freeman (1977),
Brandes (2008), Opsahl, Agneessens, and Skvoretz (2010))).
In contrast to the conceptual work before, the aim of this paper is to compare a set of mea-
sures for the identification of bottlenecks in SCNs. First, we revisit some established measures
from social network theory, e.g., degree centrality or betweenness, and analyze them in the SCN
context where these are also used (see Kim, Choi, Yan, and Dooley (2011)). We highlight the
importance of the nature of the network connections. In SCNs these connections occur on dif-
ferent interaction levels, including information channels, flow of physical goods or in our case
loss dispersion induced by production disruptions. Consequently, the informative value can be
very limited. Second, we introduce a new methodology for an efficient and accurate detection
of firms in a SCN which potentially generate high losses for a focal firm in case of a disruption.
We use a simple version of the previous approach (Subsection 2.3). In a simple example, we
determine via Monte Carlo simulation the aggregate loss distribution for the focal firm. The
loss contribution of the individual firms and hazard events to total losses for the focal firm pro-
vides then a risk-adjusted measure. We compare all these measures and naturally find diverse
predictions. Our findings support the necessity of an accurate methodology since the results are
ambiguous and can be misleading for firm’s supply chain management.
7
References
Admati, A., P. DeMarzo, M. Hellwig, and P. Pfleiderer, 2011, “Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in
Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive”, Working Paper, Stanford University.
Baker, D., and T. McArthur, 2009, “The Value of the ‘Too Big to Fail’ Big Bank Subsidy”, Center for
Economic Policy and Research Issue Brief (September).
Brandes, U., 2008, “On variants of shortest-path betweenness centrality and their generic computation”,
Social Networks, 30(2), 136–145.
Cordella, T., and E. Yeyati, 2003, “Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect”, Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 12(4), 300–330.
Expertenkommission zur Limitierung von volkswirtschaftlichen Risiken durch Grossunternehmen, 2010,
Schlussbericht.
Freeman, L., 1977, “A set of measures of centrality based on betweenness”, Sociometry, 40(1), 35–41.
Kim, Y., T. Y. Choi, T. Yan, and K. Dooley, 2011, “Structural investigation of supply networks: A social
network analysis approach”, Journal of Operations Management, 29(3), 194–211.
Lucas, D., and R. McDonald, 2009, “Valuing government guarantees: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Revisited”, Measuring and Managing Federal Financial Risk. University of Chicago Press.
Lucas, D., and R. L. McDonald, 2006, “An options-based approach to evaluating the risk of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 53, 155–176.
Merton, R. C., 1974, “On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates”, Journal
of Finance, 29, 449–470.
, 1977, “An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees”, Journal of
Banking and Finance, 1, 3–11.
, 1978, “On the cost of deposit insurance when there are surveillance costs”, Journal of Business,
51, 439–452.
O’Hara, M., and W. Shaw, 1990, “Deposit Insurance and Wealth Effects: The Value of Being ’Too Big
to Fail’”, Journal of Finance, 45(5), 1587–1600.
Opsahl, T., F. Agneessens, and J. Skvoretz, 2010, “Node centrality in weighted networks: Generalizing
degree and shortest paths”, Social Networks, 32(3), 245–251.
Peristiani, S., D. Morgan, and V. Savino, 2010, “The Information Value of the Stress Test and Bank
Opacity”, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, 460.
Swiss National Bank, 2011, Financial Stability Report.
8
Part II
Research Papers

The value of the liability insurance for Credit Suisse
and UBS
Mario Haefeli, Matthias P. Ju¨ttner
A version of this paper is published in the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*
2012 Copyright by Mohr Siebeck
This paper was presented at:
• 8th Swiss Doctoral Workshop in Finance, Gerzensee, Switzerland (June 2010)
Abstract
Using an options-based approach, we compute the value of the state guarantee for the liability side
of Credit Suisse and UBS. Insurance premiums for these two system-relevant banks are calculated in
a dynamic setup from 2004 through 2009 in quarterly steps for time horizons of one and five years.
The model captures the characteristics of the current financial crisis and detects the bailout of UBS.
Strengthened capital requirements and an increased number of audits reduce the value of the guarantee
substantially.
*M. Ha¨feli and M. P. Ju¨ttner (2012), ‘The value of the liability insurance for Credit Suisse and UBS,’ Journal of
Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 168 (4), forthcoming.
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1 Introduction
Governmental interventions in the financial sector have been observed in many countries during
the current financial crisis. The systemic relevance of large institutions has necessitated the
bailout of many banks. It is often argued that rescue packages for banking systems were impor-
tant in stabilizing the alarmingly deteriorating liquidity in the interbank market and to prevent
spillover effects onto the real economy via the credit market. However, this policy has evident
drawbacks. More specifically, the state has to intervene in, and therefore to distort, the market
economy and to support private enterprises with the tax yield. Interventions which ensure the
survival of large banks may even encourage ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF) institutions to increase
their risky positions, because they enjoy a free state guarantee. This market discipline problem
makes future crises and interventions more likely. Although the government can protect the real
economy from turmoil in the financial sector, the expenses may increase the default risk of the
entire state. In Switzerland, the ‘too big to fail’ discussion changed rapidly to the topic of ‘too
big to rescue’, since the country is very small compared to the size of the banks and the poten-
tial rescue packages. The gross domestic product of Switzerland amounted to over 500 bn CHF,
compared to a total asset value of both banks of approximately 2400 bn CHF at the end of 2009.
To avoid situations where governmental interventions are necessary, different regulatory mea-
sures and institutional reforms are being publically discussed including raising capital require-
ments, stronger liquidity measures and increasing the number of audits. Moreover, splitting big
banks to obtain system-irrelevant-units, firm size restrictions, contingent convertible bonds or
setting up a rescue fund to bail out system critical institutions. However, these approaches have
undesirable effects. For example, more severe capital requirements are not able to exonerate
governments from the role of lender of last resort. It is unclear how to divide large banks or how
to identify the maximum size. Even though holders of contingent convertible bonds - in contrast
to equity holders - do not benefit from the profit chance of high risks before conversion and their
asking for adequate risk premiums may induce discipline in bank’s risk-taking, a well-established
market for these instruments and profound knowledge of its shortcomings are not yet existent.
For instance, financial stability of the entire banking system may deteriorate if banks hold their
contingent convertible bonds mutually to a large extent. Additionally, if debt is converted into
equity, this signal may cause investors’ panic and exacerbate share price declines. Hence, the
gained solvency is lost rapidly and the problem of governmental aid persists. Another solution
is to make the implicit state guarantees for large banks explicit, i.e., to impose a premium for
deposit insurance by the government. In this case, a ‘too big to fail’ bank has to pay for the state
guarantee accordingly to the size of its liabilities and its risk exposures. Consequently, banks
know that they will not be rescued in threatening situations, which solves the market discipline
issue, and deposits will be similar to safe bonds supported by the government, which reduces
contagion effects within the financial system. Hence, to avoid market discipline problems, one
assumes that in the case of a default, only the depositors or lenders to the bank are bailed out,
not the shareholders who decide upon an institution’s risk policy. It is not our intention to prop-
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agate the idea of deposit insurance since it also induces new problems. For example, if deposits
become safe bonds, the business activity of the bank changes drastically. Moreover, governments
have to expect moral hazard when banks have paid their premiums (see, e.g., Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
and Huizinga (2004)). However, to discuss the practicability of deposit insurance and indicate
an adequate premium, it is essential to know the approximate magnitudes of the pure guarantee
value without considering any externalities.
In this study, we focus on the Swiss situation and compute the guarantee value for Credit
Suisse (CS) and UBS quarterly in a dynamic setup using data from 2004 through 2009, as if the
guarantee had been explicit.1 In our liability insurance approach, debtholders are protected in
the case of a default, not the shareholders, and the bank is eliminated, i.e., its license is with-
drawn. Thus, considering deposit insurance, the emphasis is not on the various interventions
observed in the current crisis to ensure a bank’s survival. Its potential and costly resurrec-
tion after the default is not captured. The calculation of the guarantee value is based on the
theory of valuing debt and deposit insurance by Merton (1974, 1977, 1978). We closely follow
Lucas and McDonald (2006, 2009), who adapt this theory for detecting the risk inherent in
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), namely Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (F&F). These
financial institutions were created by the United States Congress. Nevertheless, the securities
carry no explicit government guarantee. Due to the implicit guarantee that the government
would not allow such important institutions to fail, the buyers of their securities offer them high
prices and lenders grant them advantageous interest rates. This implicit guarantee was tested
by the subprime mortgage crisis, which forced the U.S. government to bail out and put into
conservatorship Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September 2008. Although UBS and CS are
privately owned and not founded by the government, the implicit guarantee exists, just because
of the size of the banks and importance for the Swiss economy.
We extend the approach of Lucas and McDonald in a variety of ways. Contrary to their work,
we not only consider a single point in time, but determine the evolution of the guarantee value.
We calculate the guarantee value, the value at risk and the expected shortfall quarterly for the
time horizon of 2004-2009. Investigating the time before the financial turmoil and incorporating
a ‘tail event’ enables us to examine the entire dynamics of the model predictions throughout the
crisis. The model detects the current crisis by indicating high guarantee values for both banks,
UBS and CS, in the years of 2008 and 2009, compared to the lower premiums in earlier years.
For instance, for CS (UBS) we obtain a maximum value of 21.3 (12.7) bn CHF in 2008. This
is the premium the bank has to pay for debt insurance for one year. Although these numbers
seem to be large, compared to profits, because it is questionable whether one of the banks could
have afforded the premium payments in this time of distress, one has to take into account the
reduced interest payments to depositors which would disburden the banks on the other side. The
1Per definitionem, it is impossible to determine the value of the implicit guarantee, because the intervention is
uncertain and the implementation is unspecified.
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reason for this reduction is that the liability insurance induces a riskless bond to debtholders
who would have asked for higher risk premiums in this market situation. In the concrete case
of UBS, many creditors even withdrew their deposits. On the other hand, the guarantee values
seem to be low compared to the total insured liabilities. However, realistic loss given defaults
are much smaller than total amounts of insured debt. Additionally, we observe a decline in the
guarantee value for the UBS after the bailout in October 2008. The sensitivity of the results
with respect to different model specifications and parameters, e.g., jumps in the asset path or
various volatility levels, is analyzed. We conduct a policy analysis with respect to political and
regulatory relevant and frequently discussed measures, such as increased capital requirements or
an augmented number of audits. Strengthened capital requirements and the increased number
of audits reduce the guarantee value substantially.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the conceptual framework clarifying the
term implicit guarantee by differentiating it from the concepts of no or an explicit guarantee.
Moreover, we give an overview of the Swiss situation and describe the key figures of UBS and
CS. Section 3 discusses the existing literature. Section 4 is devoted to our model. Section 5
explains our data and the parameter specification for the benchmark scenario and presents the
results. In section 6, we analyze our model with respect to policy relevant parameters. Section
7 concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Terminology
To clarify the term implicit guarantee, we describe the two extreme cases of no guarante and
an explicit guarantee. We then discuss the gray area ‘in between’, which we call implicit. We
assume that the guarantor is free of default risk.
Figure 1 depicts the situation of a bank without a guarantee. We observe the usual concept:
debtholders receive the riskless rate and an adequate risk premium for the default risk of the
bank. We assume that shareholders have a limited liability, i.e., shareholders lose the invested
capital in default. Note that this case only occurs for institutions which are not ‘too big to
fail’ or not systemic relevant for another reason. We present the case of an explicit guarantee
for debt in Figure 2, since our paper focuses on liability insurance. Explicit means that the
bank and a guarantor agree about the risk transfer on a contractual basis, such that the bank
is able to offer a riskless bond. Hence, debtholders are not exposed to the default risk of the
debt issuing bank. In contrast, the guarantor has to bear the losses. However, she requires an
appropriate insurance premium. Shareholders have a limited liability, which implies that the
bank is eliminated after default. Figure 3 illustrates the case of an implicit guarantee. We call
the guarantee implicit if there does not exist a contract between bank and guarantor, although
14
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Figure 1: No guarantee: debtholders (DH) obtain default risk-adequate premium, shareholders
(SH) are liable with the invested capital
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Figure 2: Explicit guarantee: guarantor insures debtholders (DH) against losses in default, DH
have a riskless bond, shareholders (SH) are liable with the invested capital
there are reasons to assume that a guarantee exists.2 Therefore, the intervention is uncertain and
the implementation is not specified. The uncertainty of the intervention is represented by the
dashed line and is, for example, affected by the perception of systemic relevance and the ability
of the guarantor to afford the bailout. In Switzerland, CS and UBS are both assumed to be ‘too
big to fail’.3 This implies that both banks enjoy an implicit guarantee, where an intervention is
relatively certain. This fact was proven for UBS in October 2008. Generally, debtholders and
shareholders benefit from the potential guarantee. For instance, the bailout of UBS avoided the
bankruptcy of the institution and protected shareholders from a total loss and debtholders from
2It is possible that market participants suppose that a bank is systemic relevant and has an implicit guarantee
before default. But the guarantor may decide to let the bank go bankrupt in default. In this case, the implicit
guarantee exists until default, in our terminology.
3See page 16, Schlussbericht der Expertenkommission zur Limitierung von volkswirtschaftlichen Risiken durch
Grossunternehmen, 4. October 2010.
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damages in the case of a default. We previously noted the hereby also induced market discipline
problems. Additionally, debtholders receive a reduced risk premium, because of the anticipation
of the guarantee. Supplementary, shareholders profit from reduced refinancing costs of the bank
because of the implicit guarantee. One may argue that banks transmit their refinancing benefits
on to credit users, although it is debatable (see Passmore (2005)). The actual allocation of these
benefits depends on the form of the intervention (for instance, expropriation of shareholders or
capital injection) and frictions between the stakeholders (for instance, the partial transmission
of funding advantages). However, shareholders, debtholders and borrowers profit by the implicit
guarantee, whereas the guarantor receives no premium. In other words, the more likely the
rescue, the more grants the guarantor a subsidy.
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Figure 3: Implicit guarantee: debtholders (DH) and shareholders (SH) benefit from potential
bailouts; the guarantor does not receive a premium
As aforementioned, CS and UBS enjoy an implicit state guarantee. Our goal is to compute the
premiums for debt insurance of these two banks from 2004 until 2009, as if the guarantee had
been explicit.
2.2 Swiss situation
In this section, we briefly describe the prominent and pivotal role of the financial industry as a
whole and of UBS and CS for the Swiss economy in particular. As illustrated in Table 1, 12.70%
of the GDP of Switzerland is created by the financial industry. We note that this number does
not reflect the additional indirect value for the real economy through a financing infrastructure
provided by such a pronounced and diversified financial industry, especially for an export ori-
ented economy like Switzerland. UBS has 1340.5 bn CHF of total assets (end of 2009) and about
26 thousand employees. Hence, it is the largest bank in Switzerland. The bank is the biggest
asset manager worldwide (over 2000 bn CHF assets under management). Although one UBS
branch originates in 1747, the current structure and size are founded in the merger of the Union
Bank of Switzerland and the Swiss Bank Corporation in the year 1998, as well as the acquisition
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Table 1: Employment and economic value creation of the financial industry in 2006 for Switzerland
Employment Economic value creation
absolut in percent absolut in percent
(in mio CHF) (of GDP)
Banking industry 113’000 3.60% 40’735 9%
Insurance industry 48’000 1.50% 16’717 3.70%
Affiliated operations 23’000 0.70% n.a. n.a.
Financial industry 183’000 5.80% 57’551 12.70%
Source: Swiss Federal Department of Finance: Situation und Perspektiven des Finanzplatzes
Schweiz, Swiss Federal Statistical Office
of the US brokerage firm PaineWebber in 2000. Besides UBS, the other global financial player,
namely CS (1031.4 bn CHF of total assets and 1229 bn CHF of assets under management), em-
ploys more than 20 thousand people in Switzerland. More than 30% of bank lending to domestic
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) is provided by the two institutions. In former years,
about 3-5% of the Swiss GDP was created by UBS and CS.
In Figure 4, the development of total assets of both banks and of the Swiss GDP during the
last years is illustrated. The massive increase and decrease of the UBS’s balance sheet length is
striking. From 2003 to 2006, the sum of total assets of UBS and CS grew by 162%, a value of
1382 bn CHF.
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Figure 4: Asset development of UBS and CS
This was nearly the eightfold GDP up to the end of 2007, which is an exceptional relation with
respect to international standards. During the subprime crisis, the two big banks, especially
the UBS, were hit hard4 by the crisis. Both banks took measures to strengthen their resilience,
4During Q3 2007 up to Q1 2009 UBS losses accumulated up to 63 bn CHF.
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e.g., reducing risky positions, the overall size of trading portfolio and balance sheet. They raised
sizeable amounts of capital, for example, UBS raised capital in the early stages of the crisis.
However, in October 2008, it became necessary for the government to intervene. The primary
element of the rescue package for the UBS, put together by the Swiss government, the Financial
Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB), was the possibility
for the bank to transfer up to $60 bn of illiquid assets to a special purpose vehicle of the central
bank to facilitate their orderly liquidation. The Swiss government subscribed to mandatory
convertible notes in the amount of 6 bn CHF, and hence, strengthened the bank’s capital base.
2.3 Literature review
In this section, we provide a selective review of the literature. First, the different approaches
for determining the size of the guarantee primarily relevant for our work are presented. Then,
we document empirical evidence of market responses to the TBTF status of banks. Finally,
we briefly describe some of the theoretical approaches to describe the potential consequences of
government guarantees on market discipline or risk-taking.
The literature in the research on valuing loan or deposit guarantees is extensive. We cannot
present it completely. We identify two primary strains of the literature: contingent-claim and
market-based analysis. In the latter valuation method, traded securities with and without guar-
antees are compared. The price difference between these securities is interpreted as the implied
value. Hsueh and Kidwell (1988) study municipal bonds, which received a credit guarantee from
the state government resulting in a raise of the credit ratings of all bonds to the highest category.
Not surprisingly, they find that the savings in interest were the highest for bonds with very low
ratings before the credit enhancement. Passmore (2005) calculates the implicit guarantee value
to F&F (shareholders and homeowners) using a cash-flow approach. He estimates gross subsidies
from the borrowing advantage by comparing yields on financial corporate debt and debt of a
GSE. Baker and McArthur (2009) investigate the spread between the average cost of funds for
small banks and the cost of funds for systemic relevant institutions with assets in excess of $100
bn. They find that the gap widened in the period from the fourth quarter of 2008 through the
second quarter of 2009, after the government bailouts largely established ‘too big to fail’ as an
official policy. The evaluation of loan insurance using contingent-claim models is based on the
initial work of Merton (1977, 1978), following his research on corporate debt pricing (Merton
(1974)) by applying option pricing theory. Merton (1977) derives an options-based formula to
evaluate the cost on the guarantor for issuing a guarantee of bank deposits. This pricing model
is built on the isomorphic correspondence between deposit insurance and common stock put
options. The payoff-structure of the loan guarantee at the maturity date of the bond is identi-
cal to that of a European put option. Therefore, the Black and Scholes’ (1973) option pricing
techniques can be applied. Merton (1978) extends the earlier framework taking into account
explicitly surveillance costs and random auditing times. These additional default checkups are
an important feature used to make the model more realistic. It is unreasonable to interpret debt
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as a European put option with a maturity of 5 years without any audits and detections of default
in the meantime. Ronn and Verma (1986) use time series data on the variance and market value
of bank’s equity, as well as the book value of its debt, to infer the underlying variance and value
of assets and then arrive at a point estimate of the appropriate deposit premium from the put’s
value. Giammarino, Schwartz, and Zechner (1989) incorporate bankruptcy costs, suggesting
that it might be optimal for the auditor to not immediately force a bank to stop operations if
the asset value reaches the value of liabilities. They adapt the framework to Canadian banks.
Dermine and Lajeri (2001) anticipate the risk characteristics from the lending function of banks
and show that conventional insurance premiums underestimate the fair value. The implicit guar-
antee value and corresponding risk of F&F is also studied by Lucas and McDonald (2006, 2009)
using a contingent-claim framework analogue to Merton (1978) incorporating audits during ma-
turity. Guarantee value, risk neutral and actual default probabilities are computed via Monte
Carlo simulation and compared to the results with varying variables including asset volatility,
capital requirements, exogenous growth, monitoring frequency and debt adjustment rules.
The seminal papers of O’Hara and Shaw (1990) and Flannery and Sorescu (1996) investigate
different market effects in connection with the financial crisis, where the Continental Illinois
Corporation was involved in July 1984. The former authors investigate equity prices before and
after the Comptroller of the Currency testified that some banks were simply TBTF and that
total deposit insurance would be provided for those banks. Using an event study, they report
an average 1.3% abnormal return to common equity of TBTF banks. In contrast, Flannery and
Sorescu (1996) ask whether banks’ debtholders were rationally pricing bank-specific risks during
1983-1991. In a panel regression analysis, they find that when government’s willingness to in-
sure bank holders of subordinated notes and debentures (SNDs) declined over time5, debenture
yields reflected the specific risk of the banks as leverage and asset quality. Therefore, investors
became more diligent about pricing default risks when authorities stopped protecting financial
institutions.6 Morgan and Stiroh (2005) revisit the Continental case focusing on the relationship
between TBTF bond spreads and risk relative to other banks. In particular, they argue that
spreads and ratings will differ to the extent that investors and rating agencies disagree about the
probability of government support where they make the assumption that investors use ratings
as a proxy for risk. Their findings suggest that also the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991, which limits regulators’ discretion to support distressed
relevant banks7 did not entirely shake investors’ beliefs in TBTF, which put the results of Flan-
nery and Sorescu (1996) a bit into perspective. Rime (2005) also uses bank ratings to test the
5For instance, in 1991, debenture holders suffered losses when the Bank of New England or Southeast Banking
Corporation went bankrupt.
6Also Avery, Belton, and Goldberg (1988) analyze the relation between default risk premium on SNDs and
accepted measures of bank risk for the years of 1983 and 1984. They find no relationship. Few reasons for this
result are provided in Flannery and Sorescu (1996).
7For details about the FDICIA, especially in the context of the TBTF discussion, see the review of Wall (2010)
and references therein. This article was originally published in 1993, but due to the current crisis and discussion
was reprinted in 2010.
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presence of TBTF expectations, but these exclusively for the years of 1999-2003. Rating agencies
distinguish between issuer rating, that also considers possible external support, and individual
rating, that focuses on the intrinsic capacity of a bank for debt repayment. Therefore, the dif-
ference should also reflect the TBTF status of a bank. In a regression analysis, he finds that
variables, like total assets or market share, characterizing the TBTF status of a bank have a
positive and significant effect on the rating difference. Hence, any implications regarding the
impact on market discipline is dependent on the degree that market investors incorporate these
ratings into their investment decisions. Vo¨lz and Wedow (2009) examine the same question,
but consider investors on the credit default swap (CDS) market, i.e., the authors quantify the
potential distortion due to the TBTF expectation on CDS prices in 24 countries during the
years of 2002-2007. Their findings confirm that the spreads reflect banks’ risk and also a size
distortion. Spreads tend to be lower for banks with a larger size, relative to home country’s
gross domestic product. The consequences of the bailout policies on financial institutions, which
are not TBTF, are studied in the paper of Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2010). The authors
show that the risk-taking of banks outside the safety net increases significantly in the presence
of TBTF institutions. The argument is that institutions with an implicit guarantee benefit due
to lower refinancing costs, which enables them to offer more attractive conditions for depositors,
or obligors, with higher deposit or lower loan rates, respectively. Consequently, the fiercer com-
petition brings unsecured institutions to take riskier positions.
Though not directly relevant for our work, we provide a very selective overview of the recent
theoretical literature about market distortions created by government interventions in the finan-
cial sector. Cordella and Yeyati (2003) develop a framework in which the ex-ante announced
commitment of the authorities to bail out insolvent banks in certain unfavorable states of nature
induces a lower equilibrium risk level. A bailout is here ’not to withdraw’ the bank license and
payment of the outstanding liabilities in the case when the bank is not able and not willing
via recapitalization to meet its liabilities. In general, the potential bailout generates two oppo-
site effects: a market discipline problem and the so called value effect. On the one hand, the
probability of surviving depends less on the bank’s choice of risk and more on the supervisory
authority’s action, therefore, shareholders have an incentive to choose riskier asset portfolios
for maximizing expected profits, which of course, also increases the default risk. On the other
hand, governmental guarantees naturally increase the survival probability and future rents due
to lower refinancing costs, thus raising the charter value in the case of a default, which, in turn,
generates the incentive to protect it by reducing the asset portfolio risk. In the theoretical part
of their paper, Ennis and Malek (2005) analyze the impact of deposit insurance (full and partial
coverage), TBTF policy and the interaction of both on the banks’ decision process to attract
depositors. The authors also make the assumption of a probabilistic bailout (’constructive am-
biguity’), which is dependent on a bank’s size. The bailout itself is specified that all deposits
beyond the deposit insurance system are covered. One of the main policy implications they
can draw is that a tougher intervention regime, i.e., lower bailout probability for all bank sizes,
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induces the reduction of the equilibrium bank size and risk level.
3 Model
Based on the insights of Merton (1977), we use an option pricing approach for computing UBS’
and CS’ implicit guarantee. The idea is to evaluate such insurance as a European put option
on the underlying UBS or CS assets with maturity date of debt and with the future book value
of debt as the strike price. We compute the put option price via Monte Carlo simulation. In
accordance with Lucas and McDonald (2009), we incorporate negative jumps −φ ≤ 0. For a
standard Brownian motion W and a Poisson process N with intensity µ, the dynamics of the
asset paths are defined via
dAt
At−
= (rf + gt − δE0
A0
+ µφ)dt+ σAdWt − φdNt
which yields the risk neutral discrete time formula
At+h = At exp
(
(rf + gt − δE0
A0
− σ
2
A
2
+ µφ)h+ σA
√
h
)
(1− φ)Nh (1)
where h is the time step, A is the asset and E denotes equity. Subscripts represent time. rf is
the risk-free rate, gt is the externally financed asset growth, δ is the dividend yield on equity,
δE0A0 is the dividend yield on assets, σA is the volatility of the assets and  ∼ N (0, 1) is standard
normally distributed. The process N counts the number of jumps. If a jump occurs, we obtain
At = (1 − φ)At−. The term µφ corrects the drift for the average effect of jumps. If we neglect
the terms of magnitude o(dt), the probabilities of the occurrence or the absence, respectively, of
a jump in the interval between t and t+ dt are µdt or 1− µdt, respectively. In formulae:
P[Nt+dt −Nt = 1] = µdt
and
P[Nt+dt −Nt = 0] = 1− µdt.
Hence, it is a reasonable approximation to assume a Bernoulli distribution for the occurrence of
jumps between t and t+ dt.
Since the initial market value A0 and volatility σA of the assets are not directly observable,
we use the following equations which are based on Merton’s framework and which are solved
simultaneously for A0 and σA :
8
E0 = A0e
−qTN(d1)− L0e−rfTN(d2) +A0(1− e−qT ), (2)
σA = σE
E0
A0
(
N(d1)e
−qT + (1− e−qT ))−1 , (3)
8The last term A0(1−e−qT ) =
∫ T
0
qA0e
−qtdt in the first equation represents the accumulated dividend payments.
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d1 = (log(A0/L0) + (rf − q + σ
2
A
2
)T )/(σA
√
T ),
d2 = d1 − σA
√
T
where T is the maturity of liabilities, L0 is the strike price (initial book value of liabilities) and
q = δE0A0 is the payout rate of assets. Thus, we again use option pricing theory since equity can
be valued as a call option. The two advantages of this method are first, that one can avoid to
directly estimate the outstanding market value of the complex liability structure and second, one
does not have to use traded debt prices which already reflect the value of the implicit guarantee.
We assume the following evolution of the book value of liabilities L which adjust towards a
target liability to asset ratio at several different adjustment rates:
Lt+h = Lte
(rd+γgt)h + Itαth(λ∗ − Lterdh/At)At (4)
where αt denotes the annual rate of adjustment, λ
∗ is the target liability to asset ratio, It is an
indicator variable that equals 1 in a period where liabilities are adjusted and 0 otherwise, rd is the
growth rate of liabilities to cover promised coupons and γ is the fraction of externally financed
growth supported by debt. At some pre-specified dates we allow for audits which examine if the
asset liability ratio falls below the default trigger. If this case occurs, asset and liability processes
are stopped, i.e., the values are held constant and multiplied with the appropriate discount rate
until maturity. At maturity, we collect the put option payoffs max(LT −AT , 0) of all paths and
compute the put price as the expected discounted payoff.
For the correct interpretation of the put option price it is crucial to emphasize the impor-
tant role of the maturity. We suppose that all debt has a maturity of time T which is a strong
assumption. In order to get reasonable and realistic results, one calculates the mean of all the
different maturities provided by the bank. However, one has to be aware of the fact that the
put option price represents the state guarantee with respect to debt and deposits with maturity
T.
4 Benchmark scenario
4.1 Data and parameter specification
All initial firm specific values for our simulation are reported in the Tables 4, 5 and 6 in the
Appendix. As described previously, the initial market value of the assets and asset volatility can
be inferred by solving equations (2) and (3), where we choose the sum of the initial market value
of equity and the book value of liabilities as a first guess for the market value of the assets A0.
9
The benchmark scenario does not include jumps. The risk free rate is the Switzerland government
9We exploit the MATLAB routine lsqnonlin and ensure that A0 and σA are in the same range.
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bond yield (with respective maturity).10 For the dividend yield q we use the respective annual
yield for all quarters. Moreover, we employ the historical equity volatility, calculated as a rolling
63-day annualized standard deviation of equity price changes. Time to maturity T is set to
one year, since we are interested in determining the guarantee value for one year. Here, we
assume that debt is homogenous with a maturity of one year. This is a strong assumption,
recognizing that the debt structure of these banks is diversified with a variety of maturities.
With more information about the maturity structure, one could use the average maturity to
carry out the calculations. Later, we discuss the five year case to illustrate the size effects
of this change. In Figure 5, historical equity and corresponding asset volatilities of UBS and
CS are plotted. Not surprisingly, the volatility level is moderate up to the end of 2006. The
second part of our considered time period is characterized by great uncertainty expressed in
asset volatility up to 7% in 2008. The simulation of the asset and liability path (equations (1)
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Figure 5: First panel: equity volatility calculated as a rolling 63-day annualized standard
deviation of equity price changes. Second panel: model implied asset volatility with a debt
maturity of one year
and (4)) requires the specification of other parameters. The asset growth rate is determined
by the logarithm of the difference in total assets.11 Therefore, we adjust the asset growth rate
dynamically at every starting point based on the average growth rate of the last year by taking
into account the changing market conditions. A growth rate based on the long time average
would have drastically failed in the UBS case, where the balance sheet length roughly halved
during the years 2008 and 2009. The promised return on debt is determined by the fraction of
annualized interest rate expenses over the outstanding liabilities of the last quarter. We then
fix some parameter values for both banks (see Table 2), a procedure that is quite similar to that
10The treasuries are called ‘Obligationen der Eidgenossenschaft’.
11In formula: log
(
Total Assett
Total Assett−1
)
averaged over the last four quarters.
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in Lucas and McDonald (2006). It gives us the opportunity to compare our results and check
them regarding consistency.
Table 2: Parameter values for both banks and for all starting times in the benchmark scenario
Name Value
Jump intensity and size 0
Target liability to asset ratio 0.92
Debt proportion of external financing 1
Adjustment of liabilities to higher target 0.8
Adjustment of liabilities to lower target 0.4
Frequency of updating debt 252
Default trigger 1
Frequency of checking bankruptcy trigger per year 4
Time steps per year 252
Time to maturity 1y
Number of Monte Carlo simulations 40000
The target liability to asset ratio is set according to the Basel II framework to 92%, where we are
aware of the fact that Basel incorporates risk weighted assets or stressed recovery values to fix
the capital requirements. It is assumed that asset growth is completely externally financed by
debt. Liabilities adjust gradually and asymmetrically.12 The 80% annual adjustment up versus
40% annual adjustment down reflects the difficulty for a financial institution to deleverage in
times when asset values are declining. For the default trigger, based on the asset value relative to
book liabilities, we begin with a value of 1, which is checked four times annually. This is in line
with the current Swiss regulatory framework13, where banks inform the Swiss Financial Market
Supervisory Authority (FINMA) quarterly about their capital resources. Since we obtain the
equity volatility based on daily data, we also run the simulation with 252 time steps annually. To
include stressed markets, Lucas and McDonald (2006) raise volatilities by four times its normal
level when assets fall to 101% of liabilities, taking into account increasing volatilities during these
times. We assume this procedure occurs over the period of moderate market conditions (2004-
2007). In turbulent times (2008-2009), we adjust this approach by halving the volatility when
assets increase to 110% of the liabilities. The identification of financially stressed, or unstressed,
times takes place in every time step of the simulation.
4.2 Results
The results, namely guarantee value, value at risk (VaR) at a confidence level of 95% and the
corresponding expected shortfall (ES) for CS and UBS with respect to one year over the time
period 2004 to 2009 (quarterly) are reported in Table 3. The first two years are characterized
by values almost all equal to zero. During 2006 and 2007, the guarantee value and VaR are also
12In equation (4) we set It ≡ 1. Hence, the liabilities are adjusted in each time step, which is typically each day.
13See Article 13, ERV (Eigenmittelverordnung).
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quite low, where we first note that it is reasonable to calculate the ES considering the tail risk.
Second, the increasing numbers for the ES in the last two quarters of 2007 can be linked to the
start of the subprime crisis with rising market uncertainty. In Figures 6 and 7, we present the
guarantee value development in connection with firm specific events. Although we are aware of
the limitations of our approach, particularly a comparison of CS and UBS in the third and fourth
quarter of 2008 is remarkable. Up through the bailout on October 16th in 2008, the insurance
premiums for UBS were higher than for CS. In the fourth quarter of 2008, all measures for
UBS roughly bisect and had lower values than CS for the rest of the considered period. We
think that this risk reduction can be partly explained by making the implicit state guarantee
certain throughout the bailout. The contrary and high level values for CS, where, e.g., the ES
in the fourth quarter of 2008 is five times higher than in the third quarter and the put price
for CS in the fourth quarter is less than twice as high as the UBS value in the third quarter,
are puzzling. An explanation is the increasing uncertainty on the CS side (see also Figure 5) –
possibly increased since, at this point in time, the situation at the bank was not clear as well
as whether Switzerland could have afforded another bailout. Note, the results are dependent
on market variables, like market capitalization of equity and equity volatility. Both quantities
are determined by the market risk perception, and therefore, are also influenced by the implicit
state guarantee, which is anticipated by market participants, to some extent. We suppose that,
for instance, the observed market capitalization of equity would be lower without an implicit
guarantee. Hence, the premiums would be higher for the banks.
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Figure 6: Guarantee value CS in the benchmark scenario (mio CHF). The text modules document
the most important firm-specific events
5 Sensitivity and policy analyses
In this section, we check the robustness of our results with respect to changes in volatility and
time to maturity and investigate the political relevant monitoring measures leverage ratio and
25
Table 3: Results of the benchmark scenario. All values for the guarantee value (put price), value
at risk (VaR) at a confidence level of 95% and corresponding expected shortfall (ES) are
reported in mio CHF.
CS UBS
Time Guarantee VaR ES Guarantee VaR ES
value (95%) value (95%)
2004 Q1 0 0 30 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 0 0 0 0
2005 Q1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Q4 0 0 10 0 0 0
2006 Q1 10 0 160 0 0 0
Q2 70 0 1440 188 0 3781
Q3 0 0 40 7 0 135
Q4 0 0 0 9 0 179
2007 Q1 20 0 500 13 0 254
Q2 0 0 90 39 0 778
Q3 240 0 4730 345 0 6931
Q4 0 0 70 268 0 5377
2008 Q1 1170 9000 19960 2033 16325 31380
Q2 10 0 170 224 0 4504
Q3 1230 8370 21880 12682 73088 98144
Q4 21340 93860 117830 5173 38183 57373
2009 Q1 2770 21860 36390 1402 9980 24527
Q2 380 0 7610 192 0 3852
Q3 0 0 70 2 0 33
Q4 0 0 40 0 0 3
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Figure 7: Guarantee value UBS in the benchmark scenario (mio CHF). The text modules
document the most important firm-specific events
number of audits. The latter explorations are highly important for regulatory implications.
5.1 Jumps
Our benchmark case assumes continuous asset paths. To introduce stress situations in the form
of price drops on the asset side, we compute the guarantee values of CS and UBS for several
discontinuity scenarios of the asset path. As described in the model section, we incorporate
negative jumps if the two parameters φ and µ are positive. Tables 7 and 8 present the liability
insurance premiums for one year and the corresponding expected shortfalls for the (annualized)
intensities µ = 252 ∗ 0.004 = 1.008 and µ = 252 ∗ 0.001 = 0.252, respectively, and jump sizes of
φ = 0.01 and φ = 0.05, respectively. Hence, we investigate daily jump probabilities of 0.4% and
0.1% and collapses of the asset path of 1% and 5%.
First, we observe that jumps, i.e., the anticipation of plunges on the asset side, generally have a
substantial augmenting impact on guarantee values. Second, increasing the jump size leads to
remarkable increases in the values. For example, guarantee values for UBS are zero for φ = 0
(benchmark case) and φ = 0.01 in the first quarter of 2005, whereas they achieve values of 1.8
bn CHF and 8.33 bn CHF for jump sizes of 5%. Third, the effect of increasing intensities is
also observable: guarantee values are generally greater with higher intensity. Fourth, the impact
of jumps is enormous in the years of 2004 through 2007, before the crisis. They are moderate
during the turbulent times in the years of 2008 and 2009. The reason for this result are different
volatility adjustment regimes for different market situations in our model, which are described in
the data and parameter specification subsection and intend to avoid unrealistic volatility values.
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In summary, our results yield a clear monotonic relationship between jump size and inten-
sity, on the one hand, and guarantee values, on the other hand. More specifically, the higher
the expected negative jumps or the greater the intensity of the jumps, the higher the guarantee
values.
5.2 Volatility
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the sensitivity analysis of the guarantee value with respect to the asset
volatility. The shaded area represents the put price for one year for different asset volatilities
between 0.9 and 1.1 times the benchmark volatility.
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Figure 8: Guarantee value CS and deviation caused by changes in asset volatility. The area plot
illustrates the guarantee value for asset volatilities between 0.9 and 1.1 times the ones induced
by the benchmark scenario
In 2008, the difference of the guarantee value induced by the low (-10% compared to the bench-
mark case) and the high (+10%) asset volatility is at most 5 bn CHF for both banks and up
to one third of the high value in percentage for UBS. In previous years, the difference of at
most 500 mio CHF is much smaller in absolute terms. However, the high guarantee value is 4.5
times larger than the low one for CS in the third quarter of 2007. Thus, we find that the put
price is more sensitive in percentage terms to asset volatility variations before the crisis than in
turbulent times.
Having discussed the effects of an asset volatility band width around the benchmark, we also
want to describe alternative specifications for the historical equity volatility, which influence the
estimation of the asset volatility. We decided to incorporate the last quarter of equity price
changes for calculating the benchmark volatility, because we also determine guarantee values
quarterly, therefore always using a new information set without overlap. However, other time
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Figure 9: Guarantee value UBS and deviation caused by changes in asset volatility. The area plot
illustrates the guarantee value for asset volatilities between 0.9 and 1.1 times the ones induced
by the benchmark scenario
intervals are possible. We report the numerical values for a rolling 10-, 63-, 126- and 252-days
window for both banks in Table 9 in the Appendix. In Figure 10, we see the corresponding
premium evolutions for CS.14
As expected, longer time horizons naturally smooth the premium development, since erratic
changes become less important, but more persistent, with a longer time horizon. This effect is
readily identifiable on the right side of Figure 10. The peak of the premium evolution moves
from the third quarter of 2008 to the second quarter of 2009 on a diminishing level, where the
relative changes are less dramatic. In the benchmark case, the premium drops after reaching
the maximum by about 88%, whereas the decline for the 252-day horizon occurs nine months
later and is just about 65%. If we compare the premiums integrated for the years 2004-2009
across the volatility specifications (see Table 9) we observe, for both banks, a bisection of the
benchmark amount with the 252-days calculation horizon.
5.3 Maturity
In the benchmark scenario, we assumed a homogenous debt structure for both banks with a
maturity of one year. We indicated that we have no information about the maturity structure
of the liability side of these institutions.15 Therefore, we discuss the case where debt maturity
is elongated to five years. The bank is also insured for the same period. In the Appendix, Table
14We depict here only the bank CS, because the UBS value in the third quarter of 2008 for the 10-day window
reached a high level, which distorts the graphical illustration.
15In Lucas and McDonald (2006), it is assumed that debt with an average maturity of 2.65 years (for Fannie Mae)
is rolled over for the studied guarantee period of ten years.
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Figure 10: Guarantee values refering to a historical equity volatility respectively calculated as a
rolling 10-, 63-, 126- and 252-days annualized standard deviation of equity price changes for CS
10, we report the results of the guarantee value and ES for both cases. The obtained guarantee
values (ESs) range up to 170 bn (480 bn) CHF during the turbulent times, which is roughly
the decuple of the benchmark scenario. These drastic changes can be explained by higher asset
volatilities (solving equations (8) and (9)) and higher uncertainty due to the longer horizon.
5.4 Leverage ratio
A decrease of the target liability to asset ratio from 92% in the benchmark scenario to 90% is in
line with the current discussion about strengthened capital requirements for banks in Switzer-
land and other countries. Table 11 in the Appendix presents the guarantee value and expected
shortfall for the benchmark case and for the lower ratio. The result is highly relevant with re-
spect to regulatory implications and illustrates that increased capital requirements significantly
reduce the guarantee value for both banks. For instance, the largest value for CS in the fourth
quarter of 2008 declines from 21.3 bn CHF in the benchmark scenario to 18.6 bn CHF. In the
first and second quarter of 2007, the guarantee value for UBS diminishes even thirteen times,
compared to the benchmark case.
As in the investigation of asset volatility, we find a similar phenomenon: the percentage dif-
ferences between a target liability to asset ratio of 92% and 90% are larger in the years before
the crisis. Leverage rates of CS and UBS were around 0.98 in terms of total assets. If we increase
the target liability to asset ratio to 98%, we obtain maximum guarantee values of 33.3 bn CHF
for CS in the fourth quarter of 2008 and 28.9 bn CHF for UBS in the third quarter of 2008. All
values of the years 2004 until 2009 are presented in Table 11 and are substantially higher than
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in the benchmark case.
Although the result suggests stronger capital requirements, one has to be aware of the fact
that the model does not consider the market for illiquid assets and the issue of ‘fire sales’ of
these assets in times of financial distress, as discussed in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009),
Cifuentes, Shin, and Ferrucci (2005). Hence, our model ignores funding and market liquidity
risk, but focuses on solvency risk. The current crisis has shown that more rigorous liquidity
measures are necessary. The liquidity aspects cannot be captured by this approach. Note that
our results depend on the comparison of already established capital adequacy constraint regimes.
The adjustment of stronger capital ratios needs time and the implementation has to occur in
appropriate market situations. Hence, the model does not provide the optimal point in time of
an increase in capital requirements.
5.5 Audits
In our benchmark scenario, the regulatory authority FINMA was assumed to check the bankruptcy
trigger quarterly. This is the typical frequency during normal times. Here, we study the effects of
an increasing number of audits. The authority is allowed to conduct monitoring on a daily basis,
especially during a stressed market environment (see, for instance, EBK-Bankinsolvenzbericht
2008). We adapt the specification from the volatility adjustment. As soon as the asset path
falls to 101% of the liabilities, the bankruptcy trigger is monitored, additional to the four audits
annually. Thereby, we increase the number of audits and detect more defaults. But, the losses
given default will be smaller, since the regulator is able to cut off rapidly growing losses. In Table
12, we can see the dramatically reduced values for the put price and ES. Especially during the
years of the financial crisis, the effects are very pronounced, which indicates that the described
boundary is undercut more often. The most extreme case can be observed in the fourth quarter
of 2008, where the ES of CS decreased to 2% of the former value. This value is also only slightly
higher than the guarantee value, i.e., the regulatory authority stopped the business more or less
directly, because no bigger losses could accumulate.
6 Conclusions
We quantify the guarantee value for the liability side of UBS and CS in a dynamic setup from
2004 until 2009. The model is based on option pricing theory and the computations are con-
ducted quarterly to obtain the guarantee value, the value at risk and the expected shortfall four
times a year. We provide the results for time horizons of one and five years, i.e., we assume that
debt has a maturity of one or five years, respectively, and that the deposit insurance will last
during this time period. The results indicate zero premiums for 2004 and 2005. The high levels
of the guarantee value, as of 2008, are up to 22 bn CHF for CS and 13 bn CHF for UBS in the
benchmark scenario. Hence, the model clearly captures the current financial crisis, which be-
came apparent in the beginning of 2007. However, already in 2006, the guarantee values for both
31
banks start to increase, which may reveal the detection sensitivity of the model with respect to
the upcoming financial turmoil. Interestingly, whereas the guarantee value for UBS is typically
larger than for CS until third quarter of 2008 in the benchmark scenario, the value for CS is
four times greater after the bailout of UBS in October 2008. We may explain this finding with
the ability of the model to identify the governmental rescue of UBS. The policy analysis yields
a reduction of the guarantee value with respect to increased target liability to asset ratio and
stress-adjusted number of audits. Hence, our results support the regulatory measures applied
and discussed in the current situation. The practical implementation of the deposit insurance
with the obliged premium payments according to the calculated guarantee values is an open
issue. First, the cyclical model obviously generates the highest values during crisis times, where
banks are short of capital and therefore are possibly not able to pay the fees. Second, the low
values during unstressed situations may not allow the insurer to accumulate sufficient reserves
for the potential depositor bailout.
Finally, we refer to the topic of executive compensation. As long as the state provides an
implicit guarantee to large banks, it is difficult to argue that only shareholders are allowed to be
concerned about managers’ compensation. Chesney, Stromberg, and Wagner (2010) find that
incentives to take asset risk can be large compared to incentives to increase the value of assets
even if CEOs are mainly compensated with stocks instead of stock options. Our work empha-
sizes the strong impact of asset volatility and hereby asset risk on the guarantee value. Hence,
the reduction of risk-taking incentives in compensation packages may be a valid concern raised
by the state in order to reduce the costs of an implicit guarantee.
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To be ‘too big to fail’ - distorted liability insurance
premiums across U.S. banks
Matthias P. Ju¨ttner
Abstract
In this paper I address several questions in the context of estimating the value of the implicit guarantee
of financial institutions which are considered as ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF). First, I investigate more closely
the often assumed refinancing advantage of TBTF institutions. Comparing quarterly interest expenses
across U.S. banks during 2004-2009, I find evidence that TBTF banks were able to refinance under more
favorable conditions than Non-TBTF institutions during 2008-2009. Second, I revisit an options-based
approach for computing the liability insurance premium. Some input parameters as asset volatility are
determined by the market perception about risk and future returns. Therefore, the estimated premiums
should also reflect the TBTF status of a bank and therefore distort the level of the insurance premium.
I analyze the magnitude and dynamic of emerging differences in insurance premiums relative to total
assets between TBTF and Non-TBTF banks. Third, I study the absolute level of these premiums and
the impact of higher capital requirements.
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1 Introduction
Authorities all over the world implemented different measures including liquidity provision or
stimulus packages to stabilize the financial system and to mitigate the decline in real economic ac-
tivity during the financial crisis. Beside these general measures, there were bailouts necessitated
by the systemic relevance of large so called ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF) banks. These interventions
were not justified by a contract but by the pivotal role of these institutions for the financial
industry and ultimately the economy as a whole and is often called implicit guarantee. There
exist two competing approaches for the valuation of the implicit guarantee. The cash-flow ap-
proach estimates the refinancing advantage of a systemic relevant bank in comparison to others.
In contrast, the contingent-claim approach determines the fair premium for insuring the liabil-
ity side of a bank. Therefore, the implicit guarantee is interpreted as exclusive liability insurance.
This paper studies both approaches for the financial sector in the United States (U.S.) from
2004 to 2009. First, I investigate differences in refinancing costs of TBTF and Non-TBTF banks
using annualized quarterly interest expenses on debt as dependent variable. After controlling
for a range of variables which influence the refinancing costs of a firm, I find evidence that
TBTF firms could fund their operations under more favorable conditions than their competitors
during the last two years, the time the U.S. government implemented an official TBTF policy.
In the second part of the paper, I revisit the contingent-claim approach which is based on the
work of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) on debt pricing. The estimation of the
liability insurance premium – used as a proxy for the implicit guarantee value – is based on
balance sheet data as total assets or liabilities and market data as market capitalization and eq-
uity volatility. Latter quantities are determined by the market perception about risk and future
returns, therefore are also influenced by the implicit state guarantee. I examine more closely
differences in asset volatility between Non-TBTF and TBTF banks and study the impact of the
described endogeneity effect on the level of liability insurance premiums across banks. I can
show that premiums relative to total assets differ substantially between systemic relevant and
other banks. If the gap is attributable to the TBTF policy of the U.S. government, one can
argue that the policy was successful in the sense that the guarantee value was relatively lower
for TBTF institutions than for the rest of the studied financial sector. In the last part of my
work, the evolution of absolute premiums accumulated for TBTF institutions is studied. The
analysis of higher capital requirements (target liability-to-asset ratio of 70%) shows that the
average amount of liability insurance premiums can be reduced by around 40%, i.e., potential
bailouts should be much cheaper for tax payers.
The paper contributes to an important topic and a large literature (see Section 2) in several
ways. Baker and McArthur (2009) find in the U.S. a positive spread between the average costs
of funds of the two groups indicating that counterparties (debtholders) seem to be able to dis-
tinguish TBTF and Non-TBTF institutions and therefore require a lower risk premium. They
state, but do not verify, that if this gap is attributable to the government guarantee it implies a
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taxpayer subsidy for the TBTF banks. I use a different data set, conduct a rigorous analysis and
find consistent results. For the second approach, I closely follow Lucas and McDonald (2006,
2009), who extend and adapt the work of Merton (1974, 1977) for detecting the risk inherent
in government-sponsored enterprises (GSE). In contrast to former authors, I am interested in
the impact of the described endogeneity on the liability insurance premiums. For completeness
I discuss the absolute premium development, also in the light of proposed regulatory changes,
at the end.
The stated endogeneity effect can be justified by two channels: market discipline and char-
ter value (see Cordella and Yeyati (2003)). The interest rate a bank pays for its deposits or debt
in general should reflect the possibility of losses on debt in case of a bankruptcy (risk premium).
By removing these possible losses by a total debt insurance or preventing the default itself,
bank’s creditors have a lower incentive to monitor the risk policy and therefore do not demand
adequate risk premiums (Flannery and Sorescu (1996)). In contrast to an explicit guarantee,
I call the guarantee implicit if there does not exist a contract between bank and guarantor al-
though there are reasons to assume that a guarantee exists. The intervention is uncertain and
the implementation is not specified. Therefore, it is unlikely and also not observed in reality that
the whole risk premium can be avoided, i.e., TBTF banks would pay only a risk-free rate. How-
ever, there is evidence (see Section 2 and Subsection 5.1) that TBTF institutions pay a reduced
interest rate compared to Non-TBTF banks and consequently the initial circumstances for the
two channels are given. On the one hand, shareholders are probably encouraged to increase
the risk profile of the company, because cost of funds are not totally tied to the riskiness and
often also shareholders are bailed out. The non-specification which goes along with the missing
contractual framework makes it difficult to infer definite consequences, but as we have seen the
free implicit state guarantee induces market discipline problems with respect to shareholders
and debtholders. On the other hand, since the guarantee is not paid by the shareholders this
should directly increase profits. This makes the firm more valuable because as long as the in-
stitution exhibits the TBTF status it is able to generate a dividend stream of lower refinancing
costs. In a reverse conclusion, this channel induces decreased risk-taking for protected banks
(and higher risk-taking for competitors as Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel (2010) show), because
in the default case without bailout – which is possible with a certain probability since the im-
plicit guarantee is not certain and specified – the TBTF institution loses future rents from lower
refinancing costs and therefore has an incentive to protect the charter value. The resulting di-
rection of these two effects is not clear. In Subsection 3.2, I revisit Lucas and McDonald (2009)
and describe the implications for asset volatility. Later in the empirical part, we can observe
differences in asset volatility but also in the relative guarantee premiums between Non-TBTF
and TBTF banks.
This paper is organized as follows. I give a short literature review in Section 2. Section 3
provides a model description, presents the implications of the TBTF status for the asset volatil-
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ity and discusses differences of both approaches. Section 4 gives an overview of the data and
the parameter specification for the simulation. The results are analyzed in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 Literature review
I present a selection of the comprehensive literature review of Haefeli and Ju¨ttner (2010). In
particular the documented empirical evidence of market responses to the TBTF status of banks
and interrelated market discipline consequences are relevant. The different approaches for de-
termining the size of the guarantee are presented at the end.
The seminal papers of O’Hara and Shaw (1990) and Flannery and Sorescu (1996) study dif-
ferent market effects in connection with the financial crisis involved the Continental Illinois
Corporation in July 1984. Former authors report an average 1.3% abnormal return to common
equity of TBTF banks. This result indicates that the market believed that government policy
would protect bank owners from at least some types of financial difficulties. In contrast, Flannery
and Sorescu (1996) ask whether banks’ debtholders were rationally pricing bank-specific risks
during 1983-1991. They find that when government’s willingness to insure bank subordinated
debtholders declined over time, debenture yields reflected the specific risk of banks as leverage
and asset quality. Morgan and Stiroh (2005) focus on the relationship between TBTF bond
spreads and risk relative to other banks. Their findings suggest that also the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991 - which limits regulators’ discretion
to support distressed relevant banks1 - did not entirely shaken investors’ beliefs in TBTF which
put the results of Flannery and Sorescu (1996) a bit into perspective. Rime (2005) uses bank
ratings to test the presence of TBTF expectations. Vo¨lz and Wedow (2009) examine the credit
default swap (CDS) market, i.e., the authors quantify the potential distortion due to TBTF
expectation on CDS prices. Spreads tend to be lower for banks with a larger size relative to
home country’s gross domestic product. A more recent study of Peristiani, Morgan, and Savino
(2010) detects bank investors’ and counterparties’ ability to judge bank solvency during the
current crisis. They find that the market was able to distinguish between banks with a capital
gap and adequately capitalized banks before the results of the Supervisory Capital Assessment
Program were released.
For the determination of the approximate magnitude of this implicit guarantee value, I identify
mainly two strains of literature: contingent-claim and cash-flow analysis. In the latter valuation
method, traded securities with and without guarantees are compared and the price difference
between these securities is interpreted as the implied value. Passmore (2005) calculates the
implicit guarantee value to Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac (F&F) (shareholders and homeowners)
1For details about the FDICIA especially in the context of the TBTF discussion see the review of Wall (2010)
and references therein. This article was originally published in 1993 but due to the current crisis and discussion
reprinted in 2010.
48
using a cash-flow approach. He estimates the gross subsidies from the borrowing advantage by
comparing yields on financial corporate debt and debt of a government-sponsored enterprise.
Baker and McArthur (2009) investigate the spread between the average cost of funds for small
banks and the cost of funds for systemic relevant institutions with assets in excess of $100 bn
and find that the gap widened in the period from the fourth quarter of 2008 through the second
quarter of 2009, after the government bailouts had largely established ‘too big to fail’ as official
policy.2 This gap implies a government subsidy of $34 bn a year for this set of banks. The
evaluation of loan insurance using contingent-claim models is based on the initial work of Mer-
ton (1977) and Merton (1978) which follows the research on corporate debt pricing (Black and
Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974)) by applying option pricing theory. Merton (1977) derives
an options-based formula to evaluate the cost on the guarantor for issuing a guarantee of bank
deposits. Merton (1978) extends the earlier framework taking into account explicitly surveil-
lance costs and random auditing times. This approach is for instance applied by Lucas and
McDonald (2006) on F&F for the year 2005, where the results compared to Passmore (2005) are
much lower. Haefeli and Ju¨ttner (2010) focus on the Swiss situation and compute the guarantee
value for Credit Suisse (CS) and UBS quarterly in a dynamic setup from 2004 until 2009. They
determine the erratic evolution of the guarantee value through the crisis.
3 Model
As already stated, my aim is to back out possible distortions in liability insurance premiums
induced by the TBTF status of financial institutions where premiums are calculated using a Mer-
ton based approach. In this section I revisit the cases of a single- and multi-period guarantee.
Associated theoretical implications for model input variables are derived. Moreover, I discuss
some issues related to the assumptions and interpretation of the different approaches. Later I
present the simulation approach and the choice of parameters for estimating liability insurance
premiums. I follow in parts closely Lucas and McDonald (2006) and Lucas and McDonald (2009).
For clarification, in the contingent-claim approach the bailout is naturally related to an ex-
clusive liability insurance and not a combined one with ‘not to withdraw the bank’s charter’,
i.e., if the bank defaults the promised debt is repaid and the bank is liquidated for sure. There-
fore, the observed survival of failed banks through the recent crisis, implicitly assuming that the
bailout is a combination of deposit insurance and not closing the bank (withdraw the charter) is
not incorporated. By construction, the intervention is not uncertain and its design is specified.
3.1 Single period guarantee
Analog to Lucas and McDonald (2009) I distinguish two groups of debt issuing banks: insured
and uninsured institutions, indexed by {I, U}, where all banks have the same physical assets
2See Table 4: the measures of the Federal Reserve in March 2008, in particular financing support of JPMorgan
Chase & Co.’s acquisition of The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. can be interpreted as one of the first steps to
establish a policy of supporting systemic relevant banks.
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and risk profile. The status ‘insured’ or ‘uninsured’ is fixed at the beginning of the considered
time period and does not change through time. I discuss the case of a single period explicit
liability insurance, i.e., I calculate the implicit guarantee value as if it had been explicit. The
debt contract has length T . Bank’s assets evolve stochastically over time and at time T the
bank is capable to repay the promised debt repayment DT , i.e., AT > DT or it defaults. At T
each bank is liquidated: in case of a default shareholders lose everything (otherwise they have
AT − DT ), debtholders of uninsured banks receive the residual asset value after liquidation,
debtholders of insured institutions get the promised debt repayment, i.e., the guarantor has to
pay the difference between residual asset value and promised debt payment. Since asset value
specifications are equal across banks, the equity value is given by
E0 = e
−rfTE0[max{AT −DT , 0}], (1)
where rf denotes the riskfree rate and E0[·] is the expected value with filtration F0 under the
risk-neutral measure Q. The value of insured debt at time t is then simply the discounted value
of the promised repayment:3
DI0 = e
−rfTDT and
the value for uninsured debt is given by the discounted expected value of the repayment:
DU0 = e
−rfTE0[min{AT , DT }]. (2)
The difference between these values is the guarantee value, here at time 0:
G0 = D
I
0 −DU0 = e−rfT E0[max{DT −AT , 0}]. (3)
If I assume that the guarantor is non-defaultable and the guarantee is announced before debt is
issued, debtholders do not ask for any risk premium. In contrast, financial institutions which do
not exhibit a deposit insurance have higher refinancing costs of the same magnitude. This value
corresponds to the expected default payments and therefore should be compensated by the risk
premium.
With this determination of the guarantee value I obtain for I the asset value at time 0:
AI0 = E0 +D
I
0 = E0 +D
U
0 +G0,
where G0 can be interpreted as a dividend for shareholders or a lower initial investment from
equity holders, because they are not paying the premium to the guarantor.4 For a solution of
equation (1) or (2) there exist a vast literature in the area of corporate bond pricing (see for in-
3For the present value at time t, write and calculate: Dt = e
−rf (T−t)DT .
4Note the assumption that the guarantee value accrues completely to shareholders is debatable. In the case of
F&F Passmore (2005) finds that these institutions partly transmit their refinancing benefits on to credit users
which is not so surprising because they were founded in order to support households providing better conditions
for mortgages.
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stance Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Leland and Toft (1996) or Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein
(2001)). For convenience, the structural framework of Merton (1974) is given in Appendix A.
3.2 Repeated debt guarantee
In the second subsection I discuss the differences between evaluating liability insurances of in-
sured and uninsured institutions which arise by considering more periods. Lucas and McDonald
(2009) develop a theoretical framework and derive implications for asset evolution and volatility
levels due to the impact of the TBTF status on market variables. The technical details can be
found in Appendix B. Intuitively, in the multiperiod case banks have as long as they are not de-
faulted at the beginning of each period the possibility to issue debt. Uninsured institutions pay
each period the appropriate risk premium on debt and declare bankruptcy as soon as they are
not able to pay back the outstanding liabilities at the end of the period, i.e., Dm−1(T ) > Am(0).5
In contrast, insured institutions generate by issuing periodically guaranteed debt for lower refi-
nancing costs a dividend stream as long they are in business. As before, the bailout is restricted
to repay outstanding liabilities once. Therefore also at debt reset dates where current assets are
not sufficient for repaying the outstanding debt amount, shareholders do not declare bankruptcy,
i.e., they pay off the outstanding liabilities by themselves, if the current value of assets and the
expected guarantee value stream is higher than the current liabilities and expected future pay-
ments of outstanding debt amounts. Therefore the declaration of a default is not just dependent
on the current level of operating assets and debt but also on the expectations regarding future
rewards and costs (so called market assets). The continuity condition for an insured institution
at each debt reset date mT is given by
Am(0)(1 + Γ−H) > Dm−1(T ), (4)
where Γ is the value of the dividend stream and H the cost component. With this insight Lucas
and McDonald (2009) define market assets on a debt reset date as
A∗m(0) = Am(0)(1 + Γ−H) (5)
and the market asset volatility is then proportional to the asset volatility of operating assets,
i.e.,
σA∗ = σA(1 + Γ−H). (6)
Consequently, it is possible that we observe today different (lower or higher) market asset levels
or volatilities for insured or uninsured financial institutions with the same operating assets and
risk profile. These variables among others are used for estimating the liability insurance premium
or corresponding risk premium and therefore distorted results are obtained. In contrast to the
5Notation: Xm(t) is the value of X at time mT + t, where m ∈ N0. Therefore, Dm−1(T ) denotes the promised
payment at time (m− 1)T + T , the debt amount which was settled at time (m− 1)T . Each period has length T .
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presented approach, Cordella and Yeyati (2003) or Ennis and Malek (2005) use a ‘constructive
ambiguity’ bailout, i.e., a bailout is not certain but occurs with a certain probability.6 Moreover,
former authors include the possibility of a ‘rebirth’ since a bailout is here ‘not to withdraw’ the
bank license and the payment of the outstanding liabilities in the case when the bank is not able
and not willing via recapitalization to meet its liabilities. The potential bailout generates also
here two opposite effects: a market discipline problem and the so called value effect. On the
one hand, the probability of surviving depends less on the bank’s choice of risk and more on the
supervisory authority’s action, therefore, shareholders have an incentive to choose riskier asset
portfolios for maximizing expected profits, which of course, also increases the default risk. On
the other hand, governmental guarantees naturally increase the survival probability and future
rents due to lower refinancing costs, thus raising the charter value in the case of a default, which,
in turn, generates the incentive to protect it by reducing the asset portfolio risk.
3.3 Discussion
First, there is controversy in the literature why the approaches from Passmore (2005) and Lucas
and McDonald (2006) lead to strongly different results for the implicit guarantee value (see for
instance Lehnert and Passmore (2006) or Lucas and McDonald (2009)). It is stated that both
‘techniques should produce similar results if the difference in yields between GSE debt and private
debt mainly reflects the implicit government guarantee’. But why? The cash-flow approach
characterizes the implicit guarantee as subsidy from the refinancing advantage (difference in the
risk premium), whereas the contingent-claim approach calculates a value which corresponds to
an explicit guarantee, i.e., if a GSE or TBTF institution defaults the government will bail out all
debtholders. Therefore, this value equates to the total risk premium and not only the difference.
In my opinion, the difference in explicit liability insurance premiums (which is not done in the
literature) corresponds in a theoretically correct way to the refinancing advantage (spread in
market risk premiums). However, it is conventional wisdom that some of the structural credit
risk models are not capable in producing spreads as high as observed in the corporate bond
market (see Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004)). In Lucas and McDonald (2006) the estimated
values (total risk premium) from the options approach are smaller than the calculated spread
difference. Note that the estimations were done in a static setup for the unstressed (low volatility)
year 2005.
Second, it is often criticized that with the contingent-claim estimation approach a ‘rebirth’ is
not possible because the option can only be executed once. Already explained in the subsection
before, one possible extension in the Merton framework is the incorporation of repeated debt
guarantees and therefore anticipating additional aspects of an implicit guarantee. But also here
the bailout is restricted to repay outstanding liabilities once. To my knowledge there does not
exist an approach which incorporates the possibility of a ‘rebirth’ in the estimation of the implicit
guarantee value. Independent of the different methods - cash-flow or options based - researchers
6They do not estimate the value of the implicit guarantee but discuss emerging moral hazard or incentive problems.
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focus on the insurance of deposits or more general of debtholders in case of a default. I agree
that the fact that TBTF banks do not disappear is also an essential point in this discussion but
one has also take into account that the status of a bank (TBTF or not) or the governmental
policy may change through time and therefore also the bailout probability. In general, also the
assumption of allowing to keep the bank’s charter can be questioned.
3.4 Simulation approach and parameter specification
In Subsection 3.1 I presented the well-known idea to evaluate the liability insurance as a Euro-
pean put option on the underlying assets with maturity date of the debt and with the future
book value of debt as the strike price. Up to now, I did not specify the stochastic nature of the
underlying processes which is necessary for the implementation. Lucas and McDonald (2006)
propose a model where they take into account that financial institutions are able to leverage
or deleverage, default before the maturity of debt, are supervised by a regulator and are also
exposed to stressed market environments with high volatilities. The complexity of the model
necessitates the computation of the put option price via Monte Carlo simulation. The asset
paths evolve according to the risk neutral discrete time formula with log-normally distributed
returns:
At+h = At exp
(
(rf + gt − δE0
A0
− σ
2
A
2
)h+ σA
√
h
)
(7)
where h is the time step, A is the asset and E denotes equity. Subscripts represent time. rf is
the risk-free rate, gt is the externally financed asset growth, δ is the dividend yield on equity,
δE0A0 is the dividend yield on assets, σA is the volatility of the assets and  ∼ N (0, 1) is standard
normally distributed. Since the initial market value A0 and volatility σA of the assets are not
directly observable, the following equations which are based on Merton’s framework (see the
details in Appendix A) are solved simultaneously for A0 and σA (see for instance Ronn and
Verma (1986) or Bohn and Crosbie (2003)):
E0 = A0e
−qTN(d1)− L0e−rfTN(d2) +A0(1− e−qT ), (8)
σA = σE
E0
A0
(
N(d1)e
−qT + (1− e−qT ))−1 , (9)
d1 = (log(A0/L0) + (rf − q + σ
2
A
2
)T )/(σA
√
T ),
d2 = d1 − σA
√
T ,
where T is the maturity of liabilities, L0 is the strike price (initial book value of liabilities), σE
the equity volatility and q = δE0A0 is the payout rate of assets.
7
Moreover, the evolution of the book value of liabilities L is assumed to adjust towards a target
liability to asset ratio λ∗:
Lt+h = Lte
(rd+γgt)h + Itαth(λ∗ − Lterdh/At)At (10)
7The last term A0(1−e−qT ) =
∫ T
0
qA0e
−qtdt in the first equation represents the accumulated dividend payments.
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where αt denotes the annual rate of adjustment, λ
∗ is the target liability to asset ratio, It is
an indicator variable that equals 1 in a period where liabilities are adjusted and 0 otherwise,
rd is the growth rate of liabilities to cover promised coupons and γ is the fraction of externally
financed growth supported by debt.
The simulation of the asset and liability path (equations (7) and (10)) requires the calibra-
tion of the introduced parameters. The asset growth rate is determined by the logarithm of the
difference in total assets.8 Therefore, the asset growth rate is adjusted dynamically at every
starting point based on the average growth rate of the last year taking into account changing
market conditions. For the dividend yield q, I use the respective quarterly dividend and an-
nualize it. Moreover, I employ the historical equity volatility, which is calculated as a rolling
60-day annualized standard deviation of equity price changes. Later, I also show some robust-
ness results with respect to other volatility specifications. Time to maturity T is set to one
year, since I am interested to determine the implicit guarantee value for one year. I assume that
debt is homogenous with a maturity of one year. This is a strong assumption recognizing that
the debt structure of these banks is diversified with all kinds of maturities and seniorities. For
the liability path (see equation (10)) I also need information about the growth rate of liabilities
to cover promised coupons. I determine rd by the fraction of annualized interest rate expenses
over outstanding liabilities of the last quarter (see Subsection 4.2). I fix some parameter values
for all banks (see Table 1), which are quite similar to Lucas and McDonald (2006). The target
Table 1: Common parameter values for all banks and for all starting times
Name Value
Target liability to asset ratio 0.92
Debt proportion of external financing 1
Adjustment of liabilities to higher target 0.8
Adjustment of liabilities to lower target 0.4
Frequency of updating debt 252
Default trigger 1
Frequency of checking bankruptcy trigger per year 4
Time steps per year 252
Time to maturity 1y
Number of Monte Carlo simulations 40000
liability to asset ratio is set according to the Basel II framework to 92%, where I am aware of the
fact that Basel incorporates, e.g., risk weighted assets or stressed recovery values to determine
the capital requirements. It is assumed that asset growth is completely financed externally by
debt. Liabilities adjust gradually and asymmetrically.9 The 80% per year adjustment up versus
40% per year adjustment down reflects the difficulty for a financial institution to deleverage in
8In formulas: log
(
Total Assett
Total Assett−1
)
averaged over the last two quarters.
9In equation (10) I set It ≡ 1. Hence, the liabilities are adjusted in each time step which is typically each day.
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times when asset values are declining.10 Since I obtain the equity volatility based on daily data,
I also run the simulation with 252 time steps per year. To include stressed markets, Lucas and
McDonald (2006) rise volatilities by four times to its normal level when assets fall to 101% of li-
abilities, taking into account increasing volatilities during these times. As in Haefeli and Ju¨ttner
(2010), I assume this procedure over the period of moderate market conditions (2004-2007). In
turbulent times (2008-2009), I adjust this approach by halving the volatility when assets increase
to 110% of liabilities. The identification of financially stressed or unstressed times takes place
in every time step of the simulation. For the default trigger11, based on the asset value relative
to book liabilities, I take a value of one. Following Merton (1978), I allow for audits at some
pre-specified dates (four times per year) which examine if the asset liability ratio falls below the
default trigger. If this case occurs, asset and liability processes are stopped, i.e., the values are
held constant and multiplied with the appropriate discount rate until maturity. At maturity,
the put option payoffs max(LT −AT , 0) of all paths are collected and the put price is computed
as the expected discounted payoff.
4 Data and parameters
In this section, I describe the dataset I use for a closer examination of the refinancing advantage
of TBTF banks and for the calculation of the single period insurance premiums across U.S.
banks. There exist firms in the sample for which possibly single values of input parameters are
not reported and therefore results of single quarters (for instance, interest expenses or guarantee
value) cannot be determined. However, I do not remove these firms in total but consider all
residual available quarters. Therefore, the cross-sectional sample size is varying across time and
object I investigate.
4.1 Company selection and time horizon
Since I need on the one hand balance sheet information as total assets or liabilities and on the
other hand daily stock prices to determine the historical volatility I use data from the Merged
Database Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)/Compustat. I collect data for all firms
with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 60, 61, and 62. Firms with these SIC codes
are defined as commercial banks, non-depository credit institutions, and investment banks, re-
spectively (see Table 5). Henceforth, I refer to the set of all banks collectively as financial firms
and, for the sake of brevity, rename the second category as ‘credit institutions’.
10The important point here is that the specification of the liability path allows financial institutions to increase
or decrease leverage. In particular, as pointed out in Bohn and Crosbie (2003), financial institutions tend to
deleverage as they approach to default in contrast to industrial firms where often liabilities are increased near
default.
11Bohn and Crosbie (2003) do not find evidence for a default when the asset value of general firms (no financials)
reach the book value of liabilities; many continue to operate and service their debts also above this point. They
state that the actual default point lies between total and short-term liabilities. Therefore, I impose a quite
conservative assumption.
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I have to adjust the dataset with respect to several dimensions. First, only firms are con-
sidered which report their results quarterly for the time period 2004-2009. Banks are allowed
to subsequently default (to preclude a potential survivorship bias), be founded, be taken over
by or merged with another company during the period. Second, I exclude data for all financial
firms that are not incorporated in the U.S., because these firms will be influenced by regulations
applicable in the country of incorporation. However, for the purpose of our study a uniform
regulatory regime is required to ensure the comparability across all banks. In total, I have data
of 916 financial firms with the majority belonging to the first category (779 banks). This number
compares to 8000 FDIC-insured banks in the U.S. at the end of 2009.12
Analog to Baker and McArthur (2009) or Chesney, Stromberg, and Wagner (2010), I define
a group of TBTF institutions (see Table 6) that consists of (a) those companies that had to
participate at the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), (b) those financial insti-
tutions that belong to the group of so called government sponsored enterprises (SIC code 6111)
and (c) some companies (Wachovia, Washington Mutual, Golden West Financial, Countrywide
Financial, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch) which belong or belonged to the biggest banks in
the U.S. measured by market capitalization or total assets and were considered by many par-
ticipants as TBTF.13 In total, this yields 30 financial institutions. Note, I exclude GMAC and
Metlife though these firms participated at the SCAP program, but the former company is not
publicly traded and the latter firm is an insurance company. Table 6 gives us an overview of the
set of financial institutions I consider as TBTF and study in this work.
4.2 Summary statistics
Table 7 gives us a first impression and overview of the underlying data. Across all banks and
all quarters from 2004-2009 there are around 16200 observations where 86% belong to the first
group of commercial banks. Therefore, I concentrate my analysis very often on this group. The
total asset distribution is highly skewed for all subclasses. On the level of all banks the mean
is around 19 times higher than the median. We observe a 10th quantile of $300 million versus
a 90th quantile of $14 billion. Between the different groups of financial firms the distributional
properties of leverage ratios differs a lot. Obviously, the leverage ratios of commercial banks are
by far less dispersed than of credit institutions and investment banks. This is also reflected in
the statistical measures for the interest expenses.
12FDIC Bank Statistics and Data are available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/.
13It is possible that market participants suppose that a bank is systemic relevant and has an implicit guarantee
before default. But the guarantor may decide to let the bank go bankrupt in default. In this case, the implicit
guarantee exists until default in the terminology. For instance, Lehman Brothers was certainly assumed to be
TBTF by many market participants and ex-post it is questionable whether the supervisory authorities would
decide in the same way and follow the ‘constructive ambiguity’ policy as they did keeping in mind the calamitous
and destructive effects on the financial system which accompanied the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
A more detailed and conceptual introduction of this term can be found in Haefeli and Ju¨ttner (2010). Especially,
if we look on the events related to these institutions the assumption can be justified. A detailed list of events
during the considered time horizon can be found in the Appendix, Table 4.
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Total assets Table 8 presents the average total assets of Non-TBTF and TBTF banks in
each considered subset (commercial banks, depository institutions and investment banks) as a
fraction of total assets of all financial firms in the sample in each quarter for the whole period.
First, note that TBTF institutions hold about 80% of total assets during the years. Second, the
total assets are unequally distributed across the different finance industry sectors. In particular
on the level of Non-TBTF companies the concentration of total assets hold by credit institutions
(1.41%) and investment banks (2.49%) is negligible. For TBTF banks the situation is different:
we observe a varying proportion of around 16-26% of total assets and corresponding number of
observations from credit institutions. Note, that big GSEs, e.g., Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac,
belong to this group.14 TBTF commercial banks increase their fraction of total assets from
around 40% at the beginning of the considered period up to 46% at the end of 2009. This
increase can be explained by the acquisitions of Countrywide and Merrill Lynch by the Bank of
America in the years 2008 and 2009.
Market capitalization Table 9 provides the average market capitalization (market cap) of
Non-TBTF and TBTF banks in each considered subset (commercial banks, depository institu-
tions and investment banks) as a fraction of market cap of all financial firms in the sample at
the end of each quarter for the whole time period. Naturally, the market valuation of equity is
more volatile than the book value of total assets I considered before. The market cap fraction
of TBTF financial firms range from around 71% (2007 2Q) to 55% (2009 1Q). Especially, credit
institutions loose around 70% of their fraction. The valuation of Non-TBTF investment banks
ranges from 4% to 15% (2009 1Q) which is in general a much higher fraction than for the total
asset case. The countercyclicality indicates that this class compared to the financial firms in the
other subsets performed better during the crisis.
Leverage ratio Figure 6 depicts the development of accounting and market leverage ratios
of Non-TBTF and TBTF banks across commercial banks, credit institutions, investment banks
and the aggregate set. The accounting leverage ratio is defined as the quotient of book value of
total liabilities and book value of total assets, where for the market leverage ratio the denomi-
nator is replaced by the sum of book value of total liabilities and market value of equity. First,
we observe on the level of all financial firms for both leverage measures a relative stable spread
of approximately 5% between TBTF and Non-TBTF banks. In market terms, the leverage in
the financial sector increased during the considered time period by approximately 9%. At the
end of 2009 (Non-)TBTF banks had a ratio of (86%) 91% probably induced by declining equity
prices. Second, in contrast to all other diagrams the market leverage ratio of Non-TBTF and
TBTF commercial banks (the group with by far most observations) evolves both on level and
14In particular, between 1Q-2Q 2004 we observe large jumps in this proportion but also in the number of obser-
vations, also 2Q 2005-4Q 2006. As already noted, for some quarters certain numbers are not available in the used
database Compustat/CRSP. For instance, total assets for Fannie Mae were not reported for the some quarters of
the years 2004 and 2006.
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direction very similar. Both measures for credit institutions and investment banks exhibit a very
pronounced spread (up to 50%). Third, in accounting terms the relation between Non-TBTF
and TBTF commercial banks reverses at the beginning of 2009.
Interest expenses on debt Table 10 reports the average annualized interest expenses across
the different subsets of financial firms. Banks announce interest and related expenses in their
financial statements quarterly. To obtain annualized and interpretable quantities, I quadruple
the expenses and express them as fractions of total liabilities. It is clear that many features of
the complicated debt structure from financial institutions cannot be captured. Banks issue debt
at intermediate dates, with different seniorities and maturities, in the form of bonds, deposits
from banks with or without collateral or from individuals. Therefore, the reported interest rates
represent the aggregated result of all these financing (and investment) decisions probably of the
last years and not only the last quarter.15 However, I use this measure for a first indication
regarding the level and development of the interest rate spread between Non-TBTF and TBTF
firms in each respective subset. First, we observe a permanent positive spread for credit insti-
tutions. On average Non-TBTF institutions in this group have to pay around 2% p.a. more
on debt than TBTF firms during the years 2004-2009. This huge difference can be explained
by the fact that the TBTF firms in this group are mainly GSEs, firms which were founded by
the government and though not directly guaranteed (at least up to September 2008) have been
beneficiaries of the proximity to the government.16 Recalling the results for credit institutions
from the former paragraph about market leverage differences (Figure 6), this positive spread is
even more remarkable since TBTF institutions are by far more leveraged. But also for com-
mercial banks with a very similar evolution in market leverage, the spread in interest expenses
is substantial. The spread between the average cost of funds for smaller (Non-TBTF) banks
and the costs of funds for institutions identified as TBTF averaged 0.4 percentage points for
the whole period. In the period from the first quarter 2004 through the fourth quarter of 2007
the spread was 0.21%, then it increased to 0.79% at average for the last two years. This spread
evolution is consistent with the results of Baker and McArthur (2009), where they use data of
cost of funds from the FDIC and obtain average spreads of 0.29% (2000-2007) and 0.78% for
2008 4Q - 2009 2Q. They state that if this gap is attributable to the government guarantee17,
it implies a taxpayer subsidy for the TBTF banks. These banks are able to borrow at a much
lower cost than other institutions who must borrow based on their own credit worthiness. For a
better illustration I plot in Figure 1 the numbers for the commercial banks. In the left panel we
15One of the problems during the financial crisis was the short term financing of banks.
16In September 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed into conservatorship by the United States Treasury
Department (see Figure 4 or http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability). The role of GSEs
and the evidence about their refinancing advantage are often discussed, for instance, Passmore (2005) or Lucas
and McDonald (2006).
17With the Troubled Asset Relief Program and other rescue measures for distressed banks the U.S. government
essentially introduced an official policy for TBTF banks. On the other hand, other explanations as a better
diversification can induce a lower risk profile and therefore lower risk premiums. I examine this problem in the
next section.
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see the computed average interest rates on debt from Non-TBTF and TBTF commercial banks,
r¯ dt,NTB and r¯
d
t,TB for t ∈ {2004 1Q, . . . , 2009 4Q} respectively. In the right panel I calculate the
difference rd,spreadt between the two curves.
Figure 1: Interest on debt evolution for commercial banks. Interest on debt refers to the
ratio of annualized interest and related expenses to total liabilities at the end of each quarter.
The left panel depicts the interest on debt development of both Non-TBTF and TBTF
commercial banks, separately. In the right panel, the difference between the rates is plotted.
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5 Empirical results
In this section I analyze the introduced objects which on the hand should reflect the TBTF
or Non-TBTF status of a financial institution as refinancing advantage, differences in the asset
volatility or the relative guarantee value spread. On the other hand I have a closer look on the
absolute guarantee premiums for the identified TBTF institutions and the impact of stronger
capital requirements.
5.1 Refinancing advantage
As already seen in the last paragraph of Subsection 4.2, the descriptive statistics of the interest
expenses indicate that TBTF institutions are able to refinance under better (cheaper) conditions
as the Non-TBTF competitors. Here, I investigate this relation more closely using annualized
quarterly interest expenses on debt as dependent variable. My goal is to find evidence that
TBTF banks actually have the possibility to refinance under cheaper conditions only because of
the ‘too big to fail’ status they have.
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Variables and predictions
I concentrate on commercial banks. Analog to Baker and McArthur (2009), I divide the time
period into the quiet phase from 2004-2007 and the stress period 2008-2009. Latter period can
be seen as the phase where the TBTF policy by the U.S. government became official (see before).
In a first step I regress interest expenses rdt on a dummy variable which equals one if the bank
is TBTF and zero if not. The first regression equation is given by
rdt = α+ β1 Dummy-TBTFt + t. (11)
In the second step I additionally control for several variables which influence refinancing costs
and investigate whether the dummy is still identified as significant. In the following, I present
the control variables individually, describe the relation to the dependent variable rdt (refinancing
costs) and report the used proxies and data source. Note, the goal is not to explain the level of
refinancing costs by all these independent variables but to control for these and then to isolate
the effect of the TBTF status of a bank.
1. Firm Leverage levt: In the structural framework higher leverage implies higher default
risk, therefore creditors will ask for a higher risk premium. We use the market leverage ratio
introduced in 4.2.
2. Volatility σE: A higher volatility increases the probability of default and therefore the risk
premium and thus the refinancing costs in total. We use the historical (last 60 days) equity
volatility, σE , since it is available for all institutions instead of the implied volatility.
3. Tier-1-Ratio: Another proxy for how well banks are capitalized and how risky operating as-
sets are, is the Tier-1-Ratio (core capital to risk-weighted assets). Commercial banks are obliged
to report it. High values indicate a sound capital buffer and/or low risk on the asset side. This
variable should be negatively related with costs for refinancing.
4. Spot rate rt: The effect of a higher spot rate is an increase in the refinancing costs. I calculate
for each quarter the average yield of the last 60 daily (10-year) Treasury yield curve rates taken
from Datastream.
5. Slope: Analog to Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), I define the slope of the yield
curve as the difference between Datastream’s 10-year and 2-year Benchmark Treasury yield. A
positive slope is an indication for higher future short rates, a growing economy and therefore
higher refinancing costs. On the other hand a downward sloping yield curve (2004 - 2Q 2007)
is an indicator for a recession, consequently lower interest rates and refinancing costs which can
be observed around one year later on average. We expect a countercyclical behavior.
6. Spread: I employ the difference between the yields of the Thomson Reuters U.S. Corporate
Benchmark BBB bond index and the 7-year Treasury as an control variable approximating the
credit risk during this period. Refinancing costs should be an increasing function of the credit
spread where we have to keep in mind that lower spreads occur rather in booming economic and
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high interest times.
7. Bond Index: Additional to the spread, I use the average coupon of a Barclays investment
grade bond index also taken from Datastream as a proxy for refinancing costs of risky firms.
8. Business Climate: Beside these variables, I incorporate the S&P 500 Return as a proxy for
the business climate. Better business climate should be reflected in higher interest rates but
lower risk premiums.
Moreover, I control for firm size (the logarithm of total assets) and include some (additional)
lagged variables since the refinancing costs have accumulated during the last quarter and are in
particular dependent on the firm characteristics at the beginning of the respective quarter. The
second regression equation is given by:
rdt = α+ β1 log(Assetst) + β2 rt + β3 (rt)
2 + β4 Bond Indext + β5 S&P 500 Returnt (12)
+ β6 S&P 500 Returnt−1 + β7 Spreadt + β8 Slopet + β9 σEt + β10 σEt−1
+ β11 levt−1 + β12 Dummy-TBTFt + β13 Tier-1-Ratiot + t.
Results
I summarize some of the main findings. The regression results of equation (11) are presented in
Table 2:
a. In both periods the dummy variable is significant and negative, where during the stress period
even at a significance level of 1% instead of 5% in the quiet period.
Table 2: Determinants of the refinancing cost level during the quiet (2004-2007) and
stress period (2008-2009). This table presents the estimation results for the regression
specified in equation (11). Associated Newey-West standard errors with a lag of two appear in
parentheses beneath. ***, ** and *, denote the statistical significance of the estimates at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Quiet period 2004-2007 Stress period 2008-2009
Intercept 2.654*** 2.416***
(0.0174) (0.0201)
Dummy-TBTFt -0.221** -0.762***
(0.0904) (0.100)
Observations 9,705 4,367
R2 0.001 0.018
Estimation results of equation (12) are reported in Table 3:
b. The contemporaneous spot rate, bond index, S&P Return, slope, equity volatility and lever-
age exhibit the predicted signs at a 1% significance level.
c. The Tier-1-Ratio is statistically significant in the stress period.
d. The results for the business climate proxied by quarterly S&P 500 Returns are positive and
significant. However, the coefficient for the lagged variable is negative in the quiet period.
e. The variable of my main interest is the TBTF-Dummy. During the years 2004-2007 the
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Table 3: Determinants of the refinancing cost level during the quiet (2004-2007) and
stress period (2008-2009). This table presents the estimation results for the regression
specified in equation (12). Associated Newey-West standard errors with a lag of two appear in
parentheses beneath. ***, ** and *, denote the statistical significance of the estimates at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Quiet period 2004-2007 Stress period 2008-2009
Intercept -26.98*** -8.857***
(1.250) (1.027)
log(Assetst) -0.0146 -0.112***
(0.00927) (0.0122)
rt 1.956*** 1.163***
(0.480) (0.425)
r2t -0.175*** -0.251***
(0.0501) (0.0657)
Bond Indext 4.085*** 2.099***
(0.150) (0.123)
S&P 500 Returnt 0.0125*** 0.00517***
(0.00207) (0.00133)
S&P 500 Returnt−1 -0.00592*** 0.0211***
(0.00172) (0.00252)
Spreadt 0.153*** -0.0793**
(0.0439) (0.0324)
Slopet -0.720*** -0.564***
(0.0138) (0.0455)
σEt 0.171*** 0.00134***
(0.0424) (0.000255)
σEt−1 0.00159*** 0.000400
(0.000396) (0.000304)
levt−1 0.0354*** 0.0196***
(0.00285) (0.00446)
Dummy-TBTFt -0.0548 -0.206**
(0.0518) (0.0854)
Tier-1-Ratiot -0.00376 -0.0283***
(0.00412) (0.00639)
Observations 7,606 3,947
R2 0.656 0.451
coefficient is negative but not statistically. Entering the stress period the respective coefficient
becomes significant and negative. This result supports the hypothesis that TBTF banks were
able to refinance under better conditions than their competitors during the time the U.S. gov-
ernment implemented an official TBTF policy.
Robustness
All standard errors are estimated by using the modified Newey-West procedure for panel data
accounting for the serial correlation of the residuals in the same cluster (see Petersen (2009)).
Here, I report the results for the case where each cluster corresponds to a bank (fixed firm-
effect). Alternatively, I account for the time-effect by setting the time variable as cluster and
increase the lag to five (see Table 11). Moreover, I also conduct the benchmark regression with
time dummies for addressing a potential additional time effect. All specifications do not change
the direction of the initial result: the TBTF-Dummy is insignificant (or slightly significant in
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Table 11) during the quiet period and then becomes statistically and economically significant. I
modify our regression equation with respect to different variables. First, I replace the market by
the accounting leverage ratio, the 10-year Treasury yield by the 1-year Treasury yield or Federal
Fund Target rate, where I take out the variable Slope because of a very high correlation. Then I
also include the S&P 500 Returns from the last year (lag 4). All these changes do not influence
qualitatively the results when I control for the logarithm of assets. Additionally, I winsorize the
interest expense data at the 2nd and 98th percentile, conduct the estimations and obtain similar
results.
5.2 Asset volatility
As described above, initial market value of assets and asset volatility can be inferred by solving
equations (8) and (9), where I choose the sum of initial market value of equity and book value of
liabilities as a first guess for the market value of assets A0. All starting values and solutions are
scaled such that they are in the same range and therefore size independent. Later, I rescale the
values and start the Monte Carlo simulation.18 As noted, as benchmark I employ the historical
equity volatility based on a rolling 60-day annualized standard deviation of equity price changes
but later also report and discuss changes in the results for a 252-day historical equity volatility.
All variables are winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentile at each quarter across all banks
(independent of TBTF or not).19
A detailed overview of the results for the asset volatility for all financial firms, the impor-
tant subclass of commercial banks and a comparison of the average asset volatility between all
three subclasses is given in the Tables 12, 13 and 14 in the Appendix, respectively. In Figure 2
I depict the asset volatility evolution across all subsets.
Some general comments: first, not astonishing we see a steep increase of the asset volatility
of all financial firms during the years of the crisis (2008-2009) and a recurrence to levels as
observed before the crisis at the last two quarters of 2009 (see Figure 2). Second, across the
three subsets of Non-TBTF financials, asset volatility levels are almost always increasing from
commercial banks over credit institutions to investment banks (see Table 14) which reflects
the reverse relation of leverage ratios. Here, Non-TBTF commercial banks have the highest
leverage ratios. This result is in line with Bohn and Crosbie (2003) who state that firms with
more stable asset values can afford higher leverage levels than uncertain businesses or in other
words leverage has an enlarging effect on asset volatility. Third, this mentioned relation can
be partially observed for TBTF firms. TBTF investment banks are most highly leveraged and
exhibit the lowest asset volatility (except 2006 2Q and 2008 4Q). Note, the sample sizes for each
18We exploit the MATLAB routine lsqnonlin and ensure that A0 and σA are in the same range. I also checked
the results when I rescale the values after the simulation. Guarantee values are slightly higher; I chose the more
conservative approach.
19By winsorizing the estimation results for asset volatility we loose for instance the extreme high volatility value
of Wachovia in the fourth quarter of 2008, where the bank was acquired by Wells Fargo.
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category are very small and therefore the explanatory power is very limited. Fourth, if we com-
pare asset volatility levels of Non-TBTF and TBTF firms of all financial firms but also within
each subclass, we notice that with few exceptions the asset volatility of TBTF institutions is
smaller than of Non-TBTF firms. This observation is also consistent with the findings of Bohn
and Crosbie (2003) who document a negative correlation between firm size and asset volatility.
TBTF banks are naturally the biggest institutions. Therefore, it is remarkable that this relation
is reversed for commercial banks during the crisis: we observe a decreasing spread since 2007
and then high negative values for 2008 and the first two quarters of 2009. In Table 15 in the
Figure 2: First panel: Asset volatility of Non-TBTF and TBTF banks across financial firms and
all subclasses. Second panel: difference in the respective asset volatility of Non-TBTF and
TBTF banks. The values are obtained by solving equations (8) and (9) using a calculated
rolling 60-day annualized standard deviation of equity price changes (historical equity
volatility), time to maturity of one year and market capitalization, total liabilities and dividend
yield reported at the end of each quarter. All variables are winsorized at the 2nd and 98th
percentile at each quarter across all banks (independent of TBTF or not).
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Appendix, I report the results for the asset volatility estimation based on a historical equity
volatility of one year. Longer time horizons naturally smooth the volatility evolution: erratic
changes become less important, but more persistent, with a longer time horizon. For instance,
the peak in asset volatility of TBTF investment banks for the 60-day (252-day) specification is
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reached with 28.86% (14.34%) in 2008 4Q (2009 2Q). Therefore, the maximum value is strongly
reduced and occurs two quarters later. The values around the peak reach in the one year case
similar or slightly higher levels.
5.3 Guarantee values
In Subsections 3.1 and 3.4 I described the idea of calculating a liability insurance premium
tailored for financial institutions. I present the results of this simulation study for the U.S.
financial sector under consideration in the next paragraphs. To compare the different magnitudes
across all banks, I express the simulated premiums as fractions of total assets in the first part.
Then I study the absolute levels. Here, I concentrate on the identified TBTF institutions since
their premiums are in particular relevant for the government or more general the tax payers. In
the last part I quantify the impact of higher capital requirements on guarantee premiums. In
general, I calculate premiums for a liability insurance with a contract period of one year, where
I do this quarterly to illustrate premium dynamics by capturing changes in the underlying
variables.
Guarantee value ratios
The relative guarantee value is set as ratio of simulated guarantee value to initial total assets.
The average values for TBTF and Non-TBTF banks can be found in the Table 17 and in Figure
3. We see on the left side the average relative guarantee values of both sets of banks. In the right
panel, the spread dynamic of the averaged estimated relative guarantee values from the first panel
is plotted. Note, in contrast to all other objects I analyzed up to now, the guarantee values – and
therefore also these relative expressions – are dependent on a multiplicity of influencing variables
which makes it difficult to identify ultimately the relevant drivers of this evolution. We see that
the volatility plays an important role but is not sufficient to explain all of the variation. First,
we observe that for all subclasses and therefore also on the aggregate level the spread is mostly
positive, i.e., Non-TBTF financial firms would have to pay on average more in relation to their
total asset side than TBTF-banks for a guarantee. For financial firms (commercial banks), the
average spread for the whole period is 1.28% (1.07%). In the period from the first quarter 2004
through the fourth quarter of 2007 the spread was 0.23% (0.26%) on average, then it increased
to 3.39% (2.70%) for the last two years. For the time of the crisis the premiums for TBTF banks
are strongly reduced. If the gap is attributable to the TBTF policy of the U.S. government, one
can argue that the policy was successful in the sense that the implicit government guarantee was
relatively lower than for the rest of the studied financial sector. In the years 2008 and 2009, the
average amount of total assets of the TBTF financial firms (commercial banks) was around $568
bn ($548 bn), therefore the spread corresponds to an absolute value of about $19.25 bn ($14.8
bn) per year. Second, if we compare the numbers to the results of the asset volatility section
(in particular Figure 2) we see on the one hand a very similar pattern of both evolutions. On
the other hand, for the subset of commercial banks relative guarantee values of TBTF banks
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Figure 3: First panel: development of relative guarantee values of financial firms and its
composition across all subclasses. Second panel: difference in the respective relative guarantee
levels of Non-TBTF and TBTF banks. Relative guarantee value refers to the ratio of guarantee
value to initial total assets. The guarantee values for each bank are obtained by using the
simulation approach described in Subsection 3.4 with an assumed debt maturity of one year and
a 60-day historical equity volatility. All variables are winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentile
at each quarter across all banks (independent of TBTF or not).
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are lower than from Non-TBTF during the crisis, although the asset volatility is much higher.
We have in mind that at the same time the interest on debt spread increases significantly (see
Figure 1) which determines in our framework the future debt repayments, i.e., Non-TBTF banks
have higher outstanding liabilities which possibly compensates the effect of a higher uncertainty
expressed in the volatility. In Figure 4, median, 25%- and 75% quantiles of the simulated Monte
Carlo distributions of commercial banks are plotted. During the quiet period, a clear separation
of the two groups is not possible. In 2008-2009, the 75% quantiles of TBTF banks is permanently
below the respective Non-TBTF values. In particular starting at 2008 4Q, the 75% quantile of
TBTF banks is even below the Non-TBTF median of relative guarantee values.
Absolute guarantee values
Figure 5 and Table 16 present the evolution of absolute guarantee values of all TBTF financial
firms and its composition across the different subclasses. The similarity to the left panel of Fig-
ure 2 is apparent and shows the strong impact of the asset volatility on the simulation results.
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Figure 4: Development of relative guarantee values across TBTF and Non-TBTF commercial
banks with 25%-, 50%- and 75%- confidence intervals. Relative guarantee value refers to the
ratio of guarantee value to initial total assets. The guarantee values for each bank are obtained
by using the simulation approach described in Subsection 3.4 with an assumed debt maturity of
one year and a 60-day historical equity volatility. All variables are winsorized at the 2nd and
98th percentile at each quarter across all banks (independent of TBTF or not). The confidence
intervals (dotted lines) are obtained from the quantiles of the simulated distribution.
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For instance, between the second quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 we observe a
development in guarantee values which is exactly reflected in the asset volatility dynamic. In
2008 3Q, guarantee values of TBTF commercial banks capture about 80% of the total amount
and the corresponding asset volatility is much higher than for TBTF credit institutions or in-
vestment banks. For commercial banks, a drop in guarantee value coverage (down to 37%) and
asset volatility follows the next quarter. In contrast, due to the turmoil during this quarter
(failure of Lehman Brothers and acquisition of Merrill Lynch, see Table 4) TBTF investment
banks end with a tripled asset volatility and a resulting 44% fraction of the total guarantee
value. This is even more remarkable since during this time they only represented almost 17% of
total assets from TBTF financial firms.20 In the third quarter 2008 the total premium amount
reaches a maximum of $850 bn. For the considered time period the average liability insurance
premium for all TBTF financial firms equals approx. $128 bn per year. This number relates to
an average amount of $12.4 trillion of aggregated total assets of all TBTF financial firms during
2004-2009.
In the panel at the bottom of Table 16, I also report guarantee value levels using a 252-day
historical equity volatility for approximating the asset volatility. In Subsection 5.2 I already
20In the Appendix, Table 8, I calculate the total asset distribution with respect to total assets of all financial firms
(Non-TBTF and TBTF). Here, I adjust the fraction for TBTF total assets.
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Figure 5: Development of absolute guarantee values of TBTF financial firms (total) and its
composition across all subclasses.
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pointed out the smoothening effect of a longer time horizon for calculating the equity volatility
and then estimating the asset volatility, which has a strong impact on guarantee value levels.
Comparing both volatility specifications: the peak of the premium evolution of all TBTF finan-
cial firms moves from the third quarter of 2008 to the third quarter 2009, where the maximum is
now at around $400 bn. I obtain now $69 bn for the average premium compared to $128 billion
before.
Increased equity capital requirements
In the aftermath of the crisis a lot of regulatory measures are discussed and some were already
implemented. In Basel, supervisory authorities discuss and decide about a third regulatory
standard for financial institutions around the globe (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(2011)). In particular, higher and anticyclical capital requirements, a supplementary leverage
ratio (not based on risk-weighted assets) or extended liquidity standards are on the agenda.21 In
Switzerland the authorities already decided about the implementation of some specific measures,
among others contingent capital – debt which converts to equity (bail-in) in certain predefined
21A compilation of documents related to the regulatory process can be found under
http://www.bis.org/list/basel3/page_1.htm.
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events – to strengthen the capital basis in situations where banks are under pressure.22 With
the proposed methodology in this paper it is neither possible to test liquidity measures (because
it is a solvency framework) nor complex liability structures as they appear for convertible bonds.
However, an often requested very simple regulatory measure is the increase of an unweighted
equity ratio, i.e., equity relative to total assets (not risk weighted). Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig,
and Pfleiderer (2011) state that ‘equity capital ratios as high as 20% or 30% on an unweighted
basis should not be unthinkable’. Therefore, I study the consequences of this proposal on the lia-
bility insurance premiums for the TBTF financial firms on the sample. Note: first, the sample of
TBTF institutions can possibly change through time and I identified these financial institutions
ex-post. Second, it is not clear at all that only very big institutions are TBTF. It is imaginable
that a number of smaller institutions default at the same time which also makes governmental
interventions necessary. Moreover, I think that it is not possible for the government to commit
to never bail out a bank. The goal is to approximate the guarantee evolution through time and
to determine the reduced magnitudes by implementing higher capital requirements. I opera-
tionalize the assumption of increased capital requirements in the simulation by decreasing the
target liability to asset ratio to 70%. Since another regulatory regime – namely Basel II – is in
place, a lot of institutions have initial equity to asset ratios much lower than proposed by latter
authors. Therefore, especially the highly leveraged institutions will have to deleverage massively
during the simulation.
Table 18 provides the respective results for the guarantee values relative to initial total as-
sets across all subclasses of financial institutions and Table 19 presents the absolute values of all
TBTF financial firms. As expected, all values are reduced. Defaults will occur less often and in
that case the costs for the guarantor are lower because of higher liable equity. In both tables the
reduction is more pronounced for lower values. For instance, the relative (absolute) guarantee
value of all TBTF financial firms at its peak in 2008 3Q is reduced by 30%, whereas in 2004 2Q
the initial much lower values decrease by around 60%.
Accumulating the reductions of relative premiums and comparing these between Non-TBTF
and TBTF (in parentheses) financial firms, we observe an average decline of 0.31% (0.06%) in
the years 2004-2007 and of 3.23% (0.94%) for 2008-2009, respectively. In other words, Non-
TBTF financial firms following a target liability to asset ratio of 70% should have paid a lower
(compared to the Basel II benchmark) insurance premium during the crisis of 3.23% in terms of
total assets. Of course the premium levels of both groups are very different as seen above (Figure
22Currently, the legislative authorities have to put the proposals from an expert commission into law,
but it is intended that a conversion takes place in the event that equity is lower than 5% of the
risk weighted assets. Details about this process can be found on the page of the financial treasury
http://www.efd.admin.ch/themen/00796/02235/index.html?lang=de. Some critical remarks regarding this way
of strengthening the capital basis can be found in Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2011), pp. 53, or
Bu¨rgi (‘Kniﬄige Preisfindung fu¨r CoCos’, Neue Zu¨rcher Zeitung, March 29, 2011).
Haefeli and Ju¨ttner (2010) examine also other discussed regulatory measures as more audits. Moreover, we give
more details about the robustness of this simulation approach to other parameter specifications. Due to the length
of this elaboration we have to refer the interested reader to our former work.
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3). Therefore, it makes sense to compare these absolute changes in the ratios in relative terms to
the benchmark ratio. During the first period (2004-2007) Non-TBTF and TBTF financial firms
reached in the benchmark case (Table 17) average premium levels of 0.38% (0.15%) and during
the crisis (2008-2009) around 6% (2.62%), respectively. Therefore, the change in the liability
to asset ratio induces an average percental reduction during 2004-2007 of 83% (42%) and for
2008-2009 of 54% (36%) for Non-TBTF and TBTF (in parentheses) financial firms.
Analog to the discussion above regarding the absolute guarantee values of TBTF institutions, I
consider also in this modified case the effects on the aggregated premium amount of the TBTF
sector. Naturally, we observe a reduction in all values where the composition across the different
subclasses is quite similar. For the whole time period the average premium is now $76 billion
(compared to the $128 bn before). For 2004-2007 an average of $29 bn and for the crisis $170
bn are obtained.
We see that within this model framework the simple measure of increasing the equity to as-
set ratio has a strong impact on insurance premiums across the financial sector. For Non-TBTF
banks this effect is even stronger, but also for TBTF institutions the average amount can be
reduced by around 40%, i.e., potential bailouts should be much cheaper for tax payers. However,
introducing an unweighted leverage to asset ratio of 30% is a critical and difficult requirement.
Regulators have to decide about timing and implementation design. Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig,
and Pfleiderer (2011) discuss this issue and provide possible solutions.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I revisit on the one hand some of the theoretical implications of the existence of
systemic relevant banks on the market mechanism or market based variables as asset volatility.
On the other hand, I compare and study two established ways for estimating the value of the
induced implicit guarantee of ‘too big to fail’ banks in the United States from 2004-2009. First,
by conducting a regression analysis, I find evidence that TBTF banks were able to refinance
under cheaper conditions during the stress period 2008-2009. In the quiet period from 2004-
2007 no statistically significant effect could be observed. The second part of the work deals with
the contingent-claim approach which determines the fair risk premium for insuring the liability
side of a financial institution. This approach uses market-based input parameters and therefore
reflects the market perception about risk and future returns. As expected, also during the years
2008 and 2009, the premiums relative to total assets of the banks differ between Non-TBTF and
TBTF banks. For all financial firms, the average difference in the relative guarantee levels of
Non-TBTF and TBTF banks is 1.28% for the whole period. In the period from the first quarter
2004 through the fourth quarter of 2007 this spread was 0.23% on average, then it increased to
3.39% for the last two years. In other words, for the time of the crisis the premiums for TBTF
banks are strongly reduced. This reduction corresponds to an absolute value of about $19.25 bn
per year if I take into account the amount of total assets of TBTF institutions. A decrease in
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the liability to asset ratio to 70% induces an average percental reduction of liability insurance
premiums for TBTF financial firms of around 40%.
The result about the endogeneity effect of the implicit guarantee on the estimation approach is
essential for interpreting and comparing both approaches. From the regulatory point of view, it
is in particular interesting to study the impact of higher capital requirements. The contingent-
claim approach allows in contrast to the cash-flow approach the quantification of a regulatory
change and shows the economic importance.
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Appendix A Merton framework
The estimation of the asset volatility and the analysis of the liability insurance premiums across
U.S. banks is based on Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974), though the actual asset and
liability paths for estimating the liability insurance premiums are simulated using the presented
framework from Lucas and McDonald (2006). In contrast to latter authors where the default of a
company possibly occurs during the debt maturity when the firm value falls below some default
threshold, Merton (1974) assumes that the company defaults at time T when the company is
not able to pay the contractual obligations. Furthermore, the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds,
the value of the firm is independent of the capital structure where the assets are financed by a
homogenous class of debt and equity.
I repeat some details of the framework and derive the used relationship between equity and
asset volatility. First, the risk-neutral asset evolution is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian
motion
dAt = (rf − q)Atdt+ σAAtdZt, (13)
where rf is the risk-free rate, q =
δE
A the dividend yield on assets (δ the dividend yield on equity),
σA denotes the asset volatility and (Zt)t is a standard Brownian motion. Then it is supposed
that another security can be expressed by a function of the value of the firm A and time, i.e.,
E = F (A, t). Merton derives a PDE which has to be satisfied by any security dependent on
A and t. The boundary conditions distinguish then different securities as equity or debt. The
security can be evaluated with contingent-claim analysis; equity as a European call option on
the underlying assets A and future book value of debt as the strike price L. The dynamics of E
are given by a similar stochastic differential equation
dEt = (rf − δ)Etdt+ σEEtdWt. (14)
With Itoˆ’s Lemma we can write
dEt = FAdAt +
1
2
FAA(dAt)
2 + Ftdt
= FA((rf − q)Atdt+ σAAtdZt) + 1
2
FAAσ
2
AA
2
tdt+ Ftdt
=
[1
2
FAAσ
2
AA
2
t + (rf − q)AtFA + Ft
]
dt+ σAAtFAdZt, (15)
where FA (FAA) denotes the first (second) derivative of F with respect to A. Comparing equa-
tions (14) and (15) we have
rfEt = rfFt =
1
2
FAAσ
2
AA
2
t + (rf − q)AtFA + Ft + qAt (16)
σEEt = σEFt = σAAtFA (17)
dWt = dZt. (18)
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With equation (17) we obtain
σA = σE
Et
At
(FA)
−1, (19)
therefore left to determine F which is in this context the value of an European call option C
which is given by
C(A0, 0) = EQ[e
−rfT (AT −DT )+],
where Q is the risk neutral measure, AT the firm value at the debt maturity date T and DT the
promised payment to debtholders. The result of this equation for stocks with dividends is well
known (see e.g. Shreve (2005)) and given by
E0 = A0e
−qTN(d1)−DT e−rfTN(d2) (20)
d1 = (log(A0/DT ) + (rf − q + σ
2
A
2
)T )/(σA
√
T ),
d2 = d1 − σA
√
T ,
where the dividends shareholders receive up to time T with rate dAt = qAtdt have to be incor-
porated, i.e., accumulated over [0, T ]:∫ T
0
A0qe
−qtdt = A0(1− e−qT ). (21)
In each time step dividends q are paid out to shareholders and therefore the asset value decreases
accordingly. After adding (21) to equation (20), the first derivative with respect to A in equation
(19) can be calculated to establish the relationship between σA and σE .
Appendix B Repeated debt guarantee - Lucas and McDonald (2009)
For convenience I present the elaboration of Lucas and McDonald (2009). They use the following
notation: Xm(t) is the value of X at time mT + t, where m ∈ N0. Each period has length T . To
describe the framework with compact and interpretable expressions Lucas and McDonald (2009)
use a stationary framework where they have to impose some very strong assumptions. First, it
is assumed that the target leverage ratio is fixed, therefore the decision about the issuing debt
amount is exogenous. At the beginning of each period mT the bank issues debt such that
Dm(T ) = γe
rfTAm(0), (22)
where Dm(T ) is the debt value at mT +T (at the end of the respective period), Am(0) the asset
value at time mT and γerfT represents the constant leverage ratio. Then it is possible with
equations (3) and (22) to express the guarantee value for an insured institution for one period
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at each reset date mT proportional to the asset value:
gm =
Gm(0)
Am(0)
=
DIm(0)−DUm(0)
Am(0)
=
e−rfTEm[max{Dm(T )−Am(T ), 0}]
Am(0)
=
Em[max{γAm(0)− e−rfTAm(T ), 0}]
Am(0)
= Em[max{γ − e
−rfTAm(T )
Am(0)
, 0}].
Note, the guarantee value in each period is just dependent on the expectation regarding the
evolution of operating assets, because also in cases where operating assets are not sufficient and
shareholders do not decide to default, debtholders receive the outstanding liabilities (the differ-
ence between debt and operating assets) but then not paid from the guarantor but from existing
shareholders. In each case debtholders are insured and therefore do not require the associated
risk premium. This results on the one hand in a dividend stream for shareholders, because each
period they do not default they are able to issue again secured debt, on the other hand in a cost
stream, because there are states where they pay the outstanding amount to be able to realize
expected future rewards from the guarantee.
Let pjm, j ∈ {I, U} denote the risk-neutral probability, conditional on the information set at
time mT , that bank j does not declare bankruptcy at the end of this period (m + 1)T . As
already noted: for the uninsured institution U this is Pm[Am+1(0) > Dm(T )], for the insured
bank I the continuity condition is more intricated and will be explained later. Since the guar-
antee value is expressed as a ratio of total assets and total assets increase through time, the
value has to be scaled by the expected asset growth rate of the period under consideration. The
term λm denotes the expectation of the asset growth rate for the period [(m + 1)T, (m + 2)T ]
conditional on ‘no bankruptcy’ at time (m+ 1)T .23
Lucas and McDonald (2009) assume a stationary environment, i.e., they can omit the time
indices. Each period has the same distributional properties where up to now any stochastic
dynamics were not specified. The value of the dividend stream starting with current asset value
A, is then:
ΓA = gA
∞∑
i=0
e−rf iT (λI pI)i. (23)
The counterpart of the dividend stream is the cost component which arises in states of the
world where uninsured firms would declare bankruptcy, but shareholders of insured institutions
23Here I want to be clear about the time structure of the different introduced elements, whereas in the stationary
framework the differences do not matter. For instance, to be able to issue secured debt at time 2T , the bank has
to stay in business at 2T , the associated probability is p1 (so the position is time T ). The discounted expected
guarantee ratio at time 2T is denoted by g2 where the guarantee refers to period [2T, 2T + T ]. Therefore, the
relevant survival probability is p1(0). For this guarantee value the asset growth rate is essential and is denoted
by λ1, that is the expected asset growth rate for period [2T, 3T ] under the condition that the institution is not
defaulted at time 2T . This notation is drawn from Lucas and McDonald (2009).
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repay the debt amount to stay in business. Again only one period is considered and then the
stationarity condition is used for more periods. At time mT the expected cost component
expressed as a ratio of total assets ηAm(0) is given by
ηAm(0) =
∫ Dm(T )
Am(0)(γe
rfT−Γ+H)
(
γerfTAm(0)− αf(α|Am(0))
)
dα, (24)
where f(α|Am(0)) is the density function of asset value Am(T ), at time (m + 1)T , conditional
on the asset value at time mT , H is the cost component describing the expected repaying of
shareholders to debtholders in the subsequent periods. Therefore, at the beginning of each
period shareholders are expected to pay outstanding liabilities at the end of the specific period
if they not exceed the potential expected benefits of repeated debt guarantees in the future ΓA
less the incidental expected costs HA. This is expressed in the integral boundaries: only total
asset levels between Am(0)(γe
rfT − Γ + H) and Dm(T ) are included in the calculation. If the
dividend stream associated with secured debt ΓA is higher, shareholders are willing to pay more
in order to realize these future rents. As before, also the cost component is dependent on the
survival probability and has to be scaled by the asset growth rate:
HA = ηA
∞∑
i=0
e−rf T (λI pI)i. (25)
All in all, Lucas and McDonald (2009) have introduced two objects which are fundamental to
understand the difference between insured and uninsured institutions: dividend and cost stream.
Now they are able to specify the continuity condition for an insured institution: at each debt reset
datemT the survival probability of an insured firm is given by Pm[Am+1(0)(1+Γ−H) > Dm(T )].
With this insight market assets on a debt reset date are defined as A∗m(0) = Am(0)(1 + Γ−H).
The market asset volatility is then proportional to the asset volatility of operating assets, i.e.,
σA∗ = σA(1 + Γ−H).
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Appendix C Tables and figures
Table 4: Time line with events during the considered period 2004-2009.
Date Event Description
May 2006 Acquisition of Golden West
by Wachovia
On May 7 the acquisition is announced. The financial
statements end at the second quarter of 2006. Golden
West Financial reports total assets of about $129 billion
at this time.
January-July 2008 Acquisition of Countrywide
by Bank of America
On January 11 announcement to purchase Countrywide
Financial. After the approval of the Fed and shareholders
the acquisition is completed in July. End of March total
assets amount for $199 billion.
March 2008 Term Auction Facility
(TAF) & Fed facilitates
Financing
The Federal Reserve Board announces $50 billion Term
Auction Facility (TAF) auctions and extends the TAF
for at least 6 months. The Federal Reserve Bank of New
York announces that it will provide term financing to
facilitate JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s acquisition of The
Bear Stearns Companies Inc.
September 2008 Conservatorship for Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac
On September 7 announcement of James B. Lockhart
from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) that
the U.S. Treasury (through the FHFA) will act as the
conservator to operate the enterprises until they are sta-
bilized.
September 2008 Failure of Lehman Brothers On September 15 Lehman Brothers files for Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection.
September 2008 Failure of Washington Mu-
tual
On September 25 the banking operations of Washington
Mutual Inc. are sold in a transaction facilitated by the
Office of Thrift Supervision and the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation to JPMorgan Chase for $1.9 billion.
Claims by equity, subordinated and senior debt holders
are not acquired. End of June Washington mutual re-
ports total assets of $310 billion.
September 2008 -
January 2009
Acquisition of Merrill Lynch
by Bank of America
On September 14 Merrill agreed to a purchase by the
Bank of America. In January it ceased to exist as a
separate entity. End of 2008 total assets added up to
$668 billion.
October 2008 Acquisition of Wachovia by
Wells Fargo
On October 3 they agree to merge in an all-stock trans-
action. At the end of the third quarter Wachovia reports
total assets of $764 billion, which is at this time the sev-
enth largest amount across U.S. banks.
October 2008 Acquisition of National City
by PNC
On October 24 PNC announces that it has finalized a
purchase agreement for National City. The total assets
of National City add up to $144 billion at 3Q 2008.
February-May 2009 Stress Capital Assistance
Program
Stress test for the largest domestic bank holding com-
panies using a common set of scenarios and conceptual
framework. On May 7 the results reveal an aggregate gap
of $75 billion. Banks which deem inadequately capital-
ized are automatically qualified for funds of the Capital
Assistance Plan.
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Table 5: Industry classification and number of banks in each category. A (*) indicates an industry
in which financial institutions report a Tier-1 ratio.
Financial Institutions 2-digit
SIC
SIC
Code
Financial Service Industry Number
Depository Institutions 60 6020 Commercial Banks* 527
6035 Federal Savings Institutions* 169
6036 Savings Institutions, Not Federally Char-
tered*
68
6099 Functions Related to Depository Banking 15
Nondepository Credit Institutions 61 6111 Federal Credit Agencies 6
6141 Personal Credit Institutions 18
6153 Short-Term Business Credit Institutions 5
6159 Miscellaneous Business Credit Institu-
tions
14
6162 Mortgage Bankers and Loan Correspon-
dents
12
6172 Finance Lessors 3
6199 Finance Services 2
Investment Banks 62 6200 Security and Commodity Brokers, Deal-
ers, Exchanges, and Services, et al.
12
6211 Security Brokers, Dealers and Flotation
Companies
39
6282 Investment Advice 26
Total 916
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Table 6: TBTF banks and SIC classification.
Financial Institutions SIC
Code
Name
Depository Institutions
Commercial Banks 6020 Bank of America Corp
Bank of New York Mellon Corp
BB&T Corp
JP Morgan Chase
Fifth Third Bancorp
Keycorp
National City Corp
PNC Financial Services Group
Regions Financial Corp
State Street Corp
Sunstrust Banks Inc
US Bancorp
Wachovia
Wells Fargo & Co
Federal Savings Institutions 6035 Washington Mutual Inc
Golden West Financial Corp
Nondepository Credit Institutions
Federal Credit Agencies 6111 Centerline Holding Co
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae)
Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Fama Mac)
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)
SLM Corporation (Sallie Mae)
The Student Loan Corporation
Personal Credit Institutions 6141 Capital One Financial Corp
Mortgage Bankers and Loan Correspon-
dents
6162 Countrywide Financial Corp
Finance Services 6199 American Express Co
Citigroup Inc
Investment Banks
Security Brokers and Dealers 6211 Goldman Sachs Group
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc
Merrill Lynch & Co Inc
Morgan Stanley
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Table 7: Summary statistics of total assets, leverage ratio, equity volatility, Tier-1-Ratio and
interest expenses. All measures refer to quarterly observations from 2004-2009 across all banks.
N denotes the number of observations. Lev. Ratio (market leverage ratio) refers to the quotient
of total liabilities and the sum of market value of equity and total liabilities. σE denotes equity
volatility and is determined by calculating the rolling 60-day annualized standard deviation of
equity price changes (historical equity volatility). Commercial banks have to report the
Tier-1-Ratio which is defined as the ratio of core capital and risk weighted assets. Interest
expenses are interest and related expenses in percentages of the reported total liabilities at the
end of each quarter quadrupled to obtain annualized expressions. The term ’q’ denotes the
quantile, i.e., 10q refers to the 10th quantile in the empirical distribution of the particular
variable.
Total assets Lev. Ratio σE Tier-1-Ratio Interest expenses
(in mio. USD) in % in % in % in %
Commercial banks
Mean 13556.57 85.68 44.58 11.35 2.57
Median 1093.89 86.57 30.41 10.79 2.52
Std. Dev. 101665.5 9.37 39.89 3.42 1.00
10q 317.91 77.95 16.26 7.92 1.42
90q 10644.88 94.84 93.10 15.42 3.75
N 14072 14072 14072 11685 14072
Credit institutions
Mean 76486.95 68.03 62.74 . 4.68
Median 1591.54 77.26 43.45 . 4.28
Std. Dev. 298575.3 27.51 58.47 . 4.51
10q 151.72 22.48 20.17 . 1.24
90q 97765.59 96.51 132.43 . 7.30
N 1026 1026 1026 0 1026
Investment banks
Mean 63380.82 49.19 56.86 . 2.57
Median 1775.05 45.94 42.36 . 1.92
Std. Dev. 207564.2 30.85 44.36 . 4.48
10q 58.89 10.09 21.02 . 0.19
90q 53196.95 92.90 109.10 . 4.73
N 1165 1165 1165 0 1165
Total
Mean 21095.88 81.96 46.61 11.35 2.70
Median 1126.529 86.07 31.87 10.79 2.55
Std. Dev. 134227.2 17.11 41.96 3.42 1.96
10q 299.564 69.39 16.66 7.92 1.31
90q 13821.7 94.79 96.79 15.42 3.98
N 16263 16263 16263 11685 16263
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Table 8: Total asset distribution across commercial banks, credit institutions and
investment banks. This table presents the average total asset amount of Non-TBTF and
TBTF banks in each considered subset (commercial banks, depository institutions and
investment banks) as a fraction of total assets of all financial firms in the sample in each quarter
for the whole period. N denotes the number of observations.
2004 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2005 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2006 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Non-TBTF
Commercial banks
Total assets in % 22.75 19.12 18.45 18.44 18.24 17.40 18.22 16.23 16.92 16.88 16.94 14.74
N 586 586 586 592 595 604 605 602 601 600 598 593
Credit institutions
Total assets in % 1.70 1.46 1.46 1.50 1.59 1.60 1.74 1.63 1.67 1.62 1.69 1.59
N 35 37 36 37 38 39 39 35 34 34 32 33
Investment banks
Total assets in % 1.85 1.56 1.46 1.44 1.42 1.32 1.48 2.14 2.36 2.31 2.45 2.36
N 34 35 35 34 36 37 38 39 38 40 40 43
Financial firms
Total assets in % 26.30 22.14 21.36 21.38 21.24 20.32 21.43 20.00 20.95 20.80 21.07 18.69
N 655 658 657 663 669 680 682 676 673 674 670 669
TBTF
Commercial banks
Total assets in % 46.54 40.56 42.47 42.15 42.42 39.44 42.22 39.07 41.46 41.16 40.04 37.73
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15 15
Credit institutions
Total assets in % 3.26 16.58 15.92 15.89 15.52 21.01 15.18 20.59 15.33 15.20 16.04 21.55
N 6 7 7 7 7 8 7 8 7 7 7 8
Investment banks
Total assets in % 23.91 20.73 20.25 20.58 20.81 19.23 21.17 20.35 22.27 22.84 22.85 22.03
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Financial firms
Total assets in % 73.70 77.86 78.64 78.62 78.76 79.68 78.57 80.00 79.05 79.20 78.93 81.31
N 26 27 27 27 27 28 27 28 27 27 26 27
2007 1Q 2Q 3Q Q4 2008 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2009 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Non-TBTF
Commercial banks
Total assets in % 14.07 12.44 12.07 12.01 11.80 12.36 12.62 13.05 12.95 12.68 13.99 12.59
N 584 583 577 563 561 556 551 532 530 521 511 501
Credit institutions
Total assets in % 1.60 1.51 1.44 1.34 1.34 1.11 1.12 1.15 1.12 1.08 1.16 0.53
N 34 36 37 36 35 35 36 33 33 33 32 29
Investment banks
Total assets in % 2.42 2.43 2.68 3.01 2.78 2.86 3.01 3.03 3.11 3.47 4.08 4.64
N 47 45 50 52 53 54 53 53 57 56 56 55
Financial firms
Total assets in % 18.10 16.39 16.19 16.36 15.92 16.33 16.75 17.24 17.19 17.23 19.22 17.76
N 665 664 664 651 649 645 640 618 620 610 599 585
TBTF
Commercial banks
Total assets in % 36.89 34.95 35.20 36.73 36.64 38.20 41.77 43.16 46.24 45.98 50.92 45.68
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 14 12 12 12 12 12
Credit institutions
Total assets in % 21.69 26.13 25.88 24.99 24.88 24.52 24.47 25.94 26.70 26.72 23.55 26.14
N 8 9 9 9 10 9 9 8 8 8 7 8
Investment banks
Total assets in % 23.32 22.53 22.73 21.92 22.56 20.96 17.01 13.67 9.87 10.07 6.31 10.41
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 2
Financial firms
Total assets in % 81.90 83.61 83.81 83.64 84.08 83.67 83.25 82.76 82.81 82.77 80.78 82.24
N 27 28 28 28 29 28 26 23 22 22 20 22
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Table 9: Market capitalization distribution across commercial banks, credit
institutions and investment banks. This table presents the average market capitalization
(market cap) of Non-TBTF and TBTF banks in each considered subset (commercial banks,
depository institutions and investment banks) as a fraction of market capitalization of all
financial firms in the sample at the end of each quarter for the whole time period. Market cap is
the product of outstanding common shares and closing price at the end of the quarter. N
denotes the number of observations.
2004 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2005 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2006 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Non-TBTF
Commercial banks
Market cap in % 28.20 23.78 23.43 23.61 23.26 23.26 23.69 20.49 20.78 20.58 20.68 19.21
N 586 586 586 592 595 604 605 602 601 600 598 593
Credit institutions
Market cap in % 2.67 2.29 2.32 2.50 2.40 2.45 2.52 2.36 2.32 2.29 1.89 1.87
N 35 37 36 37 38 39 39 35 34 34 32 33
Investment banks
Market cap in % 5.93 4.50 4.29 4.89 5.07 5.51 6.44 7.09 8.50 8.48 8.83 8.89
N 34 35 35 34 36 37 38 39 38 40 40 43
Financial firms
Market cap in % 36.80 30.57 30.04 30.99 30.73 31.22 32.65 29.94 31.59 31.36 31.40 29.97
N 655 658 657 663 669 680 682 676 673 674 670 669
TBTF
Commercial banks
Market cap in % 45.07 40.77 43.66 42.75 42.08 40.83 40.40 40.94 41.77 42.30 42.67 40.60
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15 15
Credit institutions
Market cap in % 4.16 18.06 16.81 16.68 16.51 18.74 16.48 18.41 15.07 15.30 14.83 17.54
N 6 7 7 7 7 8 7 8 7 7 7 8
Investment banks
Market cap in % 13.97 10.59 9.49 9.59 10.68 9.22 10.47 10.72 11.58 11.04 11.11 11.89
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Financial firms
Market cap in % 63.20 69.43 69.96 69.01 69.27 68.78 67.35 70.06 68.41 68.64 68.60 70.03
N 26 27 27 27 27 28 27 28 27 27 26 27
2007 1Q 2Q 3Q Q4 2008 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2009 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Non-TBTF
Commercial banks
Market cap in % 19.14 17.03 16.84 17.48 18.17 22.79 22.01 26.45 29.21 22.16 19.99 21.19
N 584 583 577 563 561 556 551 532 530 521 511 501
Credit institutions
Market cap in % 1.76 1.81 1.72 1.31 1.06 1.12 1.02 0.92 0.85 0.96 0.87 0.88
N 34 36 37 36 35 35 36 33 33 33 32 29
Investment banks
Market cap in % 9.45 10.39 11.83 14.73 13.66 14.47 12.79 12.68 14.90 13.91 13.13 13.10
N 47 45 50 52 53 54 53 53 57 56 56 55
Financial firms
Market cap in % 30.34 29.24 30.40 33.52 32.89 38.39 35.83 40.04 44.95 37.03 33.99 35.16
N 665 664 664 651 649 645 640 618 620 610 599 585
TBTF
Commercial banks
Market cap in % 40.78 38.99 41.14 41.22 42.17 36.64 42.98 45.72 40.40 46.89 46.21 43.50
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 14 12 12 12 12 12
Credit institutions
Market cap in % 16.80 19.02 18.05 13.04 14.10 13.24 11.64 7.50 5.09 5.58 12.83 12.16
N 8 9 9 9 10 9 9 8 8 8 7 8
Investment banks
Market cap in % 12.08 12.75 10.42 12.22 10.83 11.74 9.55 6.74 9.56 10.50 6.97 9.17
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 2
Financial firms
Market cap in % 69.66 70.76 69.60 66.48 67.11 61.61 64.17 59.96 55.05 62.97 66.01 64.84
N 27 28 28 28 29 28 26 23 22 22 20 22
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Figure 6: Accounting and market leverage ratio development across commercial
banks, credit institutions and investment banks. Accounting leverage ratio refers to the
quotient of total liabilities and total assets reported in the financial statement at the end of each
quarter. Market leverage ratio refers to the quotient of total liabilities and the sum of market
value of equity and total liabilities. The first panel depicts the accounting leverage ratio
development of Non-TBTF and TBTF banks across financial industry classes separately. In the
second panel the respective market leverage ratios are plotted. The figures at the top of each
panel refer to the aggregate leverage ratio development (financial firms), respectively.
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Table 10: Interest expenses across commercial banks, credit institutions and
investment banks. This table provides the average interest and related expenses in
percentages of the reported total liabilities at the end of each quarter. Interest expenses are
quadrupled to obtain annualized expressions. N is the number of observations.
2004 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2005 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2006 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Non-TBTF
Commercial banks
Interest on debt in % 1.76 1.71 1.77 1.87 1.97 2.14 2.33 2.56 2.73 3.00 3.28 3.42
N 586 586 586 592 595 604 605 602 601 600 598 593
Credit institutions
Interest on debt in % 5.17 5.49 4.76 5.74 5.25 5.55 4.71 4.54 4.94 5.03 5.08 5.59
N 35 37 36 37 38 39 39 35 34 34 32 33
Investment banks
Interest on debt in % 1.85 1.89 2.34 1.96 2.01 1.86 2.21 2.16 2.15 2.28 2.50 2.83
N 34 35 35 34 36 37 38 39 38 40 40 43
Financial firms
Interest on debt in % 1.95 1.93 1.96 2.09 2.16 2.32 2.46 2.64 2.81 3.06 3.32 3.49
N 655 658 657 663 669 680 682 676 673 674 670 669
TBTF
Commercial banks
Interest on debt in % 1.23 1.21 1.33 1.54 1.74 2.00 2.26 2.57 2.75 3.05 3.24 3.32
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 15 15
Credit institutions
Interest on debt in % 1.95 2.07 2.19 2.40 2.51 2.91 3.03 3.45 3.49 3.87 4.10 4.25
N 6 7 7 7 7 8 7 8 7 7 7 8
Investment banks
Interest on debt in % 1.95 1.97 2.27 2.67 2.93 3.37 3.71 4.20 4.40 4.73 5.14 5.11
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Financial firms
Interest on debt in % 1.50 1.54 1.69 1.93 2.12 2.46 2.67 3.06 3.18 3.51 3.77 3.86
N 26 27 27 27 27 28 27 28 27 27 26 27
2007 1Q 2Q 3Q Q4 2008 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2009 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Non-TBTF
Commercial banks
Interest on debt in % 3.44 3.52 3.58 3.48 3.16 2.75 2.66 2.54 2.26 2.11 1.96 1.78
N 584 583 577 563 561 556 551 532 530 521 511 501
Credit institutions
Interest on debt in % 4.68 6.23 5.05 5.28 4.90 4.54 4.69 5.08 4.60 4.48 4.89 4.63
N 34 36 37 36 35 35 36 33 33 33 32 29
Investment banks
Interest on debt in % 4.43 4.36 3.56 2.50 3.31 2.11 2.22 2.55 1.98 2.07 2.11 1.85
N 47 45 50 52 53 54 53 53 57 56 56 55
Financial firms
Interest on debt in % 3.58 3.72 3.66 3.50 3.27 2.79 2.74 2.68 2.36 2.23 2.13 1.92
N 665 664 664 651 649 645 640 618 620 610 599 585
TBTF
Commercial banks
Interest on debt in % 3.25 3.27 3.33 3.17 2.62 2.07 1.92 1.59 1.34 1.20 1.10 0.99
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 14 12 12 12 12 12
Credit institutions
Interest on debt in % 4.10 4.27 4.36 4.56 3.46 2.73 2.94 2.43 1.91 1.60 1.40 1.76
N 8 9 9 9 10 9 9 8 8 8 7 8
Investment banks
Interest on debt in % 5.09 5.56 5.20 5.35 4.25 3.80 3.44 2.91 1.34 0.89 0.60 0.86
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 2
Financial firms
Interest on debt in % 3.77 3.92 3.93 3.93 3.14 2.53 2.45 2.05 1.55 1.32 1.18 1.26
N 27 28 28 28 29 28 26 23 22 22 20 22
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Table 11: Determinants of the refinancing cost level during the quiet (2004-2007) and
stress period (2008-2009). This table presents the estimation results for the regression
specified in equation (12). Associated Newey-West standard errors accounting for the
time-effect with a lag of five appear in parentheses beneath. ***, ** and *, denote the statistical
significance of the estimates at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Quiet period 2004-2007 Stress period 2008-2009
Intercept -25.81*** 1.265
(1.514) (1.101)
log(Assetst) -0.0137** -0.114***
(0.00604) (0.00792)
rt 9.696*** 1.255**
(0.645) (0.628)
r2t -0.946*** -0.166*
(0.0688) (0.0959)
S&P 500 Returnt 6.391*** -0.146
(0.265) (0.147)
S&P 500 Returnt−1 4.067*** -1.484***
(0.203) (0.216)
Spreadt 0.914*** -0.188***
(0.0370) (0.0378)
Slopet -0.525*** -0.676***
(0.0104) (0.0606)
σEt 0.171*** 0.0882***
(0.0409) (0.0286)
σEt−1 0.0444 0.0752**
(0.0412) (0.0312)
levt−1 3.610*** 1.831***
(0.188) (0.288)
Dummy-TBTFt -0.0617* -0.195***
(0.0354) (0.0565)
Tier-1-Ratiot -0.00500* -0.0303***
(0.00281) (0.00420)
Observations 7,606 3,947
R2 0.622 0.434
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Table 12: Asset volatility (quarter) of financial firms. This table presents summary
statistics for the asset volatility across financial firms subdivided into Non-TBTF and TBTF
institutions quarterly from 2004-2009. The values are obtained by solving equations (8) and (9)
using a calculated rolling 60-day annualized standard deviation of equity price changes
(historical equity volatility), time to maturity of one year and market capitalization, total
liabilities and dividend yield reported at the end of each quarter. All variables are winsorized at
the 2nd and 98th percentile at each quarter across all banks (independent of TBTF or not).
Mean represents the average value of the asset volatility for each quarter across Non-TBTF and
TBTF financial firms, respectively. Std. Dev. captures the variation of this value. Median is the
value separating the higher from the lower half of the respective sample. Minimum and
Maximum values indicate the range of asset volatility values for each quarter across all banks.
N is the number of observations. Mean diff is the difference between the mean value of
Non-TBTF and TBTF financial firms.
2004 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2005 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2006 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Financial firms
Non-TBTF
Mean 6.1 6.8 5.9 0.058 5.6 6.3 5.1 5.4 5.2 6.3 5.8 5.2
Median 4.3 4.5 3.9 0.042 3.8 4.4 3.9 4.0 3.7 4.2 3.8 3.6
Std. Dev 6.3 7.8 6.5 0.055 5.8 6.0 4.2 0.052 5.3 7.1 6.1 5.1
Min 1.5 1.6 1.3 0.015 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.2
Max 45.4 52.2 45.0 42.6 43.8 39.9 29.4 38.1 33.6 42.6 38.9 30.5
N 630 634 633 642 646 656 657 651 646 646 645 643
TBTF
Mean 3.2 3.9 6.0 3.4 3.1 3.1 2.6 3.0 2.7 4.2 2.9 2.4
Median 2.9 3.0 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.4 2.7 2.7 3.1 2.4 2.0
Std. Dev 1.5 3.2 11.0 1.6 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.1 5.6 1.5 1.2
Min 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.7 1.3 1.1
Max 8.2 16.8 42.8 7.0 7.0 6.8 5.8 6.4 6.4 31.7 8.2 6.6
N 25 25 25 22 24 24 24 25 26 27 25 27
Mean diff 2.9 2.9 -0.2 2.5 2.5 3.1 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.1 2.9 2.8
2007 1Q 2Q 3Q Q4 2008 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2009 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Financial firms
Non-TBTF
Mean 5.4 5.2 7.7 7.9 9.4 7.0 14.5 20.3 15.7 12.2 7.0 6.2
Median 3.6 3.4 5.3 5.6 6.2 4.4 10.1 12.7 9.6 7.0 4.5 3.9
Std. Dev 6.0 5.7 7.6 7.5 10.1 7.8 13.4 21.9 17.3 14.4 6.9 6.7
Min 1.2 1.0 1.6 1.7 2.0 1.5 2.4 2.5 1.9 1.5 1.0 1.0
Max 34.5 35.7 41.9 44.1 55.9 43.2 75.4 114.2 99.6 93.6 37.9 39.0
N 640 639 638 625 623 620 616 596 600 589 577 563
TBTF
Mean 2.9 2.7 4.5 4.9 6.7 4.1 18.1 18.4 16.3 12.1 4.6 3.5
Median 2.7 2.5 4.7 4.5 5.6 3.9 18.2 15.5 13.1 11.5 4.5 2.8
Std. Dev 0.9 1.3 1.8 1.8 3.4 2.0 9.2 10.2 9.3 7.0 2.1 2.0
Min 1.5 1.3 1.7 2.6 2.7 1.5 5.7 8.8 5.1 2.0 1.6 1.3
Max 4.7 7.5 9.2 9.2 16.1 10.6 45.4 52.7 39.0 30.8 11.5 10.4
N 26 27 28 28 29 27 24 21 18 19 18 20
Mean diff 2.5 2.5 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.9 -3.6 1.8 -0.6 0.0 2.4 2.7
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Table 13: Asset volatility (quarter) of commercial banks. This table presents summary
statistics for the asset volatility across commercial banks subdivided into Non-TBTF and TBTF
institutions quarterly from 2004-2009. The values are obtained by solving equations (8) and (9)
using a calculated rolling 60-day annualized standard deviation of equity price changes
(historical equity volatility), time to maturity of one year and market capitalization, total
liabilities and dividend yield reported at the end of each quarter. All variables are winsorized at
the 2nd and 98th percentile at each quarter across all banks (independent of TBTF or not).
Mean represents the average value of the asset volatility for each quarter across Non-TBTF and
TBTF financial firms, respectively. Std. Dev captures the variation of this value. Median is the
value separating the higher from the lower half of the respective sample. Minimum and
Maximum values indicate the range of asset volatility values for each quarter across all banks.
N is the number of observations. Mean diff is the difference between the mean value of
Non-TBTF and TBTF commercial banks.
2004 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2005 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2006 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Commercial banks
Non-TBTF
Mean 4.88 5.65 4.62 4.86 4.42 5.21 4.31 4.53 4.30 4.88 4.68 4.18
Median 4.07 4.33 3.76 3.98 3.66 4.28 3.66 3.78 3.57 3.93 3.69 3.40
Std. Dev. 3.27 6.04 4.11 3.45 3.17 3.85 2.65 3.38 3.43 4.35 4.02 3.28
Min 1.51 1.61 1.34 1.51 1.37 1.57 1.27 1.45 1.29 1.43 1.21 1.19
Max 32.26 52.18 43.42 41.00 34.07 37.62 25.84 38.13 33.55 41.90 36.85 28.86
N 569 571 568 578 579 590 592 589 587 581 584 575
TBTF
Mean 3.00 3.15 5.14 2.84 2.63 2.93 2.44 2.86 2.71 3.09 2.65 2.35
Median 2.91 2.98 2.50 2.60 2.64 2.77 2.41 2.84 2.68 2.99 2.46 1.99
Std. Dev. 0.98 0.77 10.08 1.04 0.80 0.76 0.70 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.70 1.28
Min 1.75 1.90 1.37 1.57 1.41 1.74 1.32 1.51 1.62 1.99 1.92 1.55
Max 5.46 4.37 42.76 5.56 4.30 4.01 3.58 3.99 3.98 4.52 4.34 6.64
N 16 16 16 15 16 15 16 16 16 16 14 15
Mean diff 1.88 2.51 -0.52 2.02 1.79 2.28 1.87 1.67 1.59 1.79 2.03 1.83
2007 1Q 2Q 3Q Q4 2008 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2009 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Commercial banks
Non-TBTF
Mean 4.12 4.00 5.86 6.05 6.79 5.15 11.54 15.08 11.56 8.81 5.35 4.52
Median 3.38 3.23 4.91 5.19 5.67 4.16 9.08 11.33 8.67 6.41 4.24 3.62
Std. Dev. 3.62 3.48 4.13 4.04 5.07 4.18 8.96 14.36 11.19 9.42 4.56 3.94
Min 1.19 0.95 1.59 1.69 1.96 1.47 2.42 2.54 1.87 1.54 1.02 0.97
Max 34.47 32.88 38.06 33.50 44.35 38.32 60.95 114.20 99.62 77.79 37.94 39.00
N 570 569 563 548 547 543 535 522 518 507 502 489
TBTF
Mean 3.02 2.57 5.21 5.19 7.27 4.42 22.54 17.22 19.97 13.73 4.58 3.58
Median 2.74 2.54 5.21 5.06 6.39 4.15 21.83 15.48 16.48 12.11 4.53 3.51
Std. Dev. 0.77 0.65 1.55 1.51 2.89 1.52 8.58 7.22 9.61 6.04 0.87 1.16
Min 2.19 1.61 3.04 3.53 4.85 2.36 12.07 10.58 10.40 6.19 3.09 2.32
Max 4.73 4.17 9.17 8.31 15.18 7.10 45.40 32.88 39.01 30.76 5.72 5.76
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 13 12 11 12 12 12
Mean diff 1.10 1.43 0.65 0.86 -0.48 0.72 -11.00 -2.14 -8.41 -4.92 0.77 0.94
86
Table 14: Asset volatility (quarter) development across commercial banks, credit
institutions and investment banks. Asset vola refers to the average of calculated asset
volatilities of each subclass. The values for each bank are obtained by solving equations (8) and
(9) using a calculated rolling 60-day annualized standard deviation of equity price changes
(historical equity volatility), time to maturity of one year and market capitalization, total
liabilities and dividend yield reported at the end of each quarter. All variables are winsorized at
the 2nd and 98th percentile at each quarter across all banks (independent of TBTF or not). N
denotes the number of observations.
2004 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2005 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2006 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Non-TBTF
Commercial banks
Asset vola in % 4.88 5.65 4.62 4.86 4.42 5.21 4.31 4.53 4.30 4.88 4.68 4.18
N 569 571 568 578 579 590 592 589 587 581 584 575
Credit institutions
Asset vola in % 16.97 17.73 15.41 14.13 15.04 13.69 10.63 11.54 12.16 14.60 12.25 11.59
N 32 34 34 35 36 34 34 30 30 33 28 32
Investment banks
Asset vola in % 18.88 15.88 17.96 15.44 15.87 18.29 13.22 15.87 17.17 23.37 19.89 16.21
N 29 29 31 29 31 32 31 32 29 32 33 36
TBTF
Commercial banks
Asset vola in % 3.00 3.15 5.14 2.84 2.63 2.93 2.44 2.86 2.71 3.09 2.65 2.35
N 16 16 16 15 16 15 16 16 16 16 14 15
Credit institutions
Asset vola in % 4.77 6.93 10.43 5.03 4.78 4.44 3.33 3.59 3.23 3.85 3.94 2.81
N 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 8
Investment banks
Asset vola in % 2.23 1.76 1.81 1.55 1.63 1.65 1.26 1.66 1.74 9.47 1.72 1.74
N 4 3 3 1 2 3 2 2 3 4 4 4
2007 1Q 2Q 3Q Q4 2008 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2009 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Non-TBTF
Commercial banks
Asset vola in % 4.12 4.00 5.86 6.05 6.79 5.15 11.54 15.08 11.56 8.81 5.35 4.52
N 570 569 563 548 547 543 535 522 518 507 502 489
Credit institutions
Asset vola in % 13.36 10.85 16.23 16.73 24.69 15.53 27.58 50.08 35.35 29.84 17.88 17.37
N 30 28 30 31 35 28 35 27 32 32 28 27
Investment banks
Asset vola in % 18.40 18.05 25.37 24.15 30.69 23.29 39.38 60.71 45.92 34.81 17.86 17.04
N 40 42 45 46 41 49 46 47 50 50 47 47
TBTF
Commercial banks
Asset vola in % 3.02 2.57 5.21 5.19 7.27 4.42 22.54 17.22 19.97 13.73 4.58 3.58
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 13 12 11 12 12 12
Credit institutions
Asset vola in % 3.30 3.58 4.35 5.32 6.67 4.40 13.66 15.67 10.42 11.26 5.10 3.72
N 7 8 9 9 10 8 8 6 5 5 5 6
Investment banks
Asset vola in % 2.09 1.63 2.42 2.98 4.31 2.31 10.60 28.86 10.54 4.53 2.82 2.39
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 2
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Table 15: Asset volatility (year) development across commercial banks, credit
institutions and investment banks. Asset vola refers to the average of calculated asset
volatilities of each subclass. The values for each bank are obtained by solving equations (8) and
(9) using a calculated rolling 252-day annualized standard deviation of equity price changes
(historical equity volatility), time to maturity of one year and market capitalization, total
liabilities and dividend yield reported at the end of each quarter. All variables are winsorized at
the 2nd and 98th percentile at each quarter across all banks (independent of TBTF or not). N
denotes the number of observations and NaN stands for ’not a number’ (the entries (NaN) in
the TBTF investment bank subset are missing due to the winsorizing procedure).
2004 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2005 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2006 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Non-TBTF
Commercial banks
Asset vola in % 5.68 5.60 5.58 5.68 5.28 5.17 4.91 4.87 4.85 4.68 4.85 4.80
N 553 548 552 551 555 554 556 551 557 562 560 551
Credit institutions
Asset vola in % 17.67 18.00 15.30 15.20 14.38 13.44 12.24 14.53 13.04 12.71 12.35 12.83
N 24 26 26 28 32 32 31 28 26 26 26 29
Investment banks
Asset vola in % 20.25 17.47 17.84 18.27 15.51 15.11 14.79 15.97 18.04 19.34 19.38 18.81
N 26 25 26 27 28 27 28 28 29 30 27 30
TBTF
Commercial banks
Asset vola in % 3.32 3.07 3.65 4.40 3.95 3.78 3.16 2.77 2.92 2.84 3.84 3.80
N 16 16 16 16 16 16 15 16 15 16 15 15
Credit institutions
Asset vola in % 11.80 5.70 6.89 6.75 6.16 5.73 4.22 3.61 3.67 3.70 3.78 3.44
N 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 6 6 7
Investment banks
Asset vola in % 2.58 1.99 NaN NaN 1.81 1.64 NaN 1.62 1.78 4.52 3.43 3.82
N 3 3 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 3 3
2007 1Q 2Q 3Q Q4 2008 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2009 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Non-TBTF
Commercial banks
Asset vola in % 4.52 4.22 4.43 4.51 5.18 4.79 6.80 7.81 8.13 9.97 9.80 7.27
N 541 539 541 530 529 526 520 514 512 503 490 483
Credit institutions
Asset vola in % 13.76 12.78 14.16 14.93 16.06 19.38 18.99 25.06 27.19 36.78 40.00 31.42
N 27 26 28 28 30 32 33 29 30 30 30 27
Investment banks
Asset vola in % 19.87 18.60 19.13 21.23 23.08 21.83 26.43 34.04 38.09 46.75 41.94 28.29
N 34 36 38 40 37 40 41 44 47 48 46 45
TBTF
Commercial banks
Asset vola in % 3.74 3.44 3.31 3.66 4.45 4.15 8.89 8.93 11.39 19.84 19.49 13.88
N 15 15 15 15 15 15 14 12 12 12 12 12
Credit institutions
Asset vola in % 3.51 3.27 3.15 2.88 4.01 4.37 5.94 7.15 6.36 13.09 15.70 9.46
N 6 8 8 9 10 8 9 6 6 5 6 7
Investment banks
Asset vola in % 3.04 1.79 1.69 2.17 2.33 2.67 4.21 6.11 10.11 14.34 10.35 5.68
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 2
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Table 17: Relative guarantee values across commercial banks, credit institutions and
investment banks. This table provides the average relative guarantee values for each subclass
and all financial firms. Rel. guarantee value refers to the ratio of guarantee value to initial total
assets. The guarantee values for each bank are obtained by using the simulation approach
described in Subsection 3.4 with an assumed debt maturity of one year and a 60-day historical
equity volatility. All variables are winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentile at each quarter
across all banks (independent of TBTF or not). N denotes the number of observations.
2004 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2005 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2006 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Non-TBTF
Commercial banks
Rel. guarantee in % 0.47 0.85 0.43 0.30 0.15 0.44 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.36 0.26 0.14
N 566 566 564 573 574 584 586 584 581 579 579 572
Credit institutions
Rel. guarantee in % 2.85 3.91 2.61 1.58 1.96 2.16 0.66 0.52 0.66 0.52 0.82 0.58
N 31 36 35 34 37 36 34 30 31 33 29 32
Investment banks
Rel. guarantee in % 2.99 2.70 2.77 1.22 0.65 1.18 0.30 0.45 0.89 2.73 1.82 0.69
N 32 30 32 31 32 32 34 34 33 34 37 39
Financial firms
Rel. guarantee in % 0.56 0.80 0.55 0.30 0.17 0.44 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.38 0.27 0.14
TBTF
Commercial banks
Rel. guarantee in % 0.00 0.00 1.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 16 16 16 15 16 16 16 16 16 16 14 15
Credit institutions
Rel. guarantee in % 0.00 0.59 3.22 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.01
N 6 7 7 7 7 8 7 8 7 7 7 8
Investment banks
Rel. guarantee in % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.39 0.08 0.03
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Financial firms
Rel. guarantee in % 0.00 0.14 1.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01
2007 1Q 2Q 3Q Q4 2008 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2009 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Non-TBTF
Commercial banks
Rel. guarantee in % 0.13 0.16 1.01 0.79 1.45 0.92 6.96 15.23 12.97 8.64 2.59 1.55
N 567 561 561 546 541 537 531 512 506 499 490 482
Credit institutions
Rel. guarantee in % 1.55 1.37 4.80 1.81 2.47 2.13 7.25 62.32 48.97 20.21 3.66 1.27
N 30 35 32 35 33 32 31 31 33 32 32 28
Investment banks
Rel. guarantee in % 0.85 0.51 3.67 0.13 1.26 0.40 5.70 29.55 13.62 8.50 1.50 0.29
N 42 42 45 46 49 51 52 51 57 55 53 51
Financial firms
Rel. guarantee in % 0.16 0.20 1.06 0.68 1.30 0.81 6.04 15.46 12.72 8.08 2.32 1.29
TBTF
Commercial banks
Rel. guarantee in % 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.60 0.16 9.83 4.81 10.46 2.83 0.03 0.00
N 15 15 15 13 15 14 14 12 12 12 12 12
Credit institutions
Rel. guarantee in % 0.03 0.08 0.53 0.95 1.37 0.33 4.15 4.67 1.99 1.52 0.07 0.35
N 8 9 9 9 10 9 9 8 8 8 7 8
Investment banks
Rel. guarantee in % 0.08 0.06 0.60 0.24 0.91 0.15 3.29 15.32 2.36 0.07 0.00 0.00
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 2
Financial firms
Rel. guarantee in % 0.02 0.03 0.25 0.32 0.76 0.16 6.29 5.66 6.01 1.88 0.04 0.13
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Table 18: Relative guarantee values across financial firms with a target liability to
asset ratio of 70%. This table provides the average relative guarantee values for each subclass
and all financial firms. Rel. guarantee value refers to the ratio of guarantee value to initial total
assets. The guarantee values for each bank are obtained by using the simulation approach
described in Subsection 3.4 with an assumed debt maturity of one year and a 60-day historical
equity volatility where we reduce the target liability to asset ratio from 92% to 70%. All
variables are winsorized at the 2nd and 98th percentile at each quarter across all banks
(independent of TBTF or not). N denotes the number of observations.
2004 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2005 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2006 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Non-TBTF
Commercial banks
Rel guarantee in % 0.06 0.18 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01
N 566 563 564 572 574 583 585 583 580 576 577 571
Credit institutions
Rel guarantee in % 0.48 0.71 0.27 0.16 0.12 0.28 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03
N 33 37 35 35 37 37 35 30 31 33 29 32
Investment banks
Rel guarantee in % 0.49 0.68 0.92 0.13 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.72 0.18 0.03
N 30 32 32 31 32 32 34 35 34 38 39 40
Financial firms
Rel guarantee in % 0.10 0.24 0.17 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.01
TBTF
Commercial banks
Rel guarantee in % 0.00 0.00 1.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 16 16 16 15 16 16 16 16 16 16 14 15
Credit institutions
Rel guarantee in % 0.00 0.22 2.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 6 7 7 7 7 8 7 8 7 7 7 8
Investment banks
Rel guarantee in % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4
Financial firms
Rel guarantee in % 0.00 0.06 1.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2007 1Q 2Q 3Q Q4 2008 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 2009 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q
Non-TBTF
Commercial banks
Rel guarantee in % 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.18 0.06 2.53 6.35 5.99 3.98 0.53 0.19
N 565 561 558 539 539 532 531 513 510 497 489 479
Credit institutions
Rel guarantee in % 0.05 0.15 0.69 0.25 0.33 0.48 1.74 32.78 21.53 8.34 0.43 0.14
N 29 33 31 35 33 33 32 32 33 33 31 28
Investment banks
Rel guarantee in % 0.08 0.09 0.58 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.74 9.96 3.53 4.02 0.13 0.01
N 45 44 49 51 51 54 51 51 56 56 55 54
Financial firms 0.01 0.02 0.16 0.08 0.18 0.08 2.34 8.08 6.61 4.23 0.48 0.17
Rel guarantee in %
TBTF
Commercial banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 6.94 2.22 6.71 1.13 0.00 0.00
Rel guarantee in % 15 15 15 15 15 15 14 12 12 12 12 12
N
Credit institutions 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.21 0.01 1.32 2.52 0.62 0.31 0.00 0.00
Rel guarantee in % 8 9 9 9 10 9 9 6 5 8 7 8
N
Investment banks 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.36 11.65 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rel guarantee in % 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 2
N
Financial firms
Rel guarantee in % 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.00 4.36 3.66 4.47 0.73 0.00 0.00
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Figure 7: Relative guarantee values (year) across commercial banks, credit
institutions and investment banks. First panel: development of relative guarantee values of
financial firms and its composition across all subclasses. Second panel: difference in the
respective relative guarantee levels of Non-TBTF and TBTF banks. Relative guarantee value
refers to the ratio of guarantee value to initial total assets. The guarantee values for each bank
are obtained by using the simulation approach described in Subsection 3.4 with an assumed
debt maturity of one year and a 252-day historical equity volatility. All variables are winsorized
at the 2nd and 98th percentile at each quarter across all banks (independent of TBTF or not).
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Abstract
A model for the quantification of business interruption risk in a supply chain network is proposed. To
calculate the loss distribution induced by supply chain disruptions for a focal firm we apply a bottom-
up modeling approach. On the firm level we model production disruptions of various hazard events in
reduced form. We incorporate the network structure explicitly and define the loss propagation between
the firms. Via Monte Carlo simulation we analyze the effects of different model specifications and network
structures on the loss distribution of the focal firm. Our methodology and findings enable more informed
and transparent decisions for supply chain design.
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1 Introduction
As a result of fiercer competition, growing customer needs, accelerated globalization of markets
and rapidly developing technology, almost all industries have experienced massive pressure to
make intrafirm and interfirm business processes more efficient and/or more responsive. Firms
outsource manufacturing and research and development (R&D) activities, source in low-cost
countries, reduce inventories and slack, streamline the supply base and collaborate more in-
tensively with other members of the supply chain. For instance, as part of a globalized value
creation, Lenovo Group, Ltd. has manufacturing plants and fulfillment operations centers in
China, India, Mexico and Poland; its R&D centers are located in the USA, China and Japan.
The company sources parts from suppliers located all over the world, all of which are connected
through information channels, flows of funds and production flows that contribute to the overall
profits of the group. Naturally, the potential cost reductions and improved operational effi-
ciencies achieved through these management decisions come at a cost: supply chain networks
(SCNs) are becoming large and densely interconnected, which increases the production-inherent
complexity and uncertainty. Therefore, predictions regarding output losses from production
breakdowns in the supply chain are difficult to make due to the interaction of firms and the
dispersion of losses through the network. Last year the erupted ash of Iceland’s volcano Eyjaf-
jallajokull disrupted air transport of passengers but also of goods across Europe, which according
to European Commission could cost up to $3.3 bn.1 Recent disastrous events in Japan have
demonstrated the vulnerability and interconnectedness of the world’s supply chains. Lenovo
experienced issues with the supply of its second- and third-tier parts, such as small controllers
used in laptops, due to these events. However, the company’s supply chain team managed to
find additional supplies to avoid production disruptions (Stahl and Prince (2011)). In the car
industry shortages of parts delivered from Japan, forced General Motors to halt production at its
pickup plant in Shreveport, USA. Opel called a 24-hour production stop at its plant in Saragossa,
Spain, due to the lack of an electronic item. Toyota Motor Corp. reported a production loss of
260’000 cars in Japan from March 14 to April 8 2011 alone (Shino (2011)).
This paper introduces a conceptual framework for the field of disruption risk management in
SCNs. We propose a generic model for calculating the loss distribution of an appointed (in the
following ‘focal’) firm due to time-structured disruptions in a given network. For each firm in the
network, we allow a variety of hazard events which can be idiosyncratic (e.g., machine malfunc-
tion) or systematic and affecting more than one firm (e.g., natural catastrophes). We describe
the interaction of different hazard events on the firm level and account for the time required
for resolving the disruption using renewal-reward processes. The interaction and dispersion of
disruption losses across firms are obtained by incorporating the network topology explicitly. The
latter modeling aspect allows us to reproduce contagious effects; i.e., idiosyncratic disruptions
may affect other firms in the SCN by propagating through existing linkages among firms. By
1See European Commission, The impact of the Volcanic Ash Cloud Crisis on the Air Transport Industry,
SEC(2010) 533, 27th April 2010.
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incorporating systematic hazard events and network topology (contagion), we cover two funda-
mental aspects of interdependency among firms in SCNs that are essential for estimating the loss
distribution from disruptions in each node in the network. We implement the model and inves-
tigate some idealized examples via a Monte Carlo (MC) simulation. First, we show the effects
of different possible model specifications on expected losses and other distributional measures.
Then, we analyze typical and relevant settings for supply chain management. In particular, we
are interested in the impact and direction of certain diversification strategies (e.g., relocation of
suppliers). In collaboration with a large insurance company, we specify the data requirements
necessary to calculate the losses with the proposed model.
Deleris, Elkins, and Pate´-Cornell (2004) and Deleris and Erhun (2005), in one of the initial
quantitative approaches to modeling hazard event exposures in SCNs, concentrated on the im-
plementation and simulation of a single hazard event. We adapt parts of this general approach
but extend it in several ways. First, we do not limit ourselves to disruptions caused by fire,
but allow a broad set of hazard events. This necessitates that we also specify the mechanics
as the interaction of hazard events not only on the firm-level but also across firms. Second, we
focus exclusively on losses from supply chain disruptions. Therefore, we obtain predictions on
losses from different hazard categories and provide managerial implications. Third, we intro-
duce definitions and theoretical concepts as stochastic processes in an accurate and complete
way. The vast majority of contributions and deduced managerial recommendations in the liter-
ature are of normative nature, anecdotal or case study-based. For instance, a firm that seeks to
take advantage of economies of scale in its inbound supply chain by pursuing a single sourcing
strategy concurrently might suffer from an increased negative impact of supply side disruptions.
The premise that diversification reduces risk seems to be intuitive when we think of portfolio
theory. However, it is insufficient in the context of SCN’s substantiated quantification. To our
knowledge, the majority of previous research has focused on a simple setup of buyer-supplier
relationship, thus neglecting the structure of the SCN (as highlighted by Choi and Wu (2009)).
Ultimately, it is not obvious whether the evolving network structure exacerbates or mitigates
the effects of those hazard events on the production process and profitability of the firm. On
the one hand, a diversified supplier structure-e.g., across countries or more generally across dif-
ferent hazard events-can be helpful to dampen the impact of single production disruptions. On
the other hand, the linkages among firms induce contagion effects-i.e., single disruptions prop-
agate, and therefore the consequences may be more pronounced and harmful. Thus, a better
understanding of the described mechanics and how supply chain design affects the inherent risk
exposure is very important.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the existing literature. The formal model
is then introduced and described in Section 3. In Section 4 we implement the model and ana-
lyze some stylized examples. Section 5 elaborates on the implications for managerial practice.
Finally, we give an overview of the relevant findings and draw conclusions.
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2 Literature review
In recent years a growing number of researchers and practitioners have put supply chain risks
on their agendas, motivated in particular by catastrophic events that have disrupted economies
and supply chains around the globe. Banks (2006) provides a comprehensive analysis of catas-
trophic risk management from the perspective of the financial industry. However, it is not only
prominent ‘macro’ events that lead to costly supply chain disruptions. A substantial body of
recent literature reports on events at the supply chain level that resulted in serious problems for
the involved firms (e.g., Norrman and Jansson (2004); Kleindorfer and Saad (2005)). Numerous
proposals for best practices and guidelines for risk mitigation and business continuity planning
that aim to create secure, robust, and/or resilient supply chains have been published recently
(e.g., Chopra and Sodhi (2004); Tang (2006); Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, and
Handfield (2007)). The influence of disruptions on the performance of the supply chain is inves-
tigated, for instance, by Chen and Yano (2010). Reactive strategies for supply chain disruption
management are studied by Shao and Dong (2010). Their findings support the application of re-
active strategies to supply chain disruptions by supply chain managers, and provide guidance to
minimize the loss of profits and customers during the disruption. The negative effects of supply
chain disruptions on operational performance are investigated by Hendricks and Singhal (2005).
They find that firms which experience supply chain disruptions report on average 6.92% lower
sales growth, 10.66% higher cost and 13.88% higher inventories. Moreover, during the two-year
time period after the disruption announcement, these indicators do not improve. Mitigation
and contingency strategies are thoroughly discussed by Tomlin (2006). With a discrete Markov
process to model supply chain disruptions, the author compares the effectiveness of different
risk mitigation strategies in a simple setup with one focal firm and two suppliers. Depending on
the length of the disruption, mitigation, rather than contingent rerouting, tends to be optimal
if disruptions are rare.
More relevant for our work is the literature concerning SCNs and their analysis as complex
systems. The literature draws on different areas of economic research. First, we use basic con-
cepts and definitions for describing networks. Jackson (2010) gives a very extensive overview of
the economic and social network literature. Here, we are not primarily interested in the forma-
tion of networks, but in the consequences and managerial implications of given SCNs. Cossin
and Schellhorn (2007) present a model of credit risk in a network economy. Based on the ex-
ample of the U.S. automotive industry, they develop a structural model of cash-flow risk that
causes interdependencies between firms. In the context of SCN dynamics, Mizgier, Wagner, and
Holyst (2012) examine how companies default. Their paper is based on the agent-based sup-
ply chain model proposed by Weisbuch and Battiston (2007) and further studied by Battiston,
Gatto, Gallegati, Greenwald, and Stiglitz (2007) in the context of bankruptcy propagation and
credit relations. The authors use an agent-based modeling approach to describe the interaction
among heterogeneous agents. The main goal of this technique is to gain insights on how the
behavior of the system arises from interactions between autonomous agents. Another focus in
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this research area is the optimal design of SCNs in uncertain economic environments. Klibi,
Martel, and Guitouni (2010) present a review of optimization models proposed in the literature
and provide the foundations for a robust SCN design methodology. They highlight the need
for new SCN multi-hazard modeling techniques necessary for efficient decision making under
uncertain conditions.
Another trend in the literature is the calculation of problem-inherent losses for network struc-
tures. Nagurney and Qiang (2009) present a comprehensive study of the network approach
to deal with interdependencies and uncertainties in economic and social networks. In the fi-
nance context the work of Egloff, Leippold, and Vanini (2007) incorporate interfirm relations
of obligors in a structural credit risk portfolio model explicitly. They show that the portfolio
loss distribution exhibits significantly higher risk compared to conventional models. Operational
activities that are essential to a bank’s business model (business continuity management) are
modeled and studied in Leippold and Vanini (2005). Instead of incorporating network topolo-
gies explicitly, another common approach to capture default dependencies in credit portfolios
is to use copula functions (Li (2000)). Wagner, Bode, and Koziol (2009) apply this approach
to supplier networks and illustrate the significant impact of default correlation in a supplier
portfolio. In a simple setup of a network with one stage of suppliers, Babich, Burnetas, and
Ritchken (2007) recommend that once the suppliers are chosen, reducing their correlation will
be advantageous. For example, they may attempt to sell to different customers, use different
production technologies and/or procure from different raw material sources in order to reduce
exposure to common country-specific risks or common catastrophic events.
Deleris, Elkins, and Pate´-Cornell (2004) and Deleris and Erhun (2005) explicitly study sup-
plier networks where disruptions in the production process are modeled in reduced form. Their
main idea is to introduce two separate models, a hazard model for describing the disruptions on
the firm level and an operations model that incorporates the network topology by characterizing
the interaction between the firms in the SCN. For the integration of these building blocks, they
employ Generalized Semi-Markov Processes (GSMP), on which we give more details later in the
paper. The estimation of the loss distribution is then conducted via a Monte-Carlo (MC) sim-
ulation. The former paper focuses on disruptions caused only by fires and hence their analysis
does not reflect the actual risk of each firm in the network, where various types of risk exist. In
the latter work the set of hazard events is extended and the risk assessment (loss of volume) is
based on a flow model of the network. Both papers give a short overview of the model and state
the flexibility and generalizability of this approach using a simple example of an actual supply
chain but do not present any managerial implications.
3 Modeling approach
In this part we introduce the terminology and formal description regarding the SCN under
consideration, disruption risks, associated severities and the interaction of all these elements.
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3.1 Supply chain network structure
A SCN is a complex system of interconnected firms consisting of suppliers, focal firms, distrib-
utors and customers. The loss distribution arising from disruptions in the focal firms’ supply
chain is the subject of our investigation. The general network structure is depicted in Figure
1. We can imagine a globally active company like Procter & Gamble (P & G) with suppliers
S21
S22
S23
S11
S12
S13
F01
F02
F03
Upstream - Flow of Orders (Funds)
Downstream - Flow of Production
Stage 2 Suppliers Stage 1 Suppliers Focal Firms Distributors(Retailers) Customers
Figure 1: The supply chain network structure
located in different parts of the world. In our example P & G will be the focal firm and our
aim would be to map the structure between P & G and its suppliers. Since P & G is operat-
ing in a complex market with many suppliers, who are able to deliver the same goods, P & G
can choose among them (single vs. multi-sourcing strategy) and negotiate different contracts.
Those contracts specify the amount of parts delivered, time, quality, cost and other factors that
influence the type and intensity of the buyer-supplier relationship. P & G’s suppliers can also
deliver to other companies in the market, which makes the supply chain network highly complex
and difficult to study. The chain of suppliers ends up at the tier of the raw material suppliers.
The flows across the supply chain network can occur in two directions (we exclude feedback
loops):
• upstream: from the customer to the raw material suppliers (flow of information or funds)
and
• downstream: from raw material suppliers to the customer (flow of production),
where we focus on the downstream case. Moreover, we can distinguish between value-adding and
non-value adding units. By value adding units we understand nodes in the network where ac-
tivities like operations (production), inbound/outbound logistics, marketing and sales (demand)
and services take place, as opposite to the non-value adding units like warehouses.
Our SCN F ∪S = {F01, F02, . . .}∪{S11, S12, . . . , S21, . . .} consists of |F ∪S| = N agents divided
into focal firms F and suppliers S on different tiers denoted by Skl where k indicates the tier
and l the number of the supplier on the specific tier. In the following we only consider one focal
firm F01. The relationships between the firms are described by a directed graph associated with
the adjacency Ξ = (ξij)i,j=1,...,N . The entry ξij represents the purchasing volume sourced by
firm j from firm i, expressed as the percentage of the total order per time unit. It can also be
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interpreted as the exposure of j to i, because if supplier i suffers a production disruption the
ordered products cannot be delivered and the buying firm j will be negatively affected. Note
that the first row corresponds to the volume the focal firm purchases from its suppliers. The
network structure is assumed to be static. The matrix collects the direct business dependencies
reporting the maximum exposure of a firm (business volume) if a disruption in one of the neigh-
boring firms occurs. The impact of disruptions on stages farther in the network is not considered.
In the following example we introduce a simple fundamental network structure which accompa-
nies us through the paper to illustrate different concepts of the modeling approach.
Example 3.1. We study a SCN with six agents: one focal firm F01 with three suppliers in
the first stage S11, S12, S13 and two suppliers’ suppliers S21, S22 (second stage). The network
structure is depicted in Figure 2. The matrix Ξ is given by
Ξ =

0 0 1 0.8 0.6 0
0 0 0 0.2 0.4 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.7
0 0 0 0 0 0.2
0 0 0 0 0 0.1
0 0 0 0 0 0

. (1)
S21 S11
S22
S12
100%
F01
70%
20%
S13
10%
40%
80%
60%
20%
Figure 2: A sample supply chain network with with two stages of suppliers.
First, in the last row of Ξ we see that the focal firm F01 does not sell any products to agents within
the network. For our purpose to study the downstream risk for this focal firm all connections to
possible clients to F01 are naturally not considered. F01 herself receives all products or necessary
components from all three direct suppliers, where for instance ξS11F01 = 0.7 or ξS13F01 = 0.1 (fifth
row). A disruption in the production process of firm S11 (S13) can induce a 70% (10%) reduction
of delivery volume of F01. On the other hand, for S11 all necessary components are sourced from
103
supplier S21, for S12 components are sourced 80%, 20% from supplier S21, S22 respectively.
3.2 Disruption risk: frequency and severity
The hazard model characterizes the timing and severity of disruptive events on operations on
the firm level (independent of the network). In the first part we introduce the necessary and
allowedly complicated notation. We describe the timing of these events in each node under
certain assumptions, then the severity or impact. We use the terms hazard event and disruption
risk interchangeably. The realization of a hazard event is then called the supply chain disruption.
The finite set E = {e1, . . . , eE} collects all possible events of all suppliers in the network; Ej
denotes the set of hazard events for node j ∈ S. By definition E = ⋃j∈S Ej . As in Wagner
and Bode (2006) we distinguish two types of disruptions: events that impact a specific firm
(idiosyncratic), and those with impacts across multiple firms (systematic). In formulae, the
intersection of firm hazard event sets across firms is not necessarily empty, i.e., Ej ∩ Ei 6= {}.
For instance, two firms located at the south coast of the US identify ‘hurricane’ and ‘machine
malfunction’ as hazard events. The latter hazard event is idiosyncratic whereas a hurricane has
an impact on the production of both firms and is called systematic. The term systematic is
only used for the simultaneous dependence of different firms in the network on the same hazard
event and not the simultaneous impact because of interfirm links (contagion). A production
disruption in node j ∈ S triggered by an event ei ∈ Ej is described by the following properties2:
• disruption times, the points in time when a supply chain disruption occurs,
• recovery times, the time required to resolve the disruption,
• interarrival times, the time between successive malfunctions of the supply chain,
• direct costs at the node of the disruption, e.g., repair or property damage, and indirect
costs, losses of production (in percentage terms) for connected nodes.3
Hazard events ei ∈ Ej are assumed to take place according to a Poisson process (N eij,t)t>0 with
intensity λeij and state space N0. After a disruption occurs the firm needs a random amount of
time to resume the production process. Recovery times (Reij,n)n∈N are described by a sequence
of independent and identically distributed (iid.) and positive random variables, where we set
reij = E[R
ei
j ]. As soon as production starts, this process is again exposed to new disruptions.
According to the assumption about Poisson distributed disruptions, active times are exponen-
tially distributed, i.e., Aeij,n ∼ exp(λeij ), for all n ∈ N. As illustrated above, hazard events can be
both firm-specific and systematic, influencing the production processes of more than one firm
2In reduced form credit risk modeling it is usual to assume exponentially distributed waiting times for the next
default (see for instance Lando (2009)), where at that time the creditor realizes directly a loss (credit amount
minus recovery). For our setting this would imply that at one point in time production is interrupted, costs
occur and already in the next time step the problem is solved and production can continue, which is of course
unrealistic. Therefore we think that the interruption time structure of a certain event can be better modeled by
a renewal-reward process
3Note, the terms direct and indirect costs are also used in the accounting literature, but with a different meaning.
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simultaneously. The sum of the recovery and active times between two disruptions is termed the
interarrival time. The whole time structure for a hazard event ei ∈ Ej is given by (see Figure 3):
0 < T eij,1 < T
ei
j,2 = T
ei
j,1 +R
ei
j,1 +A
ei
j,2 < T
ei
j,3 < . . . < T
i
j,m < T. (2)
The random sequence T eij,m = X
ei
j,1 + . . .+X
ei
j,m with X
ei
j,m = T
ei
j,m − T eij,m−1 is termed a renewal
process, where the random variable T eij,m is the m
th disruption time for event ei and firm j. Costs
for a specific event are also represented by a sequence of positive iid. random variables, where
the direct costs of event ei for node j are denoted by DC
ei
j and are reported in absolute terms,
while (ICeij,n)n∈N denotes the sequence of production reductions in percentage terms per unit
time. The direct costs occur at node j, at which the process is disrupted. Indirect costs emerge
for the direct neighboring firms of supplier j as a result of the purchasing volume relationships
between the firms. Each random variable is associated with a respective density f(x). We
assume that the renewal-reward processes ((N eij,t)t>0, λ
ei
j ) are independent across all ei ∈ Ej and
cost processes (Reij , DC
ei
j , IC
ei
j ) are independent across all j ∈ S in addition. Note that the tuple
(Reij , DC
ei
j , IC
ei
j )ei∈Ej ,j∈S describes only the firm-specific impact of a hazard event, because, in
general, the impact of disruptions differs across firms due to differences in organization, financial
structure, business continuity management etc.
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Figure 3: Basic disruption time structure of event ei with costs IC
ei
j,n, recovery times R
ei
j,n,
interruption times T eij,n, active times A
ei
j,n and interarrival times X
ei
j,n.
3.2.1 Hazard events with no impact on recovery times
For the special case in which recovery times are non-stochastic and identical across hazard
events, i.e., Reij,n = r for all ei ∈ Ej and n ∈ N, the disruption process can be described as a
superposition of Poisson processes. Let (Xj,n)n∈N be an independent family of interarrival times
with parameter λj =
∑
ei∈Ej λ
ei
j and F (Xj,m ≤ b) = 1− e−λj(b+r), b ∈ R. Tj,n is the time of the
n-th disruption of firm j. We set
Tj,n : =
n∑
m=1
Xj,m and N
j
t := #{n ∈ N0 : Tj,n ≤ t} (3)
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as the counting process for firm j, independent of the specific hazard event. Under normal
circumstances, we must rely on MC simulation for the analysis since recovery times are random
and vary across hazard events. Here we impose this strong assumption to obtain a compact
expression.
3.2.2 Hazard events with an impact on recovery times
One can argue that disruptions during the recovery time do not influence the interruption status
of the firm (as seen in Subsection 3.2.1) or that the occurrence of a hazard event during the
recovery time just destroys the recovery progress and therefore the repair process starts again
with the fixed time. Therefore the recovery time will be prolonged randomly (see Figure 4).
The production process of firm j is disrupted by hazard event e2 following a fixed recovery time
of re2j . During this time a second event e1 occurs and the recovery process start again with r
e1
j .
Also the third event e3 interrupts the build up period. Not till then the production process can
continue. The random recovery time starting at disruption time τ e11 = Tj,1 is then given by
Rei1 = r
e2 + ∆τ e12 + ∆τ
e3
3
= re2 + Z1,
where the prolonged recovery time (Zn)n∈N is a r.v. dependent on the number of diruptions
during the recovery periods, which is random. 
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Figure 4: Firm specific disruption time structure when disruptions of hazard events e1 and e3
during the recovery time are anticipated. The total recovery time is prolonged randomly.
3.3 Loss dispersion
Besides concentrating on the event frequency we have to incorporate the impact of these dis-
ruptions (severity). How disruptions propagate through the network will be the topic of this
subsection. Correlations across nodes in the network are established due to two factors: system-
atic risk, in which the intersection of firm specific hazard event sets is not necessarily empty, and
contagion, in which the network naturally produces interfirm dependency, allowing idiosyncratic
disruptions to disperse through the network and affect other firms.
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Indirect costs - one stage
The impact of systematic hazard events can be partially described by (4). The total indirect
costs in relative terms of hazard event ei with respect to direct neighboring firms (not only the
focal firm) in the deterministic network up to time t are given by:
TICei(t) :=
∑
{j∈S|ei∈Ej}
N
ei
j,t∑
k=1
ICeij,k R
ei
j,k
(∑
l>j
ξjl
) . (4)
In equation (4) all firms with an exposure regarding hazard event ei are collected. The result is
given in relative terms, i.e., the entries of Ξ are given in percentage terms of delivery volume.
To obtain the absolute loss of one hazard event one has to add the absolute values of volume for
any firm which is influenced by a disruption of node j.
Example 3.2. Coming back to our SCN of Example 3.1. We introduce additionally a subset
of hazard events ES11 ∩ ES21 ⊆ E with ES11 = {eh, edS11} and ES21 = {eh, edS21}. Firms S11 and
S21 have exposure to a firm specific hazard event and one common event (hurricane). We are
interested in the indirect costs of these hazard events. We assume for a horizon of 180 days
the following realizations in Table 1. During the period under consideration only one hurricane
edS21 e
h edS11
N
edS21
S21,t
= 0 Ne
h
t = 1 N
edS11
S11,t
= 2
k = 1 ICe
h
S11,1
= 0.3 IC
edS11
S11
= 0.5
ICe
h
S21,1
= 0.5
Re
h
S11,1
= 12 R
edS11
S11,1
= 3
Re
h
S21,1
= 40
k = 2 IC
edS11
S11,2
= 0.6
R
edS11
S11,2
= 4
Table 1: Realizations for indirect costs in relative terms, recovery times and hazard frequency for
firms S11 and S21. The considered hazard events are E = {edS11 , edS21 , eh}. The first two events
are firm specific, the last affects both firms with different magnitude.
occurs. However, the impact on node S21 is quite dramatic. Only 50% of the operations can be
continued for the next 40 days. The indirect downstream costs of the hazard event hurricane eh
can be calculated in line with equation (4):
TICe
h
(t) : =
∑
j∈{S11,S21}
ICe
h
j,1 R
eh
j,1
(∑
l>j
ξjl
)
= 0.3× 12× 0.7 + 0.5× 40× (1 + 0.8 + 0.6).
To sum up, the hazard event eh affects nodes S11 and S21 in the SCN. During 180 days a
hurricane occurs once and induces a business reduction in node S11 of 30% for 12 days. S11 is
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one of the suppliers of F01 (ξS11F01 = 0.7) which results in losses for F01 of 0.3 · 12 · 0.7, analog
for node S21.
Propagation mechanism
For the second aspect of correlated losses, we must define a mechanism that allows disruptions
that occur on farther stages to affect other firms in the network including the focal firm. The
n−th power of the matrix Ξ power of the matrix describes the impact on firms from respective
suppliers on the n-th stage exclusively (without disruptions on intermediate stages). We assume
that there is no inventory to absorb parts of potential supplier disruptions; this implies that losses
are transferred without friction. In practice, disruptions occur simultaneously across nodes in
the SCN. We incorporate the effects of each disruption event and associated losses separately but
impose the constraint that aggregated losses do not exceed the indirect losses of direct neighbors;
i.e., for each disruption, we follow the complete path in the network. Hence, the propagation of
losses from one stage to the next is restricted to the maximum loss of the nearer (or next) stage.
Example 3.3. We illustrate the propagation of losses (see Figure 2) with
Ξ1 =

0 0 1 0.8 0.6 0
0 0 0 0.2 0.4 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.7
0 0 0 0 0 0.2
0 0 0 0 0 0.1
0 0 0 0 0 0

and Ξ2 =

0 0 0 0 0 0.92
0 0 0 0 0 0.08
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

,
where Ξ2 is just Ξ1 squared. If we consider Ξ2 we see that node S21 is indirectly linked to the
focal firm F01. If a disruption in S21 occurs the neighbors S11, S12 and S13 are directly affected
(first row of Ξ1) and therefore through the direct links from the first stage also the focal firm.
The entry ξ2S21F01 = 0.92 characterizes this propagation of losses through the network. Let us
assume that S21 as well as S12 are dependent on e
h. So, the occurrence of this event induces
disruptions in both nodes, where we assume that the recovery time is set to one for both firms
but ICe
h
S21
= 0.5 and ICe
h
S12
= 0.1. Then the costs for F01 induced by e
h can be calculated by
V e
h
F01 = IC
eh
S21R
eh
S21ξS21S11ξS11F01
+ min{ICehS21Re
h
S21ξS21S12 + IC
eh
S12R
eh
S12ξS12F01 , R
eh
S12ξS12F01}
+ ICe
h
S21R
eh
S21ξS21S13ξS13F01
= 0.5× 0.7 + min{0.5× 0.8× 0.2 + 0.1× 0.2, 0.2}+ 0.5× 0.6× 0.1
= 0.35 + min{0.1, 0.2}+ 0.06
= 0.51.
The correlation structure of disruptions in the network is very important for the shape of the
loss distribution. Below, we discuss the impact of two basic diversification strategies that aim to
decouple existing linkages and therefore to mitigate exposure due to high correlation. We distin-
guish the dependency reduction on one stage (vertical) and across two stages (horizontal). Our
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interest is whether, and under which conditions, management may choose a network structure
that can improve the risk exposure of the focal firm.
Vertical diversification
Example 3.4. We illustrate the aspect of common hazard events on aggregated losses for the
focal firm in a simple setting. We compare two cases: first, we calculate the total loss of focal
firm F01 assuming that there exist only two suppliers with ES11 ∩ES12 = {eh}; one corresponding
disruption process, which is identical for both firms, N e
h
t with λ
eh; no recovery time, purchasing
volumes of ξS11F01 = ξS12F01 = 50% each and IC
ehS11 (t) = IC
ehS12 (t) = 1 for all t– i.e., if a
disruption occurs, losses of 100% occur for the focal firm. Then, we investigate the case, in
which one of the firms is relocated and both firms are exposed to different (independent) hazard
events that occur with the same probability. All other assumptions are still in place. Formally,
ES11 = {eh1}, ES12 = {eh2} and N e
h1
S11,t
, N e
h2
S12,t
independent and λe
h
= λe
h1
S11
= λe
h2
S12
. In the first
case, the expected total loss4 up to time t is given using Wald’s equation,
E[Vt] = E[
Ne
h
t∑
k=1
(ξS11F01 + ξS12F01)] = E[N
eh
t ] = λ
eht
and the variance is given, using the law of total variance
Var[Vt] = E[Var[Vt|N eht ]] + Var[E[Vt|N e
h
t ]]
= E[N e
h
t Var[IC
eh
S11 ]] + Var[N
eh
t E[IC
eh
S11 ]]
= Var[1]E[N e
h
t ] + E[1]
2Var[N e
h
t ]
= λe
h
t.
Analogously, we easily obtain the expected loss for the second case:
E[Vt] = E[
1
2
Ne
h1
S11,t∑
k=1
ICe
h1
S11,k +
1
2
Ne
h2
S12,t∑
k=1
ICe
h2
S12,k] =
1
2
(λe
h1
S11 + λ
eh2
S12)t = λ
eht.
Using the independence of both processes the variance is given by
Var[Vt] =
1
4
t(λe
h1
S11 + λ
eh2
S12) =
1
2
tλe
h
.
The relocation of one firm to an area in which the firm is exposed to the same risk in terms of
expected losses and variance induces the same expected total loss Vt but a 50% reduced variance
for the focal firm. Therefore, the loss distribution in a framework with less correlation exhibits
a lower dispersion. We thus expect fatter tails for highly correlated networks.5
4Vt is of course well known under the term compound Poisson process.
5Due to the independence of the processes the calculations can be easily extended to N firms where the variance
is reduced to zero in the limit (diversification effect).
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Horizontal diversification
In Example 3.4, we have seen that diversification on one stage can be very successful in reducing
uncertainty. If we also anticipate the effects of other stages, the situation is different: if the
production of a firm in the SCN totally breaks down, in Example 3.3 firm S12, all simultaneous
disruptions one stage before, so losses from the suppliers S21 and S22 are totally irrelevant for
the focal firm because there is no propagation. This is an extreme case because the loss potential
is directly wiped out. However, clear statements in favor of diversification are more difficult, as
shown in the simulation results below.
Example 3.5. We consider one path in a two-stage supplier network, comprising supplier S11
on tier one, S21 on tier two and the focal firm F01. We conduct an analysis similar to that in
Example 3.4, but investigate the effects of diversification across stages. In the first case, all firms
are dependent on the same hazard event eh with corresponding disruption process (N e
h
t , λ
eh). In
case of a disruption, the recovery time is one day for all times and events. The expected loss is
given by
E[Vt] = E[
Ne
h
t∑
k=1
min{ICehS21,k ξS21S11ξS11F01 + ICe
h
S11,k ξS11F01 , ξS11F01}]
= E[
Ne
h
t∑
k=1
ξS11F01 min{ICe
h
S21,k ξS21S11 + IC
eh
S11,k, 1}]
= λe
h
t ξS11F01E[min{ICe
h
S21ξS21S11 + IC
eh
S11 , 1}]
= λe
h
t ξS11F01
( ∫ 1
0
x fC(x) dx+
∫ ∞
1
fC(x) dx
)
(5)
where fC(x) denotes the density of the r.v. C = IC
eh
S21
ξS21S11 +IC
eh
S11
. By writing the sum as the
product of expected values, we implicitly assumed that the Poisson and indirect cost process are
independent. Moreover, we omit the index k indicating that the r.v.s are identically distributed.
Losses are bounded above by λe
h
tξS11F01, the maximum loss of the nearest connection to the focal
firm weighted by the expected number of disruptions.
In the second case, we assume that both suppliers are dependent on two different hazard events
eh1 in S21 and e
h2 in S11. We obtain
E[Vt] = E[
Ne
h1
S21,t∑
k=1
ICe
h1
S21,k ξS21S11ξS11F01 +
Ne
h2
S11,t∑
k=1
ICe
h2
S11,k ξS11F01 ]
= ξS11F01
(
λe
h1
S21tξS21S11E[IC
eh1
S21 ] + λ
eh2
S11tE[IC
eh2
S11 ]
)
(6)
In the special case, in which all intensities are equal, equation (6) can be rewritten as
E[Vt] = λ
ehtξS11F01
(
E[ICe
h1
S21 ]ξS21S11 + E[IC
eh2
S11 ]
)
. (7)
Relocation of a supplier (on a different stage) in order to decouple the stochastic dependence is
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obviously reasonable considering the expected losses in equations (5) and (7) if the term within
the brackets of the latter formula is smaller than it was in equation (6). For this we have to
consider the size of indirect costs of both firms but also changing intensities. The interesting
result is that a relocation of a supplier should not be considered if the expression within the
brackets is greater than one, while if the expected loss of S11 is relatively small, the potential of
losses above the threshold is small and therefore reducing the correlation structure may be an
option. For the variance we refer to the calculations in Appendix B.
4 Implementation
4.1 Simulation setting
Up to this point, we have calculated single loss realizations in idealized examples with the aim of
illustrating particular aspects and mechanics of our modeling approach, but have not employed
the aspects of randomness and the interaction of the model input parameters. In this section, we
implement a sufficiently simple example of SCN configuration and generate a loss distribution
for the focal firm via Monte Carlo simulation. This allows the study and comparison of the
impacts of different network topologies and modeling approaches on the loss distribution. Our
results are presented in terms of expected losses and established tail risk measures such as Value
at Risk or Expected Shortfall.
We always consider the same global network structure depicted in Figure 2 and described by
the adjacency matrix (1) (for reference of a similar network design, see Cossin and Schellhorn
(2007)). At the beginning of each simulation run, we incorporate only the first stage of suppliers.
In the next step we also account for the second stage. After assuming total disruptions (indirect
costs of 100%) we run simulations with and without varying indirect costs as described in Sub-
section 3.2. We will see that the model specification is of utmost importance for determining
the loss distribution. Note that we do not work with a calibrated model where we can make
conclusions about absolute losses. We instead conduct a comparative statics analysis in which
we describe consequences for the focal firm in relative terms (i.e., relative to other models or
network presettings). With the results of this analysis, we infer managerial implications in the
next section.
The time horizon is set to 180 days and we perform 1000 MC iterations. We investigate dif-
ferent specifications for the time structure of events which were described in Subsection 3.2.1
and following. First, we assume that there exist two idiosyncratic hazard events for each firm.
Therefore, we simulate two independent Poisson processes with corresponding intensities on each
node; the intensities are shown in the first columns of Table 2. The intensities refer to days as
time units. A value of 0.01 corresponds to a mean arrival rate during 180 days of 1.8 malfunc-
tions. Later we also incorporate a third hazard event eh, which can have an impact on more
than one firm in the network. This hazard event eh has an impact on all suppliers; we simulate
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one Poisson process with intensity 0.001 so that the time structure (T e
h
j,m)m of this event is the
same for all firms. In our analysis we distinguish between events which have no impact during
the recovery time and those where there is the possibility of randomly prolonged recovery times
(PRT), as described in Subsection 3.2.2. We set the average recovery time reij of 3 days for
hazard events e1 and e2, and 14 days for hazard events eh for all firms. We report mean and tail
risk measures Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall (ES) for a confidence level of 95%.
Hazard Event 1 Hazard Event 2 Hazard Event 3
λ
e1S11 = 0.01 λ
e2S21 = 0.01 λ
ehS21 = 0.001
λ
e1S12 = 0.015 λ
e2S22 = 0.005 λ
ehS22 = 0.001
λ
e1S13 = 0.01 λ
e2S11 = 0.01 λ
ehS11 = 0.001
λ
e1S21 = 0.02 λ
e2S12 = 0.05 λ
ehS12 = 0.001
λ
e1S22 = 0.01 λ
e2S13 = 0.01 λ
ehS13 = 0.001
Table 2: Intensities of hazard events.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Loss dispersion across stages
In the first step, we calculate the losses for focal firm F01 induced by disruptions from the three
direct suppliers S11, S12, S13 and ignore the second stage. The SCN is described by the following
weighting matrix:
Ξ =

0 0 0 0.7
0 0 0 0.2
0 0 0 0.1
0 0 0 0
 . (8)
When we run simulations with the standard values of intensities reported in Table 2, we do not
observe significant differences in reported risk measures with and without prolonged recovery
times (PRT). The average difference in all risk measures between the two categories is around
1.3%. The results are summarized in Table 3. For the PRT case there is a probability of 5%
that losses (days of production stoppage) for the focal firm during 180 days exceed the VaR of
22.2. Therefore, we conduct simulations with intensities five times higher (see Table 4). With
Type Mean VaR ES
One-stage without PRT 14.64 21.6 24.16
One-stage with PRT 14.88 22.2 24
Table 3: Loss distribution characteristics: one stage.
these new intensities, we observe naturally an absolute increase in all risk measures. Now, the
average increase in the respective risk measures is with 3.2% more pronounced when we allow
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PRT. For making reasonable statements about the risk status of a given supply chain network
the classification of hazard events and their interaction is fundamental.
Type Mean VaR ES
One-stage without PRT 56.26 67.7 70.68
One-stage with PRT 57.9 70.3 72.88
Table 4: Loss distribution characteristics: one stage (increased intensities).
Disruptions can now take place in the first stage and in the nodes S21, S22. Here, we follow
Subsection 3.3 where we described the dispersion of losses emerging on stages of higher order
than the first. As an analogue to the first step, we also incorporate the possibility of prolonged
recovery times. The results are reported in Table 5. The fact that we include more than one risk
factor (as compared to the model proposed by Deleris, Elkins, and Pate´-Cornell (2004)) offers
the possibility of investigating the effects of interacting hazard events. The introduction of the
second stage induces a higher and a broader spectrum of losses. All values increase up to 2.5%
on average when PRT is allowed.
Type Mean VaR ES
Two-stage without PRT 24.2 34.32 36.9
Two-stage with PRT 24.8 35.32 37.7
Table 5: Loss distribution characteristics: two stages.
4.2.2 Correlation effects
In this subsection, we investigate more closely the interaction of the two correlation effects
between nodes in the network, namely the dependency created by hazard events across firms
(nonempty intersection between the event sets) and by the network topology. The question at
hand is whether a diversification strategy is always the dominant decision rule for managing the
SCN. We show that this is not necessarily the case. In Example 3.4, we show analytically that
the dependence reduction between two firms on the same stage (vertical diversification) induces
a more centered (measured in variance terms) loss distribution for the focal firm. In Example
3.5, we calculate expressions for expected value and variance of losses if the focal firm has one
supplier on the first stage and that supplier has itself one supplier on the second stage. These
two horizontally aligned firms are either both dependent on the same hazard event or on different
hazard events (horizontal diversification). We see that clear implications in this general setting
are not possible since many parameters influence the results. In particular, the transmission
mechanism from one stage to the other stage is pivotal for this analysis.
We simulate Example 3.4, i.e., in the first case we have two independent Poisson processes
with the same intensity equal to 0.2. In the second case we have one process with intensity
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0.2 but affecting both suppliers. Purchasing volumes are uniform and equal to 50% for each
supplier. The results are presented in Table 6.6 The variance resulting from simulations is equal
to 16.56 in the former case and 29.53 in the latter. From that result we would infer that risk can
be reduced by making suppliers independent of the same hazard event (vertical diversification).
Next, we investigate the correlation effects embedded in the complete network structure. We
Type Mean VaR ES Variance
Independent processes 32.6 39.5 40.75 16.56
One process 33 42 44.26 29.23
Table 6: Loss distribution characteristics: two suppliers one stage.
assume that all suppliers (first and second stage) are located in the same geographical region
and therefore exposed to the same type of hazard event. If the event strikes, all facilities are
damaged and suffer from production delays of 14 days. We compare the loss distributions of the
same system, where the disruption processes are either independent or replaced by one hazard
event. The results are reported in Table 7. All risk measures are slightly higher in the case
Type Mean VaR ES Variance
Independent processes 28 41.6 47.47 63.3
One process 26.3 40.4 46.2 61.2
Table 7: Loss distribution characteristics: two stages.
where disruptions are independent. On the one hand, we can attribute this observation to the
fact, that the sum of intensities of the independent Poisson processes is higher than the intensity
of a single Poisson process; thus, it leads to a relatively higher number of disruptions. On the
other hand, in a situtation where disruptions are perfectly correlated, the propagation mecha-
nism prevents the complete contagion of losses through the network.
Next, we study how the uncertainty of production reductions affects the loss distribution. For
that purpose we compare the disruptions occurring across both stages, where expected produc-
tion reductions on the first stage is lower than the production reductions on the second stage.
Correspondingly, we generate random numbers from a Gaussian distribution with a mean of 0.2
and standard deviation of 0.1 on the first stage, and Gaussian with a mean of 0.8 and standard
deviation of 0.1 on the second stage.
Table 8 illustrates how misleading it can be when managers make their decision based only
on the mean value of losses. The correlation effects are first visible, when we compare the
tails of the distribution. In contrast to the case before, where we assumed that production
6The small deviations from the analytical results can be justified by the number of simulations and the implemented
random number generator, where we have to discretize the numbers to obtain disruption ‘days’ for a reasonable
interpretation.
114
Figure 5: Loss distributions for a sample 2-stage supply chain network. The original structure:
independent processes (a) and one process (b). The reconfigured structure: independent
processes (c) and one process (d).
Type Mean VaR ES
Independent processes 18.4 30.48 34.37
One process 17.34 31.64 37.38
Independent processes reconfigured 13.87 22.84 25.05
One process reconfigured 14 26.75 31
Table 8: Loss distribution characteristics: sample network with 2 stages. Indirect costs varying
between stages.
breaks down completely, the relative difference in VaR and ES is significantly higher here, when
disruptions occur simultaneously. The reason is again the propagation mechanism, because
now the cost potential of disruptions on neighboring stages is not wiped out directly. Based
on the observed results, we then make a hypothetical decision about the reconfiguration of the
purchasing volumes in the network. We decide to switch the business volumes between supplier
S11, S12 and S13. The new business volumes are: ξ11 = 0.1, ξ12 = 0.2 and ξ13 = 0.7. The effects
of this decision can be seen in the decrease of all risk measures. The decision to reconfigure the
network was correct, as it lowered the company’s overall risk exposure.
5 Implications and conclusions
5.1 Managerial implications
In this section, we draw some important conclusions for SCN design in general and for the
managerial decision process in particular. First, we notice that the classification and estimation
of the frequency and severity of hazard events is important for an accurate loss distribution
calculation. In the case of high frequency events, the random prolongation of recovery times
contributes to the tails of the loss distribution. Firms should establish an internal database
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for losses due to disruptions in its SCN. All entities in the SCN including the focal firm can
be characterized by the set of geographic, operational and financial metrics that should be
gathered and evaluated prior to the risk management process. In collaboration with a large
insurance company, we specify the data requirements necessary to calculate the losses with
the proposed model (see Table 6). Moreover, to obtain full information about risk, one also
needs the corresponding likelihood of occurrence and the impact of all possible hazard events.
The probability and recovery time for each event have to be estimated by expert knowledge
and time series analysis (see for instance the International Disaster Database of the Centre for
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), or loss data providers like Algorithmics,
Inc.). Another lesson we can learn from our theoretical and numerical results concerns the
diversification of supplier portfolios and networks. The chief contribution of our method is the
bottom-up reconstruction of the correlations caused by the dependencies among suppliers. The
reconfiguration of the supplier base in the first stage can lead to substantial improvement of the
focal firm’s risk profile. In some simple cases it is very clear that the more suppliers we have
in our portfolio the lower the variance induced by disruptions. In cases where we add more
stages to the existing SCN, however, conclusive statements are not straightforward. In these
simulations, we observed situations where the accumulation of negative network effects exceeds
the benefits of diversification on the first stage of suppliers. This approach helps us to quantify
the impact of a reconfigured SCN on the company’s risk exposure. This observation contributes
to the understanding of diversification effects, studied by Babich, Burnetas, and Ritchken (2007)
and Wagner, Bode, and Koziol (2009).
5.2 Conclusions
The goal of this paper is to propose a model for the calculation of the loss distribution from
disruptions in a SCN. This gives supply chain risk managers an efficient tool for the quantifica-
tion of supply chain risks, intrinsically embedded in the existing network design. We employed
generalized semi-Markov processes for simulating disruptions in each node and these disruptions’
interaction across the network, where we allowed a broad set of hazard events. For the modeling
of disruptions from single hazard events, we used renewal-reward processes. Their structure
corresponds to the typical production disruption we have in mind. Moreover, we described
and categorized different classes of hazard events with respect to interaction issues. This ap-
proach allowed us to incorporate the correlation effects among different groups of hazard events.
Most of the modeling aspects were illustrated in simple examples where we also inferred some
implications regarding expected losses or distributional properties in stylized situations. After
implementing the model and simulating a hypothetical supply chain network with different spec-
ifications, we can infer some interesting and also counterintuitive results. With this framework,
we hope to reproduce the mechanisms of disruption propagation across the network in a more
sophisticated and transparent way than in conventional models. A better understanding of how
supply chain design affects supply chain risk exposure enables operations managers to structure
their supply chains in a way that is in line with the firms’ willingness to take risks and thus
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facilitates better supply chain design decision making.
We are certainly aware of the limitations of our model. The simulations we carried out were
based on idealized examples and have not been validated with real data. Nevertheless, the mod-
eling environment and parameter values have been discussed in several meetings with insurance
and manufacturing companies’ representatives to assure the plausibility of our approach. Nat-
urally, the next step would be to apply our model to a real-world case. The matrix notation
of purchasing volumes allowed us to describe the topology of the supply chain network in a
very efficient manner. Here, we concentrated only on the downstream risk arising from sup-
plier disruptions. In general, however, firms are also exposed to upstream risks originating from
customers (e.g., customer defaults or demand fluctuations). In our framework, we decided to
keep the number of parameters to the minimum; therefore, we did not include inventories either,
which may have had a moderating effect on the recovery times. As we mentioned in the intro-
duction, the heterogeneity of disruptions is an important and difficult issue to tackle. Here, we
assumed that the recovery times and intensities for the hazard process are deterministic. One of
the possible extensions of our model is to introduce stochastic recovery times and time-varying
intensities. The evolution of the supply chain network is another interesting aspect of SCNs
observed in reality. Agent-based simulation techniques are an interesting research avenue, as
well. In terms of risk-weighted network optimization, it would be desirable to automatize the
reconfiguration algorithm, thus providing managers with an efficient software tool for supply
chain network design, one which is not solely based on the reduction of production costs but
takes into account the risk profile of the company.
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Appendix A Data requirements
Figure 6: Data requirements.
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Appendix B Calculations
To Example 3.5 – calculation of the variance: first, all firms are dependent on the same hazard
event eh with corresponding disruption process (N e
h
t , λ
eh). The following expression gives the
total loss for the focal firm F01 up to time t:
Vt =
Ne
h
t∑
k=1
min{ICehS21,k ξS21S11ξS11F01 + ICe
h
S11,kξS11F01 , ξS11F01} =:
Ne
h
t∑
k=1
M e
h
k . (9)
We set again C = ICe
h
S21
ξS21S11 + IC
eh
S11
and fC(x) denotes the corresponding density function.
Then we obtain again with the law of total variance where we neglect the index k because the
indirect costs are identically distributed:
Var[Vt] = E[Var[Vt|N eht ]] + Var[E[Vt|N e
h
t ]]
= E[N e
h
t Var[M
eh ]] + Var[N e
h
t E[M
eh ]]
= Var[M e
h
] E[N e
h
t ] + E[M
eh ]2 Var[N e
h
t ]
= λe
h
t
(
Var[M e
h
] + E[M e
h
]2
)
= λe
h
tE[(M e
h
)2]
= λe
h
tξ2S11F01
(( ∫ 1
0
x2 fC(x) dx+
∫ ∞
1
fC(x) dx
))
(10)
In the second case, we assume that both suppliers are dependent on two different hazard events
eh1 in S21 and e
h2 in S11. For the total loss we write
Vt =
Ne
h1
S21,t∑
k=1
ICe
h1
S21,k ξS21S11ξS11F01 +
Ne
h2
S11,t∑
k=1
ICe
h2
S11,k ξS11F01
=:
Ne
h1
S21,t∑
k=1
M e
h1
S21,k +
Ne
h2
S11,t∑
k=1
M e
h2
S11,k. (11)
Both terms are independent, because we assume only recovery times of one day and therefore
no interaction between both hazard events. Therefore we calculate just the sum of the variances
and again using the law of total variance:
Var[Vt] = E[N
eh1
S21,tVar[M
eh1
S21 ]] + Var[N
eh1
S21,tE[M
eh1
S21 ]] + E[N
eh2
S11,tVar[M
eh2
S11 ]] + Var[N
eh2
S11,tE[M
eh2
S11 ]].
For the terms with eh1 (so firm S21) we obtain (analog as above):
E[N e
h1
S21,tVar[M
eh1
S21 ]] + Var[N
eh1
S21,tE[M
eh1
S21 ]] = Var[M
eh1
S21 ] E[N
eh1
S21,t] + E[M
eh1
S21 ]
2 Var[N e
h1
S21,t]
= λe
h1
S21tE[(M
eh1
S21 )
2].
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So, all in all we obtain the following expression:
Var[Vt] = λ
eh1 tE[(M e
h1
)2] + λe
h2
tE[(M e
h2
)2].
If we assume that the intensities are equal across hazard events eh = eh1 = eh2 we can write
Var[Vt] = λ
eht ξ2S11F01 (E[(IC
eh1
S21 ξS21S11)
2] + E[(ICe
h2
S11 )
2]).
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Abstract
In supply chain risk management, it is essential to identify firms that induce high losses due to supply chain
disruptions in a focal firm or the supply chain network as a whole (bottlenecks). In this paper, we describe
supply chain networks as complex systems of firms and their suppliers. We revisit some established
network measures and compare their predictions with a new methodology for detecting bottlenecks. In
this bottom-up approach, production disruptions on the firm level are modeled with stochastic point
processes, and a mechanism for the propagation of losses through the network is defined. The individual
firms’ emerging loss contributions to the total losses of the focal firm provide, then, an alternative risk-
adjusted measure. Our methodology and findings enable more informed and transparent decisions to be
made for optimal supply chain network design.
*K. Mizgier, M. P. Ju¨ttner, and S. M. Wagner (2013), ‘Bottleneck identification in supply chain networks,’
International Journal of Production Research (IJPR), 51 (5), forthcoming.
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1 Introduction
Supply chain networks (SCNs) are becoming larger and more densely interconnected, which
increases the inherent complexity and uncertainty of production. The pressure of increasing
competition and the possibilities of globalized markets have driven firms to outsource manu-
facturing globally to reduce inventories or economize the supply base. Although production
processes are becoming more efficient (for example, through technological advances, see Bryn-
jolfsson and Hitt 2000), the complexity of these networks makes it difficult to predict losses due
to production breakdowns in the supply chain. On the other hand, many of the lean initiatives
undertaken by the major car producers in the last two decades have striven to simplify supply
network structures and reduce both the number of tiers and the number of entities at each tier.
Indeed, much of the evident risk involves reduced diversification, albeit with a simplified struc-
ture. The correct assessment of the firm’s risk exposure embedded in the actual network design
is still a highly debated issue. Due to insufficient knowledge regarding the impact or correlation
of hazard events and the dispersion of losses through the network, it is unclear whether certain
network structures are more resilient or more susceptible to supply chain disruptions in single
or multiple nodes in the SCN. In particular, it is essential that focal firms identify their high-
risk suppliers. Supply chain risk managers are then able to reconfigure the network structure or
improve resilience by introducing additional inventories to mitigate or prevent contagious effects.
This paper compares a set of measures for the identification of bottlenecks in SCNs. First,
we revisit some established measures from social network theory, e.g., degree centrality or be-
tweenness, and analyze them in the SCN context. Second, we introduce a new methodology for
an efficient and accurate detection of firms in a SCN that potentially generate high losses for
a focal firm in the case of a disruption. We use a simple bottom-up approach, in which supply
chain disruptions are modeled on the firm level with stochastic point processes. A mechanism for
the loss propagation through the network is defined. We determine via Monte Carlo (MC) sim-
ulation the aggregate loss distribution for the focal firm. The loss contribution of the individual
firms and hazard events to total losses for the focal firm provide, then, a risk-adjusted measure.
These measures aim to condense the complex informational content of a given network topology.
However, it is crucial to our interpretation to consider the nature of the network connections.
In SCNs, these connections occur on different interaction levels, including information channels,
the flow of physical goods or, in our case, the loss dispersion induced by supply chain disruptions.
We interpret and compare the results of these measures in the context of loss dispersion. Our
findings support the need for an accurate methodology to identify firms in the SCN that greatly
impact the losses of the focal firm.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the existing literature. The SCN un-
der consideration is introduced in Section 3. In Section 4, we revisit centrality measures from
network theory and discuss their applicability in the supply chain risk management context. We
present our approach in Section 5. We discuss the results of both approaches in Section 6 and
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conclude in Section 7.
2 Literature review
Network theory has been widely applied in many research areas, spanning fields from the natu-
ral sciences (Dorogovtsev and Mendes 2003) to finance (Boss, Elsinger, Summer, and Thurner
2004), banking (Mistrulli 2011), economics (Allen and Gale 2000) and the social sciences (Gra-
novetter 2005). The network paradigm developed in the aforementioned areas is fairly new to
supply chain management (SCM). Nevertheless, we have observed a rapid growth in interest
and applications in this domain. One of the initial studies of supply chains as complex systems
was conducted by Macal (2003). Pathak, Day, Nair, Sawaya, and Kristal (2007) propose the
Complex Adaptive System (CAS) perspective to study the interrelations that are often inherent
in supply chain networks. Mizgier, Wagner, and Holyst (2012) develop an agent-based model to
examine the defaults of companies in a supply chain network. They show how the dynamics of
the relations among the supply chain members affect the system’s performance. Yang and Yang
(2010) study the role of postponement in supply chain risk management from a complexity per-
spective. Building on the normal accident theory, they conclude that in some circumstances the
introduction of postponement may add to the complexity of a system and, thus, make the sys-
tem inherently infeasible. Kumar, Tiwari, and Babiceanu (2010) analyze a mathematical model
for supply chain network design under uncertainty. Considering the problem’s complexity, they
apply various computational techniques to offer potential solutions to robust supply chain design.
Several measures for bottleneck identification are proposed in the literature. Craighead, Black-
hurst, Rungtusanatham, and Handfield (2007) derive six propositions relating the severity of
supply chain disruptions to supply chain characteristics, such as density, complexity and node
criticality. Their underlying theory involves identifying the most important nodes based on the
measurement of information and the material flows between them. In this paper, we will concen-
trate on some basic definitions of node importance. Degree centrality and betweenness centrality
are discussed by Freeman (1977). Opsahl, Agneessens, and Skvoretz (2010) propose modified
algorithms and definitions, including the weighted connections. The use of these measures has
many applications in social and natural sciences, such as scientific collaboration networks (New-
man 2001) or biological metabolic networks (Ravasz, Somera, Mongru, Oltvai, and Baraba´si
2002). The algorithms used for the calculation of the centrality measures can be found in Bran-
des (2008). A thorough overview of the social network approach to SCM is provided by Borgatti
and Li (2009). They state, that network theory has the potential to enrich SCM research with
new tools and that network theory supports the creation of a coherent management science per-
spective. Choi and Kim (2008) and Choi and Wu (2009) use examples to show how to manage
suppliers based on their embeddedness in the network and the strategic formation of triads.
Such a view of the supplier base encourages buying firms to develop more realistic policies and
strategies when managing their suppliers. Diabat, Govindan, and Panikar (2011) apply graph
theory to illustrate the conceptual relationships between the risks in a food supply chain. An
125
empirical investigation of a supply chain network has been carried out by Kim, Choi, Yan, and
Dooley (2011). Their framework relates key social network analysis metrics to supply chain
networks and proposes SCM-specific implications. They also provide a comprehensive literature
review for readers interested in topics related to social networks.
3 Supply chain network structure
A SCN V = F ∪ S = {F01, F02, . . .} ∪ {S11, S12, . . . , S21, . . .} consists of |F ∪ S| = N agents
divided into focal firms F and suppliers S on different tiers denoted by Skl where k indicates the
tier and l the number of the supplier on the specific tier. In the following we only consider one
focal firm F01. The relationships between the firms are described by a directed graph associated
with the adjacency Ξ = (ξij)i,j=1,...,N . The entry ξij represents the purchasing volume sourced
by firm j from firm i, expressed as the percentage of the total order per time unit. It can also
be interpreted as the exposure of j to i, because if supplier i suffers a production disruption
the ordered products cannot be delivered and the buying firm j will be negatively affected.
Note that the first row corresponds to the volume the focal firm purchases from its suppliers.
The matrix collects the direct business dependencies reporting the maximum exposure of a firm
(business volume) if a disruption in one of the neighboring firms occurs. The impact of disrup-
tions on stages farther in the network is not considered. Additionally, we introduce the matrix
A = (aij)i,j=1,...,N where the entry aij is one if there is an edge from a node i to a node j,
otherwise zero. The network structure is assumed to be static.
We use the following stylized example throughout the rest of the paper. We study a supply chain
network with six agents: one focal firm F01 with three suppliers in the first stage S11, S12, S13
and two suppliers’ suppliers S21, S22 (second stage). The network structure is depicted in Figure
1. The matrix Ξ is given by
Ξ =

0 0 1 0.8 0.6 0
0 0 0 0.2 0.4 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.7
0 0 0 0 0 0.2
0 0 0 0 0 0.1
0 0 0 0 0 0

. (1)
First, in the last row of Ξ we see that the focal firm F01 does not sell any products to agents within
the network. For our purpose to study the downstream risk for this focal firm all connections to
possible clients to F01 are naturally not considered. F01 herself receives all products or necessary
components from all three direct suppliers, where for instance ξS11F01 = 0.7 or ξS13F01 = 0.1 (fifth
row). A disruption in the production process of firm S11 (S13) can induce a 70% (10%) reduction
of delivery volume of F01. On the other hand, for S11 all necessary components are sourced from
supplier S21, for S12 components are sourced 80%, 20% from supplier S21, S22 respectively. We
assume total disruptions (indirect costs of 100%). This stylized example has been discussed in
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S21 S11
S22
S12
100%
F01
70%
20%
S13
10%
40%
80%
60%
20%
Figure 1: A sample supply chain network with with two stages of suppliers.
several meetings with our industry partners to ensure the feasibility of our approach.
4 Network theory-based measures for bottleneck identification
In graph theory and related applications measures exist to determine the rank or centrality of
nodes according to their position in the network (see, for example, Freeman (1977), Brandes
(2008), Opsahl, Agneessens, and Skvoretz (2010)). A thorough overview of centrality metrics
and applications in SCM can be found in Kim, Choi, Yan, and Dooley (2011). Though these
measures help identify the relative importance of nodes in a network, the context of the appli-
cation is important. We apply the centrality measures to our simple example and describe some
of the shortcomings when using the respective measure for risk management purposes. For the
calculation and visualization of these measures, we use Visone, a freeware software developed at
the University of Konstanz.1
For the SCN (V, A) one of the simplest measures is the degree centrality CD(v) (outdegree)
for vertex v ∈ V. V (with |V| = N) is the set of nodes representing the firms and A describes
the edges representing the business weightings between the firms. CD(v) is defined as follows:
CD(v) =
deg(v)
N − 1 , (2)
where deg(v) is the number of links node v directs to others (downstream), i.e., these firms are
directly affected by a disruption of the production process in v. Several shortcomings exist: first,
the network topology is only partially anticipated because only direct links are relevant; second,
the weightings of the edges are not considered; third, the risk of a disruption in each node is
not included. The results are depicted in Figure 2. Not surprisingly, supplier S21 is the most
important node for our sample SCN, due to its high connectivity with other suppliers. Following
Freeman (1977) the betweenness centrality counts the fraction of shortest paths between each
1For more information see www.visone.info.
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Figure 2: The relative importance of the suppliers, based on the outdegree.
pair of vertices that are passing through a given node v ∈ V, in the following formula:
Cb(v) =
∑
s 6=v 6=t∈V
σst(v)
σst
, (3)
where σst is the number of shortest paths from s to t, and σst(v) is the number of shortest
paths from s to t that pass through a vertex v. The result is standardized by dividing it
Figure 3: The relative importance of the suppliers, based on the betweenness centrality measure.
through the term (N − 1)(N − 2), which corresponds to the maximum number of edges in
a directed graph. The theory behind this concept is that nodes between others are central
because they can influence the flow of information. In the case using weighted links, Brandes
(2001) proposes to invert the weights while computing betweenness centrality. He also introduces
several computationally efficient algorithms. In the case of the propagation of losses in an
SCN, this measure appears misleading because firms on the outermost stage of the SCN are
not identified as risk sources. The information flow, in contrast to loss dispersion, should be
sustained, and, therefore, disruptions in the nodes present between other nodes are central. For
the area of loss propagation in SCNs, these disruptions can have a positive effect because the
contagious effects are absorbed. On the other hand, if losses are not absorbed, these nodes in
the network appear to be central the loss propagation. In Figure 3, we see that the group of
suppliers S12, S13 is marked with the highest values of centrality. For a supply chain manager,
this result indicates that this group of suppliers is highly clustered, and is, therefore, vulnerable
to collective disruptions. The next measure, which can be used to support identification of the
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Figure 4: The relative importance of the suppliers, based on the weighted betweenness centrality
measure.
most critical suppliers is called radiality (Valente and Foreman (1998)). Radiality is the degree
of supplier’s connectivity when reaching out into the network. It is defined as follows:
R(k) =
∑
j 6=k RDjk
N − 1 , (4)
where RDjk is the reverse distance computed from the geodesic between suppliers j and k,
measured on outdegree ties and N is the network size. High radiality means that fewer steps, on
average, are necessary for that supplier to deliver goods to everyone else in the network through
her distribution channels (outdegree ties). In terms of supply chain disruptions, a supplier with
high radiality would affect more firms in the network if a disruption occurred. The results of
analysis based on node radiality are depicted in Figure 5.
Figure 5: The relative importance of the suppliers, based on the radiality measure.
5 Alternative method for bottleneck identification
In this section, we first model the frequency and severity of disruptions on each firm’s production
process. In the second subsection, we define the loss propagation through the network. In the
last subsection, we implement the model for the examplary SCN, generate via MC simulation
a loss distribution for the focal firm and study the impact (loss contribution) of single nodes to
the total average loss of the focal firm. In performing these measures, we are able to identify
potential bottlenecks in the focal firm’s supplier structure, i.e., the suppliers with the highest
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loss contributions.
5.1 Disruption risk: frequency and severity
We model disruption risks (frequency and severity) on the firm level using renewal-reward pro-
cesses. We first identify potentially disruptive supply chain events for each node in the network.
The finite set E = {e1, . . . , eE} collects all possible events of all nodes in the network; Ej then
denotes the set of possible hazard events for firm j. We can distinguish two types of disrup-
tions: firm-specific and systematic hazard events. The term systematic is only used for the
simultaneous dependence of different firms in the network on the same hazard event and not the
simultaneous impact due to interfirm links (contagion). The variable (N eij,t)t>0 ∈ N0 is the ran-
dom number of disruption event ei that occur during the period [0, t] in node j. The probability
function is denoted is by pjei,t(k) = P[N
ei
j,t = k]. The cumulative density function (cdf) for the
loss frequency is then obtained by
P[N eij,t ≤ n] =
n∑
k=0
pjei,t(k). (5)
It is necessary to determine the theoretical distribution and parameters that best fit to the
empirical distribution of documented historical occurrences. The disruption frequency is often
modeled by a Poisson or negative binomial distribution. In contrast, the impact of a disrup-
tion differs across firms because firms have different approaches to organization and business
continuity management. The required time for firm j to resolve the disruption due to event
ei ∈ Ej is described by the sequence of independent and identically distributed (iid.) and posi-
tive random variables (r.v.) (Reij,n)n∈N. The production losses for connected nodes are denoted
by (ICeij,n)n∈N. These indirect costs represent reductions in production in percentage terms and
per time unit. After a disruption occurs, the firm requires a random amount of time to resume
the production process. As soon as production restarts, it is exposed to new disruptions. The
entire time structure for a hazard event ei is depicted in Figure 6. In the simulations in Section
5.3, we will assume that production times are exponentially distributed (Poisson process) and
are independent across hazard events. According to this assumption, it is possible to aggregate
these processes. We also impose the assumption that recovery times are non-stochastic and
identical across hazard events, i.e., Rei = r for i = 1, . . . E.
The total indirect costs in terms of an exposure to hazard event ei, with respect to direct
neighboring firms in the network up to time t are given by
TICei(t) :=
∑
{j∈S}|ei∈Ej}
N
ei
j,t∑
k=1
ICeij,k R
ei
j,k
(∑
l>j
ξjl
) . (6)
In equation (6), all firms with an exposure regarding hazard event ei are collected. The result
is given in relative terms, i.e., the entries of Ξ are given as percentages of purchasing volume.
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Figure 6: Basic disruption time structure of event ei with production reduction IC
ei
j,n, recovery
time Reij,n, interruption time T
ei
j,n, active time A
ei
j,n and interarrival time X
ei
j,n.
5.2 Correlated business interruptions - dispersion
We have previously described the effects on the hazard event- and firm-specific levels. The
complete hazard model for one firm j is consequently given by aggregating the events within
the set Ej . The correlation across the nodes in the network is established by two channels: first,
the intersection of firm-specific hazard event sets is not necessarily empty, i.e., Ej ∩ Ei 6= {}
(systematic risk) and second, the network naturally produces a dependency structure across the
firms. Therefore, idiosyncratic disruptions also propagate through the network and affect other
firms (contagion).
For the second aspect of correlated losses we must describe how disruptions that occur in the
farther stages propagate and affect other firms in the network. In this way, they also affect the
focal firm through the existing connections. As mentioned previously, Ξ describes the business
weightings between the firms. The n−th power of the matrix Ξ power of the matrix describes
the impact on firms from respective suppliers on the n-th stage exclusively (without disruptions
on intermediate stages). We assume that there is no inventory to absorb even part of the
potential supplier disruptions. This implies that losses are transferred without any friction.
The simultaneous occurrence of disruption events is also important: we anticipate the effects of
each disruption event and the associated losses separately, but we must impose the constraint
that aggregated losses will not exceed the indirect losses of direct neighbors, i.e., we follow the
complete path of each disruption through the network. Hence, the propagation of losses from
one stage to the next stage is restricted to the maximum loss of the ‘nearer’ (or next) stage.
5.3 Simulation setting and loss contribution
The SCN is given by the adjacency matrix in equation (1). The time horizon is set to 180 days,
and we perform 1000 MC iterations. First, we assume that two idiosyncratic hazard events exist
for each firm. Therefore, we simulate two independent Poisson processes with corresponding
intensities on each node. The intensities can be found in the first column of Table 1. Later,
we also incorporate an event eh (third column) that can have an impact on more firms in the
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network. In our case, eh has an impact on node S13 and S21, i.e., here we simulate one Poisson
process with intensity 0.001. Therefore, the time structure (T e
h
j,m)m of this event is the same
for both firms. We keep the ‘initial’ average recovery time reij of three days for hazard events 1
and 2 (HE1 and HE2) and 14 days for hazard events of type 3 (HE3). We calculate the relative
Hazard Event 1 Hazard Event 2 Hazard Event 3
λ
e1S11 = 0.01 λ
e2S21 = 0.01 λ
ehS21 = 0.001
λ
e1S12 = 0.015 λ
e2S22 = 0.005 λ
ehS22 = 0.001
λ
e1S13 = 0.01 λ
e2S11 = 0.01 λ
ehS11 = 0.001
λ
e1S21 = 0.02 λ
e2S12 = 0.05 λ
ehS12 = 0.001
λ
e1S22 = 0.01 λ
e2S13 = 0.01 λ
ehS13 = 0.001
Table 1: Intensities of hazard events.
contributions to the total losses of the focal firm by each node. We identify their impact on
the focal firm in two ways. First, we simulate disruptions for only the single nodes and assume
that losses propagate through the network unhindered (not mitigated or amplified), i.e., all other
firms in the SCN are operating without disruption in their own production facilities. An efficient
computation of these losses is made possible by using the squared business weighting matrix.
Second, we simulate the actual hazard events in all the nodes and separate the contributions
from the different nodes from the total losses of the focal firm. It is possible that disruptions
from second stage suppliers do not affect the focal firm because simultaneous disruptions on
the first stage prevent the loss propagation. This computation enables us to evaluate the each
supplier’s contribution to the risk exposure and its impact on the focal firm, which is not iso-
lated but embedded in the risk environment of the whole SCN. In the following figures, the blue
(green) bars depict the first ‘isolated’ (second ‘embedded’) case.
We start by simulating only the idiosyncratic events HE1 and HE2, thus neglecting correla-
tion effects induced by HE3. In Figure 7 we summarize the mean percentage value of losses
coming from a given supplier as the measure of nodes’ importance. We can see that indepen-
dent of the way we map losses to separate nodes, the supplier S21 accounts for approximately
36% of the losses, followed by nodes S11 (28%) and S12 (27%). If we look more closely at the
values of suppliers’ hazard event intensities, we observe that the network structure is the crucial
factor in bottleneck identification. Although the intensities of the hazard events are comparable,
the business volumes and the interconnectedness of a given node play the most important roles.
Our approach clearly shows that supplier S21 has the highest relevance in terms of generated
losses and its impact on the focal firm’s risk exposure. Next, we add the systematic hazard event
HE3 to analyze the influence of the correlated disruptions. As Figure 8 shows, the distribution
of the blue bars representing the first case does not change much. This is obvious because the
effect of HE3 is only observable when hazard events of different firms interact which is assumed
not to occur in the isolated case. Instead, the difference in the distributions of the green bars
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Figure 7: The relative importance of the suppliers, based on the percentage loss contribution.
Green bars: embedded, blue bars: isolated.
Figure 8: The relative importance of the suppliers, based on the percentage loss contribution with
a correlated hazard event. Green bars: embedded, blue bars: isolated.
is very clear. Suppliers S21 and S11 are now nearly equal. It comes from the fact that the
losses generated on the second stage are not propagated when disruptions occur on both stages
simultaneously, which is always the case for HE3. In a third step, we demonstrate the impact
Figure 9: The relative importance of the suppliers, based on the percentage loss contribution
(modified business weightings). Green bars: embedded, blue bars: isolated.
of a changed network structure. We can imagine that a focal firm influences the first stage of
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suppliers. The firm decides to switch purchasing volumes. In this setup, the network struc-
ture remains as it was, but purchasing volumes from suppliers S11, S12 and S13 are adjusted
to 20%, 70% and 10%, respectively. We present the results for HE1 and HE2 in Figure 9 and
with the additional systematic hazard event in Figure 10. In both settings supplier’s S12 loss
Figure 10: The relative importance of the suppliers, based on the percentage loss contribution
with correlated hazard event (modified business weightings). Green bars: embedded, blue bars:
isolated.
contribution surges and it becomes the only bottleneck with approximately 66%. The impact
of an additional systematic hazard event is similar to the results of the previous analysis. The
technique presented above can be applied to any given network structure, providing managers
with a risk-based optimization support tool for decisions about the supply chain network design.
6 Comparison of results, discussion and implications
Table 2 summarizes the results of the introduced network theory-based measures from Section
4 (first four columns) and juxtaposes the outcome with the loss contributions (LCs) of our sim-
ulation approach (last two columns). The bold letters indicate the node in the SCN with the
highest importance according the respective measure. We observe in our calculations that the
results for bottlenecks in the SCN vary massively dependent on the centrality measure or risk
structure. Node S21 is identified as the most important production facility using degree central-
ity or the first case (two independent hazard events) of our approach. Betweenness centrality
predicts that the nodes on the first stage S12 and S13 are the prominent facilities in the SCN.
For the management of SCNs this variety of results is not desirable. As pointed out before: the
concrete context, interpretation and application is essential for using these measures and not
being misled. Table 3 compares directly the results of ‘isolated’ and ‘embedded’ LCs when we
incorporate an additional systematic hazard event. Adding the third hazard event to each node
which represents a correlated disruption, changes the picture dramatically. Now, the impact in
the embedded case of S21 and S11 are almost the same. Such a change in the risk structure does
not change the results of the established measures.2 The ‘real’ inherent SCN risk changed but
2One possibility to incorporate this feature one would have to adjust the weightings by the risk of hazard events.
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Table 2: Comparison of bottleneck measures - benchmark case: CD(v) (Cb(v)) denotes the
outdegree centrality (betweenness centrality) measure introduced in equation (2) ((3)). The bold
letters indicate the node with the highest importance according the respective measure. Loss
contribution (LC) is the loss for the focal firm F01 induced by node v relative to total losses.
Node v CD(v) Cb(v) Cb(v) Radiality Loss Contribution (LC) LC
(uniform) (weighted) (isolated) (embedded)
F01 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 - -
S11 0.2 0.17 0.54 0.20 28.18% 29.17%
S12 0.2 0.42 1.68 0.20 26.84% 27.77%
S13 0.2 0.42 2.83 0.20 4.06% 4.20%
S21 0.6 0.00 0.00 2.80 37.62% 35.87%
S22 0.4 0.00 0.00 1.50 3.30% 2.98%
can only be identified by our advanced approach. Though the isolated case is superior in the
computational simplicity it does not capture important aspects of the SCN risk. All in all, we
think that simple measures can be helpful to obtain first indications regarding possible bottle-
necks but these are definitely not conclusive. Table 4 presents the results of the modified SCN.
Table 3: Comparison of bottleneck measures - benchmark case with a systematic hazard event:
The table presents the simulation results for the isolated (embedded) loss contribution (LC) if
all nodes in the SCN are additionally exposed to a systematic hazard event HE3.
Node LC (with HE3) LC (with HE3)
(isolated) (embeddeed)
F01 - -
S11 29.04% 32.49%
S12 23.60% 26.40%
S13 4.24% 4.75%
S21 39.78% 33.68%
S22 3.34% 2.68%
With the exception of the weighted Cb(v) all other network theory-based measures stay the same.
Table 4: Comparison of bottleneck measures - modified case without and with a systematic
hazard event: This table shows the results for the modified SCN. The first two columns present
the loss contribution when the nodes are dependent on firm-specific hazard events, the last two
columns when an additional systematic hazard event is introduced.
Node LC LC LC (with HE3) LC (with HE3)
(isolated) (embedded) (isolated) (embedded)
F01 - - - -
S11 5.48% 5.72% 6.01% 6.64%
S12 63.89% 66.73% 59.80% 66.10%
S13 2.76% 2.89% 3.07% 3.40%
S21 22.81% 20.24% 25.67% 19.72%
S22 5.06% 4.42% 5.44% 4.15%
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6.1 Discussion
From our results, we infer that each of the measures presented in this paper has both advantages
and limitations, as summarised in Table 5. Simple network theory-based measures can be helpful
in obtaining first indications regarding possible bottleneck identification, but these are definitely
not conclusive. The more advanced concepts, such as radiality, are capable of including the
entire network structure and following complete geodesic paths. Therefore, they contain more
information about the global network design. They are also superior in terms of computational
efficiency, as they do not require heavy numerical calculations. The main drawback of these
methods is that they do not capture the dynamic properties of the supply chain disruptions and
their propagation across the network. Here, our approach adds the most value, as it correctly
captures the risk exposure to different hazards and includes the topological features of the SCN.
Naturally, these improvements come at a cost. The performance of our method depends on the
complexity of the network and the number of hazard events that must be included in the MC
simulation. As we assume that waiting times between successive disruptions are exponentially
distributed, the running time of our algorithm depends heavily on the quality and efficiency
of the random number generators. Moreover, because the algorithms used to sort the graphs
depend on the number of nodes and edges in the network, the time complexity of the algorithms
will increase with the size of the network. After considering all these factors, we believe that
combining our proposed method with the network measures will achieve accurate bottleneck
identification to support supply chain risk management decisions. As computational power
rises, the running time of our algorithms should be acceptable, even when applied to large-scale
networks.
Table 5: Summary of measures for bottleneck identification.
Centrality measure Conceptual definition Advantages Disadvantages
Out-degree centrality The supplier is critical when
it is connected to a large
number of other suppliers
Easy to compute, can
be used as a first
measure of supplier’s
criticality
Measures only the impact on
the directly connected firms
Betweenness centrality The supplier is critical when
it lies between many other
suppliers
Includes the whole
network structure
Raw material providers are
not penalized even if critical
due to their position in the
network
Weighted betweenness cen-
trality
The supplier is critical when
it lies between many other
suppliers
Includes the whole
network structure
and business weight-
ings
Raw material providers are
not penalized even if critical
due to their position in the
network
Radiality The supplier is critical when
its reachability to other sup-
pliers is high
Includes the whole
network structure
Raw material providers are
penalized even if not critical
due to their position in the
network
Loss contribution approach The supplier is critical when
it generates the highest ex-
pected losses
Includes the whole
network structure
and all parameters of
disruption risk
Computational complexity
and high data requirements
136
6.2 Practical implications
Our study has several practical implications. First, the direct consequence of the presented
comparison between the established network measures and our proposed loss contribution ap-
proach is the careful use of all measures. In particular, the data requirements for the established
network measures are relatively low, and efficient algorithms already exist, which lends a great
advantage to our new approach. Firms are tempted to apply these approximate and sometimes
misleading indicators. Managers must always be aware of the respective purposes of each mea-
sure and operate with a set of different measures.
Second, the implementation of the appropriate approach necessitates the establishment of a
detailed loss database. Therefore, guidelines for reporting and documenting losses from supply
chain disruptions within the SCN (also across different firms) are required. The firm requires
sufficient data about hazard events, respective frequencies, recovery times and corresponding
losses to calibrate the model. The fulfilment of this requirement is certainly ambitious. The
documentation and analysis of such a loss database is very helpful for sensibilising the work force
regarding inherent risks in the SCN and optimising production and supply chain operations.
Third, our new method provides operations and supply chain managers with an efficient tool
for the quantification of losses due to supply chain disruptions from single suppliers, both in
isolation and when embedded in the network structure. They can both identify the most critical
suppliers and estimate the potential impact of disruptions in absolute terms. These evaluations
may have two consequences. On the one hand, managers may monitor these firms accurately to
avoid the negative impacts caused by disruptions. They learn more about their business model,
the risks of their suppliers’ operations and locations and potentially have the ability to change
some of the parameters. On the other hand, the quantification of losses based on the model
input parameters allows managers to study the impact of reconfigured networks (as Figures 9
and 10 show). Our model can, therefore, be developed further, allowing for the automatisation
and optimisation of risk-weighted allocations of purchasing volume. Using a stepwise compari-
son of purchasing volumes sourced from each supplier, supply chain managers can optimise the
risk exposure of the entire SCN. A comparative statics analysis for all the input variables may
also be helpful in identifying both important nodes and their risk exposure.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a set of methods for identifying bottlenecks in an SCN. By incorpo-
rating the risk-specific features of the SCNs, we extend the set of measures proposed by Kim,
Choi, Yan, and Dooley (2011). We demonstrate that some methods based on network theory
may support the bottleneck identification process. However, they can also be misleading because
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they often focus only on a small part of the network or have been developed for a particular
application, not for supply chain risk management. Therefore, we propose an alternative method
of bottleneck identification that considers the features of modern supply chain networks. More-
over, we show that the reconfiguration of the supply chain network can offer substantial benefits
regarding the reduction of the company’s risk exposure in absolute terms. Using our bottleneck
identification scheme, supply chain risk managers can easily discover which suppliers are strongly
interconnected (critical) and pose the greatest threat to the focal firm. Our study is not without
its limitations. We run simulations on a simplistic and stylised supply chain network structure.
It would be desirable to test the measures on a real-world example and then to backtest the
simulation results. However, we discussed the network structure with industry representatives
to confirm the validity of the proposed model, and it is sufficiently complex for illustrative pur-
poses. For a similar network setup, please refer to the study by Cossin and Schellhorn (2007).
Nevertheless, we are aware of this limitation.
Our approach allows for further development of this model. Both the investigation of the net-
work theory measures and the loss contribution method enable researchers to explore several
research paths. It would be interesting from the network perspective to observe how the model
behaves when the network under investigation increases in size and complexity. As noted by
Brandes (2001), the fastest algorithms to compute the betweenness centrality and radiality mea-
sures require O(N+A) space and O(NA+N2logN) time, where N is the number of nodes and A
the number of edges in the network. Therefore, the computational complexity and efficiency of
the methods presented in this paper also present an interesting research avenue. We previously
assumed in the simulation that the connections are deterministic and fixed. The incorporation
of a more realistic, random graph may provide insight. Furthermore, the assumption of fixed
values of hazard event intensities may be relaxed to incorporate seasonal effects. In stressed
market phases, these intensities could increase, causing the picture to change fundamentally.
The analysis of SCNs under stress – including strongly increased intensities – should be consid-
ered as an additional valuation tool. Another aspect that has potential for improvement is the
integration of the risk structures of hazard events into existing network measures. One could
modify the business weightings by the corresponding values of risk parameters and obtain the
risk-adjusted network measures.
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